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Democracy is a regime which guarantees effective political participation of citizens and 
accountability of political leaders via, above all other mechanisms, free, fair and regular 
elections. A nondemocracy, accordingly, can be defined as a regime in which the 
opponents of the government cannot openly and legally organize into political parties in 
order to oppose the government in free and fair elections.1 Even when multiple parties 
are allowed, a nondemocratic regime lacks an arena of contestation sufficiently fair that 
the ruling party can be turned out of power.2
A leading student of democratization, Larry Diamond, stresses that “the distinction 
between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism
 
3 turns crucially on the 
freedom, fairness, inclusiveness, and meaningfulness of elections.”4
 
  
“Elections are ‘free’ when the legal barriers to entry into the political arena are low, 
when there is substantial freedom for candidates and supporters of different political 
parties to campaign and solicit votes, and when voters experience little or no 
coercion in exercising their electoral choices. … Elections are unfair and political 
systems descend into electoral authoritarianism when violations of the minimum 
                                                 
1 Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 
p.1. 
2 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1999), pp. 15-16.  
3 For various classifications of nondemocratic regimes see Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan. Problems of 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1996). Juan Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Fred 
Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, Vol.3 (1975), pp. 191-357. Larry 
Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1999). Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes” and Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of 
Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13, no.2 (2002). 
4 Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes,” p. 27 
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Diamond also notes that while an opposition victory is not impossible in such a regime, it 
requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what 
would normally be required for victory in a democracy.6
Nondemocratic regimes are, therefore, marked by the absence of a formal (or 
effectively functioning) institution available for the citizens to hold the rulers accountable 
for their policies and actions, and to remove them from office in case of mal-
performance. Under the conditions, one may inquiry, whether incumbents can stay in 
office and be totally unresponsive to the citizens’ interests. Bueno de Mesquita et al. put 
forward in their seminal work “The Logic of Political Survival” that “everyone in a 
position of authority wants to keep that authority and that it is the maneuvering to do so 
that is central to politics in any type of regime.”
  
7 Accordingly, they argue that “every 
leader answers to some group that retains her in power: her winning coalition.”8
 
 They 
define ‘the winning coalition’ as a group of people who control enough instruments to 
keep the ruler in office.  
 “The winning coalition is defined as a subset of the selectorate9 of sufficient 
size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership with political power over 
the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the 
society … This group controls the essential features that constitute political power in 
the system. In democracies the winning coalition is the group of voters who elect the 
leader; in other systems it is the set of people who control enough other instruments 
of power to keep the leader in office. If the leader loses the loyalty of a sufficient 




                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
7 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.,  The Logic of Political Survival (Cambridge, London: The MIT 
Press, 2005), pp. 8-9 
8 Ibid., p. 7. (Emphasis added) 
9 Selectorate: “We define the selectorate as the set of people whose endowments include the qualities 
or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining 
access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership… Membership in the selectorate is a 
necessary condition for membership in a winning coalition.” Ibid., p. 42.  
10 Ibid., pp. 51, 7-8. (Emphasis added) 
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Because the members of the winning coalition, by definition, have the political or 
economic power to keep the incumbent in or remove her from the office, the leader is 
directly accountable to them. Thus, responsiveness to the interests of the winning 
coalition is a necessary condition of political survival. To remain in office, in exchange 
for the support of the winning coalition, the leader responds to their interests and needs 
by providing them with public or private goods in various forms and amounts.11
 
 
“Leaders operating under certain institutional arrangements closely associated 
with republican government or democracy emphasize good public policies rather 
than establishing secret Swiss bank accounts because good policy—that is, policy 
that satisfies their crucial supporters—is essential to their personal political welfare. 
… [L]eaders working under institutional arrangements correlated with 
authoritarianism are wise to establish special privileges for their backers like the 
special stores party members enjoyed in Soviet Union.”12
 
  
Against these powerful assumptions, I posit that, in capitalist economies, 
responsiveness to the winning coalition is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
political survival; rulers, who are financially dependent on extraction from domestic 
resources (taxation), have to respond to the interests of the domestic capital owners and 
investors as well—regardless of whether they directly support the incumbent or not. 
Furthermore, I claim that in nondemocratic regimes, under certain conditions, 
responsiveness to the interests of capital owners can be regarded as a form of 
accountability—indirect accountability. In that regard, I reformulate the classical 
‘structural dependence of the state on capital’ argument in nondemocratic regimes, yet 
claim that contrary to its negative effect on a democratic government’s responsiveness to 
all citizens,13
                                                 
11 Specifically, the ratio of the winning coalition over the selectorate, i.e. the loyalty norm determines 
the kind and the amount of goods that is necessary to maintain support of the winning coalition. “In 
political systems characterized by small winning coalitions and large selectorates—as is common in many 
rigged-election autocracies—supporters of the leader are particularly loyal because the risk and cost of 
exclusion if the challenger come to power are high. Conversely, in political systems characterized by large 
coalitions and large selectorates—as is common in many democracies—supporters of the leader have weak 
bonds of special privileges and so are more willing to defect.”  Ibid., pp. 8, 19. 
 in nondemocracies, capital owners may have an important role to play in 
12 Ibid., pp. 7-8, 18. 
13 Dahl defines democracy as “a political system one of the characteristics of which is the quality of 
being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens.” Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and 
Opposition, p. 2. (Emphasis added.) 
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generating government responsive to a least a segment of the society, and hence, in an 
indirect way, may sow the seeds of political accountability in the long run  
The importance of capital owners does not reside in their political role; since not 
necessarily all capital owners directly (politically and economically) support the 
incumbents. Yet by investing and producing (simply for their own interests), and thus, by 
generating tax revenue for the state, they enable rulers to provide public or private goods 
to their supporters. That is, capital owners indirectly support the political survival of the 
rulers. Capital owners cannot directly remove the rulers from the office, either. However, 
in a capitalist economy investment decisions are to a great extent private; and, the 
willingness of capitalists to invest depends on their perception about the profitability of 
investment at present and in the future. That is, if capital owners anticipate unfavorable 
conditions they may hold investment (investment strike), or reallocate their money or 
business elsewhere (capital flight), which in turn halts or shrinks the size of economic 
activities from which the rulers extract their revenue (taxes). Accordingly, they can 
damage the ability of the rulers to provide public or private goods to their winning 
coalition. Due to the ‘revenue imperative’, hence, the rulers respond to the 
demands/interests of the domestic capital owners (at least, of those in the leading 
economic sector of their country) to avoid investment strike and capital flight. The main 
argument of the present study is, therefore, that when the ruler is financially dependent on 
extraction from domestic productive forces, and when those productive forces are strong 
and independent enough to ‘punish’ the ruler by exiting in case their interests are not 
met, government responsiveness to capitalists interests, to avoid their exit, can be 
regarded as a form of accountability.  
Political accountability refers to the relationship or correspondence between what 
citizens want and what government officials do. It is built on a mechanism of 
punishment, and is one of the paths which generate government responsiveness to 
citizens’ interests. In electoral democracies, this punishment mechanism is elections, by 
which citizens hold public officials accountable, in its basic form, for their past behavior. 
In the context of business-state relations, the punishment mechanisms are, in the words of 
 5  
Waterbury, “the twin weapons of investment strike and capital flight”.14
The idea that capital owners and investors have a central and determining role not 
only in the economy but also in policymaking finds its most radical form in the theory of 
‘structural dependence of the state on capital,’ which is widespread both among neo-
Marxists and neo-Pluralists. The adherents to this view do not draw distinction between 
different types of economic activity but see business/bourgeoisie as a unified actor—as 
capital. It simply departs from the fact that in a capitalist economy most investment 
decisions are made by private actors who respond both to market signals and expectations 
about the future government actions. Accordingly, this approach focuses on the 
constraints posed on the state by private control of financial assets and capital mobility.
 Capital owners 
may hold policymakers accountable either ex-post for the policies in effect (a backward-
looking reaction), or ex-ante for the effects of anticipated policies ex-post (a forward-
looking reaction). In other words, if the government loses credibility in the eyes of the 
capitalists, even before any policy detrimental to their interests is made, capitalists may 
well react to such an atmosphere of uncertainty and risk by withholding investment 
(investment strike), or even by reallocating their assets elsewhere (capital flight). 
Acknowledging such reactions ex-ante (or ex-post following exit) and making policies to 
avoid it (or to re-attract capital), I claim, can be regarded as a form of accountability to a 
segment of the society, and also as restriction on the policy-making power of the ruler. 
Therefore, to reiterate the argument of the presents study from an other perspective, I 
claim that if responsiveness to capitalist interests springs from their implicit or explicit 
(voiced) ‘exit-threat’ or enacted ‘exit’, then it can be regarded as a form of 
accountability—indirect accountability. Any responsiveness to capitalist interests in the 
absence of adequate bargaining-power of the private sector (i.e. in the absence of credible 
exit-threat or exit) should be regarded as a function of a different causal mechanism—
either external factors or structural reasons—but not accountability.  
15
                                                 
14John Waterbury, "From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts: The Political Economy of 
Authoritarianism and Democracy." in John P. Entelis, ed. Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 160-161. 
 
Among the neo-Marxists authors, Claus Offe, for example, says,  
15 Haggard, Stephan, Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, “Theories of Business and Business 
State Relations,” in Sylvia Maxfield and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing 
Countries (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997), p.38 
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“In a policy making process in which the state solves its own problems … those 
groups are strategically located which are in a position to obstruct successful 
policies. This is, under capitalist relationships of production, the class of owners of 
(money) capital. What this class basically does is to decide on the volume, place, 
time and kind of exchange processes to take place. Seen in this way, the political 
power of the capitalist class does not reside in what its members do politically (exert 
“power” and “influence” in the decision making process, etc.) but it resides rather in 
what its members can refuse to do economically (namely initiate exchange processes 
through buying labor power and fixed capital; i.e. invest."16
 
  
Fred Block similarly maintains that  
“In a capitalist economy the level of economic activity is largely determined by 
private investment decisions of capitalists. This means that capitalists, in their 
collective role as investors, have a veto over state policies in that their failure to 
invest at adequate levels can create major political problems for state manager.”17
 
  
Those defining business primarily as capital, assume that interest realization of 
capitalists proceed automatically; that is, they need not be organized and mobilize 
resources in order to influence policy decisions; uncoordinated private investment 
decisions effect policy outcomes. In other words, “business influence already occurs in 
the absence of political pressure—the mere threat of a decline in business confidence is 
sufficient to induce state managers to act in favor of business.”18 This idea is summarized 
by a neo-pluralist, Lindbloom, who argues that because the level of investment 
determines economic growth, government decision-making in a mixed economy is 
always constrained by anticipated private reactions.19
                                                 
16 Claus Offe, The Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formulation. In: Leon Lindberg (ed.), 
Stress and Contradiction in Contemporary Capitalism (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1975) citied in Adam 
Przeworski, State and Economy Under Capitalism (Chur, Switzerland : Harwood Academic Publishers, 
1990), p. 92. (Emphasis added.) 
 He says, “even the unspoken 
possibility of adversity for business operates as an all-pervasive constraint on government 
17 Fred Block, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist. Theory of the State,” Socialist 
Revolution, Vol. 7, No. 33 (1977) cited in Adam Przeworski and Michael Wallerstien, “Structural 
Dependence of the State on Capital,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No.1 (March 1988), 
p. 13.  
18 Volker Schneider and Marc Tenbuecken, “Business and the State: Mapping the Theoretical 
Landscape,” Paper presented at the IPSA Business-Government Roundtable (May 2002), p. 18.  
19 Charles Lindbloom 1984 cited in Haggard et al. “Theories of Business and Business State 
Relation,” p. 38 
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authority.”20 Thus, he argues that large companies are in control of government.21  In 
brief, both Marxists and neo-liberalists claim that “under capitalism all governments must 
respect and protect the essential claims of those who own the productive wealth of 
society.”22
In democratic regimes, government ‘responsiveness’ to business interests may work 
against realization of citizens’ preferences. That is, the interests of the majority might be 
curbed by those of the capitalists, and, thus, a democratic regime may turn into a 
‘bourgeois democracy’. Contrary to this important deficiency of capitalist democratic 
regimes, it is the claim of this study that in nondemocracies, capital owners may play an 
indirect role in restraining the unlimited policymaking power of the rulers. The 
importance of indirect accountability in nondemocratic settings, hence, hinges on the 
assumption that there might be a link from this kind of accountability to democratic 
accountability / democratization in the long run. As John Waterbury notes, owners of 
capital initially bargain to protect or advance their business activities;
 
23 that is, they do 
not necessarily promote democratic accountability.24 Accordingly, it is not theoretically 
reasonable to establish a direct link from responsiveness to capital owners’ voice and/or 
exit to democratization. However, scholars highlight two factors which may indirectly 
establish such a link in the long run: changing power relations and transfer of economic 
power to the private sector due to economic reforms, and formalization of habits of 
interaction between the government and citizens. Clement Henry, referring to the Middle 
East, for example, argues that although there is yet no direct evidence that financial 
reform sets the stage for democratic transitions, it seems plausible to suppose that altering 
financial flows will alter power relationships.25
                                                 
20 Charles Lindbloom, Politics and Markets: The World’s Political Economic Systems (New York: 
Basic Books, 1977), 178 cited in Schneider and Tenbuecken, “Business and the State: Mapping the 
Theoretical Landscape,” p. 18. 
 John Waterbury, arguing for the second 
path, holds that “as a kind of by-product of their bargaining for favorable policy 
responses from the state, [owners of capital] may foster habits of interaction between the 
21 Ibid., p. 19. 
22 Przeworski and Wallerstien, “Structural Dependence of the State on Capital,” p. 11.  
23 John Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 29 (Transitions to 
Democracy: A Special Issue in Memory of Dankwart A. Rustow), no.3, (April 1997), p. 395. 
24 John Waterbury, "From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p. 164.   
25 Clement M. Henry, “Crises of Money and Power: Transition to Democracy?” in John P. Entelis, ed. 
Islam, Democracy, and the State in North Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 178.  
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governments and citizens that can lead to a transition.”26 He even claims that “if 
democratic practice is to take root in the Middle East, it will be as the result of the 
formalization of this bargaining process.”27
While these theoretical claims also deserve quantitative evaluations, in this study I 
test the arguments underlying them. By using time-series cross-sectional data from 42 
non-democratic countries over the period of 2001 to 2007, I test whether rulers in 
nondemocratic countries respond to the interests of the capital owners in the leading 
economic sector of their countries, due to ‘credible exit-threat’ or ‘exit’ of the private 
sector. The results support that controlling for other structural and contextual factors 
which might bring about responsiveness to the leading sector’s interests in the absence of 
adequate bargaining-power of the private sector, ‘credible exit-threat’ and ‘exit’ 
generates government responsiveness—hence, indirect accountability. 
 
Because the sample of the study is composed of only nondemocratic countries, I am 
unable to make any argument whether the same relationships exists in democratic 
countries as well. Nevertheless, considering that the reason for focusing on business-state 
relations is primarily to investigate the prospects of an informal mechanism of 
accountability—hence possibility of limited government—in nondemocratic regimes, but 
not to analyze responsiveness to business interests per se, a generalization to democratic 
regimes is not relevant for the present study.  
* 
In the following chapter (Chapter Two), I present a model of indirect accountability 
by expanding on the conditions under which we can claim that the observed 
responsiveness of the rulers to the interests of capital owners can be considered as 
indirect accountability. I also present a literature overview on the connection of each 
condition to the notions of limited government and democratization. At the end of 
Chapter Two, I summarize the main hypotheses of the study, alongside the alternative 
hypotheses related to responsiveness to capitalist interests in the absence of ‘exit-threat’ 
or ‘exit’ of the private sector.  
                                                 
26 John Waterbury, "From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p. 36. 
27 John Waterbury and Alan Richardson, A Political Economy of the Middle East. (Colorado: 
Westveiw Press, 1998), p. 36.   
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In Chapter Three, I present the research design and the operationalization of the 
variables. Specifically, I explain the procedures of sample formation, determining the 
leading economic sector of each country covered by the sample, specifying the interests 
of the capitalists in those sectors, and measurement of the dependent and the independent 
variables.  
Chapter Four starts with a brief note on the characteristics and the related problems 
of time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) data, and expands on how these problems are 
addressed in this study. The second part of Chapter Four presents the results of the 
analyses for both main and alternative hypotheses.  
Finally, Chapter Five presents a summary of the arguments and findings, and 

































A MODEL OF INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
In this chapter, I present a model of indirect accountability by explaining the conditions 
under which responsiveness of nondemocratic rulers to capitalists interests could be 
considered as a form of accountability. I elaborate on each condition in connection with 
the notions of limited government and democratization.  
As mentioned before, this study argues that, under certain conditions, the autocratic 
power of a nondemocratic ruler can be restricted by domestic private business—as 
owners of capital and investment—due to ‘the revenue imperative.’ Rulers need revenue 
to meet the interests of their winning coalition. Except rentier states, the revenue 
available for a government is, to a great extent, determined by the health of the domestic 
economy; that is, whenever the economy grows, the prospects for greater revenue 
extraction (via taxes) also increases. In a capitalist economy, economic growth is greatly 
shaped by the investment decisions of capital owners. That is, as capitalists invest more, 
they stimulate economic growth; and a growing economy will yield not only higher tax 
revenues for the state due to expanding income base on which taxes can be levied, but 
also more employment and consumption opportunities for the society. In brief, capitalists 
invest, create employment, provide goods and services for the whole economy, earn 
foreign exchange, and directly or indirectly generate taxable revenue. In a capitalist 
economy, therefore, a strong and active private sector is the main economic ‘supporter’ 
of the state.  
The other side of the coin, however, is a shrinking economy and lesser revenue for 
the government when capitalists take their money away or halt investment. Because in a 
capitalist economy investment decisions are private, future possibilities of production, 
employment, and consumption depend on the present investment decisions of the 
 11  
capitalists. The willingness of capitalists to invest depends on their perception about the 
profitability of investment at present and in the future. That is, if capital owners anticipate 
unfavorable conditions they may withhold investment (investment strike), or reallocate 
their money or assets (capital flight)—provided that they have the capability to do it—
which in turn halts or shrinks the economy. This very threat leads rulers, in need of 
extracting revenue from domestic sources, to be responsive to the interests of domestic 
capital owners—in the leading economic sector of the country, at least. In other words, 
“the twin weapons of investment strike and capital flight”28
Not every kind of pro-capitalist policymaking, however, can be considered as 
indirect accountability. Indirect accountability indicates responsiveness to business 
reactions only when capital owners possesses posses adequate bargaining-power to 
extract policy concessions. The reactions of the capitalists to the existing business 
environment may take the form of Voice (expressing demands by implicitly or explicitly 
threatening to exit) or Exit (investment strike or capital flight). The crucial part of the 
argument is it is only when the voiced exit-threat is credible and when a possible exit (or 
an actual exit) is likely to inflict some sort of losses on the part of the ruler that we can 
conclude that the rulers are being accountable to the capital owners. Accordingly, any 
pro-capitalist policymaking in the absence of one of these conditions is very likely to 
result either from structural necessities (such as dependence on a single sector) or 
external factors (such as fiscal crisis, or pressures from an international monetary 
organization)— hence, cannot be considered as accountability 
 as Waterbury calls them, are 
the means which help capitalists to indirectly hold a non-democratic government 
accountable. It is indirect accountability; because, while capitalists do not (necessarily) 
directly demand government accountability, but simply act in accordance with their 
narrow economic interests, the threat of investment strike and capital flight, hence loss of 
revenue, obliges an  authoritarian incumbent to respond to the interests of capitalists, and 
hence to restrict its policy-making power.  
 
In the following parts of this chapter, first, I explain the notions of Exit and Voice as 
a framework to understand capitalist reactions to existing business environment. Then, I 
                                                 
28 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” pp. 160-161. 
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expand on the conditions which confer to capital owners greater bargaining-power vis-à-




EXIT AND VOICE 
Hirschman contends that “there are two main types of activist reactions to discontent with 
organizations to which one belongs or with which one does business: either to voice one’s 
complaints, while continuing as a member or customer, in the hope of improving matters; 
or to exit from the organization, to take one’s business elsewhere.”29
 
 In the context of 
business-state relations, thus, when economic actors are displeased with a 
policy/situation, they have three options for action:  
1) Exit: Ceasing to produce in a particular sector and/or country (i.e. reallocating 
their business or assets in other sectors or abroad) 
 
2) Voice: Expressing discontent and demanding changes (by implicitly or explicitly 
threatening to exit) 
 
3) Loyalty: Accepting the situation with no reaction.  
 
Exit is an indirect way of expressing discontent with the economic environment. As 
a form of exit, capital flight, as Waterbury points out, “involves no formal expression of 
collective interest and no institutionalized bargaining.”30
                                                 
29 Albert Hirschman, “Exit, Voice and the State,” World Politics, Vol. 31, No.1 (October 1981),   p. 
90. 
 Accordingly, government 
responsiveness to exiting business’s interests involves a learning process on the part of 
the ruler, who initially either could not foresee the business reaction or did not take their 
voiced discontent seriously. A historic case from the Middle East is a good example for 
this sort of government responsiveness. Waterbury narrates from Crystal that “in 1909 
the Shaykh of Kuwait attempted to impose new levies on merchant wealth. The 
merchants in turn “exited” to Bahrain. The Shaykh backed away from his exactions, and 
30 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p. 394.  
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the merchants returned.”31
In the light of this example and the related literature, I argue that for Exit to engender 
a learning affect and thus responsiveness, the government must be financially dependent 
on the exiting capital. It is also worth noting that, for Exit to be realized in the first place 
of course, there must be exit opportunities and independence from state rents/quasi-rents. 
In other words, actual exit of capital from a country indicates that owners of exiting 
capital either possess financial assets or that the sector they operate in allows reallocation 
or easy liquidation of assets.  
 As Waterbury notes, attributes of the actors in this example 
gives us clues regarding the conditions of indirect accountability resulting from exit: The 
Shaykh did not have access to any external rents (petroleum rents) and merchants 
possessed mobile capital.  
While exit is a rather private decision of capitalists, voice may take individual or 
collective forms. Business elite may voice their demands or discontents through various 
channels: such as individual channels (network-like relations), formal corporatist 
institutions, or organized collective-action (lobbying).32
For Voice, expressed in any form, to result in indirect accountability, certain 
conditions, which bestow business with bargaining power vis-à-vis autocratic 
government, must be jointly present. These conditions are  
 While the type of voice-channels 
used by capitalists may be an important factor determining the extent of responsiveness, 
due to impossibility of gathering organizational data for around forty non-democratic 
countries, we have to content ourselves with assuming that domestic business use at least 
one of above mentioned channels to express their discontents or demands.  
 
1) Financial dependence of the government/ruler on domestic productive forces: A 
great portion of government revenue must come from extraction from domestic 
economic resources. A financially autonomous government would not care what 
the domestic capital owners want, since their exit would not inflict great loss on 
the government revenue.  
                                                 
31 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar. New York: 
Cambridge University Pres, 1990, pp. 24-25 and 47-48 cited in Waterbury, "From Social Contracts to 
Extraction Contracts,” p. 161. 
32 Haggard et al., “Theories of Business and Business-State Relations.” 
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2) Credibility of Exit-Threat: Ability to threaten to exit is conceptualized to be 
determined by two factors:  
 
a. Investment strength and independence of the private-sector from 
government rents or quasi-rents: The private sector should have the 
financial capacity to reinvest elsewhere and to survive without major and 
continuous government support and/or protection. Otherwise, knowing 
that a weak private-sector has no capacity to exit, and thus would chose to 
remain loyal, rulers would not entertain their interests. 
 
b. Sectorally determined viable exit-opportunities: The main business should 
either have moveable assets or the sector they operate in should allow 
reallocation or easy liquidation of assets. Otherwise, knowing that the 
leading business cannot easily liquidate their assets or reallocate their 
business without incurring great costs (in the mining sector, for example), 
rulers would not respond to their interests.  
 
I posit that while each of these conditions, individually, adds to the bargaining-power 
of capitalists, it is only when they are jointly present that we can assume the private 
sector has adequate bargaining-power to extract concessions from the incumbent. Thus it 
is, again, only when these conditions are jointly present that we can conclude 
responsiveness to business interests is a case of indirect accountability.  Responsiveness 
to business interests in the absence of one of these conditions should be read through one 
of the alternative hypothesis which I present at the end of this chapter.  
In the following section I explain how each condition individually adds to the 
bargaining power of capitalists. In doing this, I also consider each condition in 
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CONDITIONS OF INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILTY  
 
A. Financial Dependence of the State on Extraction from Domestic Productive 
Forces (Tax Revenue) 
Joseph Schumpeter argued that “public finances are one of the best starting point for an 
investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life.”33 In a 
similar vein, work done by Hossein Mahdavy on Iran suggested that states dependent or 
based upon external sources of income should be understood as qualitatively different 
from those that rely on domestic extraction.34 While revenue extracted from the domestic 
economy refers to various forms of taxation, external revenue includes foreign aid (loans 
and grants), sales of oil and mineral (mining), payments for pipeline crossings, transit 
fees (e.g. passage through the Suez Canal), and workers remittances.35 This distinction 
hinges on the fact that while in the first case the revenue is extracted from domestic 
productive forces, and is directly related to efficiency of these forces, in the latter case 
“the revenue stream that is generated is not directly related to greater efficiency in 
production or to new investment.”36 That is why this kind of revenue is called as rent—
“any income not originating from the productive activity of the concerned unit, the flows 
and dimensions of which are not directly linked to the beneficiary’s activity.”37 
Governments enjoy not only economic rents but strategic rents as well. Economic rent is 
“the difference between the market price of a good or a factor of production and its 
opportunity cost (the price needed to produce the good or to keep the factor of production 
in its current use).”38
                                                 
33 Joseph Schumpeter, “The Crisis of the Tax State,” in Alan T. Peacock (ed.), International Economic 
Papers, no.4 (London: Macmillan, 1954), 7 cited in Pete W. Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East: 
Politics and Economic Crisis in Jordan and Kuwait (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.14.  
 Waterbury and Richardson note that “owners of certain assets or 
34 Hossein Mahdavy, “The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The 
Case of Iran,” in M. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (London: Oxford 
University Pres, 1970), pp.428-67 referred in Laurie A. Brand, “Economic and Political Liberalization in a 
Rentier Economy: The Case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” in Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan, ed., 
Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992),  p. 168.  
(Emphasis added)  
35 Michael L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics, Vol. 53, No.3 (April 2001), p. 
329. 
36 Waterbury and Richards, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 17.  
37 Michel Chatelus and Y. Schmeil, “Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialization in 
the Middle East,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.2 cited in Brand, “Economic and 
Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan,” p. 168.  
38 Waterbury and Richards, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 16. 
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providers of certain services enjoy strategic positions in markets that allow them to set 
prices well above the opportunity cost for what they are providing.”39 And, strategic rents 
are loans and grants that certain governments enjoy due to geo-strategic positions of their 
country in a particular confrontation; “designed quite openly to buy their allegiance to 
one side or the other.”40
In the Middle East regional studies literature, states relying mostly on rents are 
referred to as rentier-states. A neat definition of rentier state is given by Hazem Beblawi, 
who states that a rentier state is one whose economy relies on substantial external rents, 
where the government is the principal recipient of the external rent in the economy, and 
where only a few are engaged in the generation of this rent (wealth), the majority being 
only involved in the distribution or utilization of it.
  
41 Both Beblawi and Luciani stress the 
direct accrual of external revenue to the state.42 As noted in this definition, availability of 
externally generated revenue—i.e. revenue that is not extracted from domestic productive 
forces—and its direct transfer to the state frees the state from its domestic economic 
base.43
On the opposite site of relatively autonomous states stand ‘extractive states’ (or 
production states
 Thus, I call such states as ‘relatively autonomous states’.  
44
 
) which rely on taxation of the domestic productive forces in order to 
finance their expenses. I call such states ‘financially dependent states,’ because their 
income depends on the productivity of the domestic business. Those are the states which, 
under capitalism, are structurally dependent on capital—as argued in the introduction 
section of this study. In other words, as is quite obvious, the structural dependence 
argument makes sense only if the state is financially dependent on its citizens. For only 
financially dependent states would be harmed by capital flight or investment strike.  
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 17. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” in Hazem Bellawi and Giacomo Liciani, 
eds, The Rentier State, (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 51-2.  
42 In this sense, they do not consider workers’ remittances as a source of income from the rest of the 
world “because they belong to the migrant, not to the state… It is only after remittances have entered the 
domestic economy … that they can be taxed and become a source of income for the state.” Giacomo 
Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” in The Arab State, ed. Hazem 
Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 72.  Also see Beblawi, 
“The Rentier State in the Arab World,” p.61.  
43 Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,”p.71.   
44 Ibid.   
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General Arguments on the Tax-Accountability Relationship 
The political economy literature argues that both financial dependence of the state on its 
citizens and its autonomy from the domestic productive forces have political 
consequences. Some scholars claim that government extraction from citizens—both the 
kind and level of it—may significantly affect the kind and level of governmental 
accountability.45 In the background of this argument stands the idea that taxes constitute a 
kind of contract between citizens and the state; for taxation creates expectations among 
the taxpayers that they are to receive services in return for their contribution to the keep 
up of the administration.46 Further, as taxes fund such services (public goods) citizens 
gain the right to hold public officials accountable for the kind, quality, and cost of public 
goods.47
This argument is grounded in the historical studies of the emergence of democratic 
institutions in Western Europe. Scholars argue that parliaments arose as arenas of 
bargaining between monarchs and citizens who owned wealth over taxes to finance the 
cost of warfare.  
  
 
“The primary function of parliament was usually to grant the ruler a tax for specific 
purposes, often war. … The reason why parliaments were called by kings for such 
purposes, and played the role they did, lie in the social structure of medieval Europe, 
in the way power and wealth were distributed. Parliaments became important 
because they were the means by which kings were able to gain entitlements to 
income from their subjects, both their major vassals and others, over and above what 
they could acquire through applications of existing feudal contracts and rights.”48
 
 
In return for tax revenue, kings granted representation and liberties to certain 
segment of the society, and were held accountable for the use of the money they 
collected.  
                                                 
45 John Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” pp. 383-402. Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle 
East and North Africa,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 20, No.1 (October 1987), pp. 1-18. Lisa Anderson, 
“Prospects for Liberalism in North Africa,” in John P. Entelis, ed. Islam, Democracy, and the State in North 
Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 127-139.  
46 Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 10.  
47 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p. 149.  
48 Anthony Black, Political Thoughts in Europe, 1250-1450, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993), pp. 162-163. 
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“That ‘many’ should be consulted about legislation and war was a commonplace in 
northern and southern Europe. Kings are called upon, and agree, to recognize the 
rights and liberties of persons and groups, especially towns, in return for a tax. The 
reciprocity of the relationship between the king and others is stressed, and forms a 
basis for action against the king if he is thought to have used the money for illicit 
(private) ends, or incompletely; hence attempts by barons and parliaments to have a 
say in the appointment of royal ministers.49
 
  
“Historically, states have become beholden to their citizens through reciprocal 
obligation. Impersonal, formal, arbitrary state extraction—taxes and conscription, for 
example—was the first sign of government penetration and control in the early 
modern nation-states. It was soon followed by demands, particularly among property 
holders, for protection against such arbitrary government extraction and for a role in 
decision-making about the expenditure of state income. These developments we now 




Thus as Luciani puts it “whenever the state essentially relies on taxation the question of 
democracy becomes an unavoidable issue, and a strong current in favor of democracy 
inevitably arises.”51
In contrast to such a reciprocal relationship that taxation of domestic economic 
forces generates, scholars, especially those studying the rentier-state phenomenon, argue 
that “external revenues impede accountability, and that only when states have to extract 
their revenues from their own citizens will the demand for accountability arise.”
  
52  Lisa 
Anderson notes that in countries like Kuwait and Libya, the state may be virtually 
completely autonomous from its society, winning popular acquiescence through 
distribution rather than support through taxation and representation.53 As Beblawi notes, 
governments in the rentier-states—especially in the oil states—provide public goods and 
services, which are of adequate, sometimes excellent, quality, to their citizens. Further, 
they are provided free or at very low cost to the beneficiary.54
                                                 
49 Ibid., p. 163.  
 Thus, as Anderson notes, 
50 Anderson, “Prospects for Liberalism in North Africa,” p.130. (Emphasis added.) 
51 Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework,” p.75. 
52 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” pp.149-50. 
53 Jacques Delacroix, “The Distributive State in the World System,” Studies in Comparative 
International Development, 15 (1980) and Jill Crystal, “State Formation in Kuwait and Qatar” (PhD. Diss., 
Harvard University, 1986) referred by Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 
10.  
54 Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” p. 54.  
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“distributive regimes emphasize egalitarian current consumption which ensures present 
acquiescence.”55
Luciani further claims that even the feeling of unequal distribution of benefits is not 
a sufficient incentive to coalesce and attempt to change the political institutions; but 
would simply lead to seeking the solution of maneuvering for personal advantage within 
the existing setup. He argues that “there is always little or no objective ground to claim 
that one should get more of the benefits, since his contribution is generally dispensable 
anyhow.”
 
56 On the contrary, in extractive states (financially dependent states), as Lisa 
Anderson nicely puts it, “wealth translates into capacity to pay taxes to, and extract 
concessions from, the government—that is, power.”57
Scholars studying the rentier-state phenomenon argue that the post-rentier state 
(especially after mid-1980s), which does not have as much access to external resource as 
it used to have, display conditions for greater demand for popular representation and 
accountability. Lisa Anderson, for example, referring to North African countries, says,  
  
 
“A clear trend in favor of democracy was discernible, particularly in countries whose 
access to reliable sources of external funding was declining. With great trepidation, 
governments were being forced to face the unpleasant prospects of holding 
themselves accountable to taxpayers… Far more taxing, literally and figuratively, is 
the construction of the tangible, material means of guaranteeing popular 




Waterbury also joins her by noting that, in the Middle East,  
 
“whereas thirty years ago most social actors were ‘policy-takers’ in the face of 
autonomous states that they could not significantly influence, much less hold to 




                                                 
55 Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 10.  
56 Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States,” p. 76. 
57 Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” p. 130 
58 Lisa Anderson, “Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Politics in North Africa,” Daedalus, 
Vo.120, No. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 110-111 cited in Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East, p. 21.  
59 Waterbury & Richardson, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p.36.  (Emphasis added.) 
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and he concludes that “if democratic practice is to take root in the Middle East, it will be 
as the result of the formalization of this bargaining process.”60
 
  
When we consider these arguments in the context of business-state relations, and 
with respect to pre-conditions of government responsiveness to private-business reactions 
(Exit or Voice), we reach the following conclusion: Demand for policy changes (Voice) 
may or may not arise in rentier states. But even if Voice is given, it would hit deaf ears of 
the autonomous government. For a financially autonomous government, which does not 
need tax revenue to finance its expenses, and thus to politically survive, can function 
without being responsive to the demands of domestic productive forces, whose 
efficiency/productivity does not affect the amount of revenue accrues to the government. 
The same is true for Exit;  if some capital flies out of the country or capitalists conclude 
that further investment is no longer profitable, a financially autonomous government 
would not care so much as an extractive (financially dependent) one.  
In essence, therefore, my argument is not that business will demand governmental 
accountability or establishment of democratic procedures (i.e. representation) as the 
government levies new taxes or increase tax levels (relative to income), which is a rather 
widespread argument in the rentier-state literature.61
                                                 
60 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
 Rather, by following the distinction 
between financially autonomous rentier-states and financially dependent extractive states, 
my argument concerns the relationship between the degree of financial dependence of a 
government on tax revenue relative to its total revenue, and the bargaining power that 
this dependence bestows upon productive forces of the economy—the private-businesses. 
Accordingly, I hold, first, that before demanding political representation, capitalists are 
more likely to begin with issues that concern their own business. However, existence of 
external rents directly accruing to the government, that is, lesser dependence of 
61 I consider increase in taxes relative to income (especially corporate taxes) only one of the factors 
that might lead to a bargaining between the business and the government.  
For a test of the hypothesis that higher taxes relative to income lead to a demand for democratization, 
see Michael Ross, “Does Taxation Lead to Representation?” paper presented at Center for the Future State, 
IDS Taxation Seminar,  (2002)  
 http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/activities/Taxation-Seminar.html (accessed August, 2006).  He finds no 
evidence to support the hypothesis. However, he finds some evidence to support the hypothesis that higher 
taxes relative to government services tend make states more democratic—a cost benefit model. 
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government revenue on taxation of domestic economic forces, put the private-business in 
a position of “policy-takers” with no real bargaining power to extract policy changes—
even though they may demand it via Voice or Exit. In other words, as the level of 
financial dependence of the government on its citizens increases—i.e. as the share of tax 
revenue in total government revenue increases—the capital owners and investors gain 
greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the government due to (1) their crucial role in 
generating economic growth—hence, greater taxable revenue, more jobs, more goods 
and services, etc—and (2) the accompanying threat about the potential harm that 
investment strike and capital flight would inflict on the state revenue.  
Practically speaking, when private-business gains greater bargaining power (when 
tax revenue/total government revenue ratio increases) even an authoritarian government 
becomes obliged to be more attentive to private-business interests, and thus, to respond to 
their Voice or Exit. As a result, capitalists who possess credible exit-threat, can 
indirectly, that is, simply voicing their economic interests or by actually exiting, restrain 
policy-making power of a financially dependent autocratic incumbent.  
 
 
B.  Ability to Threaten to Exit 
I prefer to use the term ‘credible exit-threat,’ first, because I am using the ‘Exit, Voice, 
Loyalty’ framework; and second, the term “exit-threat” is a more direct way to indicate 
how capitalists are able to exert pressure on the government to induce its responsiveness 
to their concerns. I argue that two factors must be presents so that capitalists can credibly 
threaten to exit: (1) Investment strength and independence of the private sector from 




(1) Investment Strength and Independence of the Private Sector 
I have already explained the revenue generative role that capital owners play in a 
capitalist economy, and how this role can turn into a mechanism to hold an autocratic 
ruler accountable for his/her policies, provided that the capital owners have the capability 
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to exit, and hence to credibly threaten to exit. In this section, I explain one of the 
conditions of credible-exit threat: investment strength and independence from 
government rents.  
I maintain that only those owners of capital who do not need the support and the 
protection of the state for the survival of their economic activities can exit (reallocate 
their assets and business), and accordingly, can challenge government policies by 
implicitly or explicitly threatening to exit. This condition, in fact, embodies two separate 
phenomena: existence of a strong private sector bourgeoisie, and its independence from 
state rents.  
State intervention and development of a large public sector has been a characteristic 
of late industrialisers. In those countries private entrepreneurs lacked financial capacity 
(since the start up costs had been enormously expanded by time of later industrialisers) 
and entrepreneurial skills that would have enabled them to start it all from the very 
beginning.62 The leaders in such states, thus, have seen their tasks “in terms of 
‘engineering,’ architecture, blueprints, and the like. They are designing new societies, and 
the state is that collection of agencies that will enable them for state intervention.”63
Waterbury, referring to Fitzgerald who studies Latin America, points out that there 
are two fundamental types of state intervention and capitalist accumulation. Both aim at 
structural transformation of the economy.  
 
 
“The first is a process whereby the state helps nurture or strengthen a private sector. 
It does so in various ways. It provides roads, railroad, ports, and electrical power to 
stimulate economic activity in general. Through basic industries and mines it 
provides raw material (coal, oil) and semi-manufactured goods (iron, aluminum, 
chemicals, synthetic fibers) that feed directly into private production. It provides 
cheap credit and protective legislation. It may take over failing private enterprises. In 
this process of accumulation, the state transfers surpluses on its own operations, 
profits if any, and external rents to the private sector and tries to absorb all major risk 
for that sector. … The second process of accumulation is one in which the state 
undertakes all the resource mobilization and infrastructure development functions 
mentioned above but captures the surplus of its own activities, of a substantial 
portion of private-sector profits, and of external rents in order to finance its own 
                                                 
62 Nazih  N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (New York: 
I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd., 2006), p. 291.  
63 Richards and Waterbury,  A Political Economy of the Middle East, p. 174 
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expansion. Its goal is to dominate all aspects of resource allocation and to seize, once 
and for all, the commanding heights of the economy.”64
 
  
While the second path precludes development of a private sector—and usually sees 
development of an independent bourgeoisie as a threat to political stability65— the first 
path creates a weak and dependent private-sector which is a ‘client’ of the state—that is, 
one which needs state protection and aid in order to survive—at least in the early periods 
of its development. In other words, while the state sets out to create a national 
bourgeoisie, the interventionist and protectionist development strategy brings about a 
patronage relationship between the state and business. Especially in rentier-states this 
relationship is so intense that, as Beblawi points out, “the whole economy is arranged as a 
hierarchy of layers of rentiers with the state or the government at the top of the pyramid, 
acting as the ultimate support of all other rentiers in the economy.”66
Hootan Shambayati, by comparing Iran and Turkey, highlights the relationship 
between the degree and the nature of dependence of a nascent industrial bourgeoisie on 
the state rents, and the political outcomes those differences generate. In both countries the 
state actively fostered emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie, yet Shambayati notes that 
“whereas the Iranian state was able to finance its activities through external rents, that is, 
oil revenues, the Turkish state had to rely primarily on domestic sources of capital.”
 Accordingly, 
private-sector activity centers on securing a piece of state rents in the form of contracts, 
subsidies, or tax exemption.  
67 In 
Iran, he says, “the government provided a great percent of the capital for the big families 
that controlled industrial businesses… Many privately owned factories were tax exempt, 
allowing some of the companies to produce from 50 to 80 percent net profits.”68 
Accordingly, he concludes, the new capitalist class, was “dependent on the state and had 
no potential for challenging the state.”69
                                                 
64 Ibid., pp. 201-2. 
 Shambayati states that in Turkey the newly 
established industries were heavily dependent on imports of capital and intermediate 
65 Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” p.11. 
66 Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World,” p. 53. 
67 Hootan Shambayati, “The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and 
Business in Turkey and Iran,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, no. 3 (April 1994), p. 316. 
68 Ibid., p.321. 
69 Ibid., p.320. 
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goods. As a result, Turkish industrialists were “beneficiaries of rents generated by 
government policies. They benefited from overvalued exchange rates, protectionist 
measures, and subsidized credits.”70 By the late 1970s, when the state was no longer 
capable of maintaining overvalued exchange rates, however, he asserts, some segments of 
the private sector had already achieved the financial and organizational capacity to 
challenge the state.71 In this respect, the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association (TUSIAD), “became the main private sector organization to criticize the 




Independent Bourgeoisie and Democratization Relationship  
The role of an independent bourgeoisie in the democratization process is emphasized by 
some scholars. The most prominent of such authors is Barrington Moore, who argues that 
only when there is a strong bourgeoisie, which emerges as a result of a grass-roots 
industrialization process, and challenges the economic and political power of the landed 
aristocracy, is representative democracy likely to emerge—as happened in Britain. On the 
contrary, he claims, when a strong state initiates the industrialization process by allying 
with a powerful landed aristocracy and a weak bourgeoisie that needs protection of the 
state—as happened in Germany under Bismarck’s rule—fascism is likely to emerge.73 By 
the same token, Lisa Anderson sees the weakness and subordination of existing 
bourgeoisie (in the Middle East) as a major cause of continued authoritarianism.74
 
 For, as 
Waterbury notes, “the private-sector bourgeoisie [in those countries] has entered into a 
pact with the state which has impeded progress toward democracy.” He argues that ‘a 
tacit understanding’ dominates the relations between the bourgeoisie and the state;  
                                                 
70 Ibid., p.316. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., p.315  
73 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, 
reprint 1993). 
74 Lisa Anderson, "Liberalization in the Arab World” discussion paper fr the Mellon Seminar, Near 
East Department, Princeton Universtiry (14 February, 1992) cited in Waterbury, “Democracy without 
Democracrats? The Potential for Political Liberalization in the Middle East,” in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), 
Democracy without Democrats (London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p.28.  
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“... The bourgeoisie would renounce any overt political role and that it would follow 
the broad economic directives of the state, in exchange for which it would be 
allowed to make significant profits. The state would keep labor docile through a 
combination of welfare benefits and political repression.”75
 
  
When other protectionist or financial rents offered by the state are also added to this 
‘contract’, it is obvious that rational economic actors would prefer political loyalty to 
voice, not only because they benefit form government rents but also because they know 
that they do not have much bargaining power vis-à-vis a government which guarantees 
their economic survival. Therefore, as Waterbury puts it, “the importance of the 
bourgeoisie lies in the resources it controls. If they are significant and beyond the reach 
of the state, then the mere possibility that the bourgeoisie might confront the state is 
enough to create political space.”76
In case of a strong and independent bourgeoisie, though, we should not mistakenly 
assume that capitalist interests are always democratic; that is, they would always have a 
preference for a democratic regime. Waterbury, in this respect, draws attention to the 
highly inconsistent behavior of entrepreneurial bourgeoisie just about everywhere in the 
developing countries,
  
77 and claims that owners of capital do not innately posses 
democratic interests78 or do not necessarily promote democratic accountability.79 
Przeworski and Limongi also claim that the business elite cannot have any interest-based 
preference for democracy.80 And, Acemoglu and Robinson, and Boix, articulating the 
conditions that shape capital owners’ regime preferences—i.e., whether they might 
oppose a democratic transition—argue that they might not oppose democratization 
provided that capital is mobile.81
                                                 
75 Waterbury “Democracy without Democrats,” p. 27. 
  
76 Ibid.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p. 395  
79 Waterbury “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p. 164.  
80 Their reasoning is as follows: “(1) poor people want to consume immediately; (2.1) when workers 
can organize, they drive wages up, reduce profits, and reduce investment (either by lowering the rate of 
return or the volume of profit or both) and (2.2) when people can vote, governments distribute incomes 
away from investment (either they tax and transfer or they undertake less public investment; (3) lowering 
investment slows down growth.” Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and 
Economic Growth” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.7, No.3 (Summer 1993), pp. 54-55.  
81 The reasoning is as follows:  As the specificity of capital declines or as capital becomes more 
mobile, the cost of moving it away from its country of origin diminishes; thus capital owners can easily 
take their money away from a given country. This makes it more difficult to tax. Thus, mobility of capital 
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Waterbury, however, looks at capitalists’ role in the process of regime transition 
from a different standpoint and argues that capital owners and investors may have a 
particularly important role to play in the preparatory phase of democratization: yet this 
does not necessarily have to be a conscious demand for democratic procedures. He claims 
that while they initially bargain to protect or advance their business activities,82 “as a 
kind of by-product of their bargaining for favorable policy responses from the state, they 
may foster habits of interaction between the governments and citizens that can lead to a 
transition.”83 For, he adds, “a kind of public good—the obligation of the government to 
deal directly with significant economic interest in society—has thus been created. 




To summarize, then, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie has to be strong (in terms of its 
investment power) and self-sufficient (independent from government rents) in order to 
gain greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the government, and hence, to effectively 
advance and protect their economic interests (by threatening to exit) or to be able to Exit. 
In other words, a weak and dependent private sector (which has a small share in the 
overall economy activity, and which needs protection and support of the government) 
possesses no bargaining power vis-à-vis the government. The reason is that, because it 
would be too costly for them to operate in ‘unprotected’ environments they can neither 
actually exit, nor credibly threaten to exit. Since they cannot exit, there is no use of 
talking about effective Exit. They may still voice, though. If dependent business elite do 
voice anyway, the ruler—knowing that they have no place to go—may choose to ignore 
                                                                                                                                                 
curbs the redistributive effects of democracy or reduces the extent to which democratic government can 
pursue populist and highly majoritarian policies. Accordingly, the conflict between the capital owners and 
non owners is diminished; hence, the elite feel more secure about the redistributive effects of democracy 
and are discouraged from using repression to prevent a transition from nondemocracy to democracy. On the 
contrary, “the prevalence of highly immobile types of capital exacerbates the authoritarian solution. Unable 
to shift assets abroad to escape the threat of high taxes, capital owners grow more resolute in their efforts to 
block democracy.” Charles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution, (New York, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), p.3. and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of 
Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 
82 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.395. 
83 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p.164. Waterbury and Richardson, A 
Political Economy of the Middle East, p.36.   
84 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.396. 
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their demands, and continue to extract revenue from their surplus. Thus, if business is to 
act rationally, they would prefer loyalty to voice or exit—which would be less costly for 
them. In brief, a dependent bourgeoisie possesses no bargaining power to extract policy 
concessions via Exit or Voice, and hence, to restrain the policy-making power of an 
authoritarian incumbent.  
 
 
(2) Sectorally Determined Exit-Opportunities   
While investment strength and independence from government rents is a necessary 
condition to credibly threaten to exit, and hence, extract policy concession, it is not 
sufficient. There also must be viability of exit-opportunities for the capital owners so that 
the rulers conjecture that the capitalists may indeed choice to exit in case their interests 
are not met.   
Sectoral analysis provides us with tools to analyze whether capital owners in a 
particular sector can credibly threaten to exit. Michael Shafer, in this respect, proposes 
four covarying variables which enable us to assess the extent of viability of exit 
opportunities in a particular sector. He states that sectoral analysis builds on two core 
variables in sectors’ production processes, capital intensity and the extent of economies of 
scale, and two composite variables, production flexibility and asset/factor flexibility, that 
recombine elements of both.85
Capital intensity refers to “the amount of fixed or real capital present in relation to 
other factors of production, especially labor.” The fixed or real capital includes the 
capital cost of start-up, production, research and development, inventory, and 
distribution.
 
86 The extent of economies of scale is the extent to which efficiency demands 
large-scale production.87
                                                 
85 D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers. How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp 1-48.  
 In other words, it refers to the increase in efficiency of 
production as the number of goods being produced increases. Typically, a company that 
achieves economies of scale lowers the average cost per unit through increased 
86 Ibid., p.23 
87 Ibid., p.24.  
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production since fixed costs are shared over an increased number of goods.88 Shafer notes 
that capital intensity and economies of scale account for the “divisibility” of production 
(its openness to broad participation), the sector-specificity of capital equipment and other 
assets, and the rigidity of barriers to exit.89 Production flexibility is the ability to meet 
short-term market shifts by varying output levels or product mix. Asset/factor flexibility 
refers to the sector-specificity of facilities, supporting infrastructure, and workforce 
skills. Shafer states that it determines the extent to which assets and factors can be reused 
elsewhere.90 Production and asset/factor flexibility variables are composed of elements 
reflecting capital intensity and economies of scale.91
Shafer argues that that since these variables covary across sectors, “we can imagine a 
single continuum between two polar ideal types”
  
92
                                                 
88 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp 
—High/High and Low/Low sectors. 
High/High (HH) Sectors (such as oil, mining, industrial plantation crop production) are 
marked by high capital intensity, high economies of scale, and high production 
inflexibility and asset/factor inflexibility. In such sectors there are high barriers to exit, 
because, as Shafer says, it requires large sunk investments in sector-specific capital 
equipment, facilities, infrastructure, management, and skilled labor. Therefore, capital 
owners and investors in such sectors cannot credibly threaten to exit. In other words, 
when they use voice, they do not possess much bargaining-power vis-à-vis a government 
who knows that the business in question cannot easily exit (i.e. change sector or 
reallocate abroad) without incurring a lot of costs or losses. Accordingly, it is less likely 
that policymaking favoring a HH sector interests result from bargaining. Yet we may still 
observe responsiveness to HH sector interests if the state is highly dependent on a single 
HH sector, in which case the bargaining power of the policymakers also greatly diminish. 
Under the latter condition, however, pro-HH sector policy-making is no longer 
accountability but just a structural necessity due to sectoral dependence. I present this 
argument as an alternative hypothesis at the end of this chapter along with other 
alternative causal mechanisms of pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policymaking.   
89 Shafer, p. 24. 
90 Ibid., pp.10, 24.   
91 Ibid., p. 24 
92 Ibid, p.10 
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Low-Low (LL) Sectors (such as light manufacturing, peasant cash crop production) 
are marked by the opposite characteristics, and thus, have smaller barriers to exit.93
In the political economy literature, authors who focus on the restraining role of 
capital movements on autocratic-state power use the terms ‘capital mobility’ or ‘elasticity 
of the tax base’ to indicate viability of exit opportunities.
 
Accordingly, capitalists in such sectors can credibly threaten to exit if their interests are 
not met. Thus, it is more likely that the voice of those capital owners and investors in LL 





Capital Mobility as a Restrain on the Arbitrary Rule  
The exit possibility of capital has been seen by many scholars as a check and restraint on 
the arbitrary power of autocratic governments. Around the 18th century, the absolutist 
state in Europe actively promoted expansion of commerce and finance. With this 
expansion, a new form of wealth—movable wealth—appeared. Montesquieu defined it as 
“money, notes, bills of exchange, stocks of companies, ships, all commodities and 
merchandise”; and noted that this form of wealth could be moved from one country to 
another.  As Hirschman notes, both Montesquieu and Sir James Stevart perceived capital 
flight—the possible exit of capital (and of the capitalists)—as a salutary restraint on 
arbitrary government.95
 
 Montesquieu, for example, says  
“Since that time, the rulers have been compelled to govern with greater wisdom than 
they themselves might have intended; for, owing to these events, the great and 
sudden arbitrary actions of the sovereign (les grands coups d’authorité) have been 




                                                 
93 Shafer, p.10 & 25.  
94 ‘Capital mobility’ used by Charles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution,. ‘Elasticity of the tax base’ 
used by Robert H. Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” PS: Political Science & Politics, 
March 1991; and Robert Bates and D. H. Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative 
Government." Politics and Society, Vol.14, No.1 (1985).  
95 Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the State,” p. 99. 
96 Montesquieu, Esprit des Lois, XXI, chap. 20, cited in Ibid., p.98 
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Another prominent 18th century scholar, Adam Smith, looks at the issue from the 
standpoint of ‘elasticity of the tax base’, and argues that arbitrary/excess state extraction 
(i.e. a policy that is contrary to capitalist interests) may diminish the state revenue 
generated by taxation of movable assets, because such assets holders might leave the 
country. He says,  
 
“…land is a subject which cannot be removed, whereas stock easily may. The 
proprietor of land is necessarily a citizen of the particular country in which his estate 
lies. The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world and is not necessarily 
attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which 
he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome 
tax, and would remove his stocks to some other country where he could either carry 
on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at his ease. By removing his stock he 
would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the country he left. 
Stock cultivates land; stock employs labor. A tax which tended to drive away stock 
from any particular country would so far tend to dry up every source of revenue, 
both to the sovereign and to the society…”97
  
 
Due to the very threat that Smith explains—that is, the threat of capital flight—
Mitchell notes that in England monarchs first convened citizens and bargained with them 
for revenues when they began to tax movable property—such as “cows, oxen, grain, 
household goods and other possessions…that could be transferred from place to place.”98 
Movable property could be concealed, he states, therefore, its efficient taxation required 
the cooperation of its owners. “In order to secure that cooperation, the monarch had to 
give the owners greater control over the use to which those tax revenues would be put. 
Increased taxation implied increased representation…”99 By the same token, as Bates 
notes, since commerce is more mobile than mining, “the British monarch, who taxed 
trade, had to supply more political benefits for a given level of revenues than did that of 
France, who drew a greater portion of his revenues from taxes on such sources as salt 
deposits.”100
                                                 
97 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Modern Library ed., 800, cited in Ibid. Hirschman, “Exit, 
Voice, and the State,” World Politics, Vol.31, No.1, (Oct. 1978), p.98. (Emphasis added) 
 Based on similar historical examples, Bates, thus, claims that the nature of 
the tax base shaped the bargaining between the rulers and asset-owning citizens. 
98 Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” p. 25 
99 Ibid.  
100 Aristide Zolberg, “Strategic Interactions and the Formation of Modern States: France and 
England,” International Social Science Journal, 32, no.4 (1980) in Ibid.  
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“In the literature on the origins of parliaments, it becomes clear that the nature of the 
economy—and in particular the tax base—strongly shaped the terms of the bargain 
between revenue-seeking monarchs and asset-owning citizens. The more elastic the 
tax base, the greater the degree to which the sovereign had to give control over 
public policy to those whose money he sought to appropriate for public purposes.”101
 
  
In other words, Bates claims that “sovereigns will make greater concessions in the policy 
domain to those to whom they must in order to secure revenues; i.e. they will make 
greater concessions to those who control the more elastic portions of the tax base.”102
Hirschman also extents the same logic to economies open to capital movements, and 
stresses the role of “moveable property and its exit” as a restrain on the government’s 
freedom of maneuver. He notes that although free capital movements can restrain 
despotic and predatory rule, they can also undermine a government’s ability to make 
redistributive policies or social reforms.
 
103 Haggard et al. argue that Hirschman’s insight 
is much more important today in a world of financial integration where liquid assets 
move more freely. Accordingly, they note that, macroeconomic and exchange-rate 
policies are the most vulnerable areas; that is, there is consensus on the effect of capital 
mobility on these areas.104
 
 In order to appeal to foreign investors and creditors and to 
deter capital flight, they say, policy makers give in to pressures for convergence and 
abandon of regulatory controls, and greater economic liberalization.  
We can now elaborate these arguments within the context of business-state relations, 
and in the light of the sectoral approach and the ‘Exit, Voice, Loyalty’ framework. First, 
we consider the decision of capitalists whether to Voice. Hirschman argues that “the 
decision whether to exit will often be taken in light of the prospects for the effective use 
of voice. If customers are convinced that voice will be effective, they may postpone 
exit.”105
                                                 
101 Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” p. 25 (emphasis added) 
 As noted before, effective Voice requires a threat of inflicting some sort of loss 
upon the owner of the organization to which one belongs; otherwise the voicing party 
102 Ibid. 
103 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and the State”. 
104 Haggard et al., “Theories of Business and Business State Relations,” p.39.  
105 Albert O., Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), p.37 (Emphasis added).  
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would not have any bargaining-power. In the context of business-state relations, 
investment strike and capital flight are ‘the twin weapons’ that capitalists can use as 
threats against a financially dependent state. Therefore, if we assume that economic 
actors act rationally—making cost-benefit calculation and choosing the least costly act—
we expect that those who would Voice—challenge government polices and bargain with 
the government to alter certain policies—would be the capital owners operating in sectors 
endowed with viable exit-opportunities. Those capitalists who know that they have 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the government—that their exit-threat is credible, that they 
can reallocate their money and business in another sector or abroad, if necessary, and also 
that this act would inflict loss of revenue on the part of the dependent state—will engage 
in voicing their demands, rather then exiting in the first place.  
As an alternative argument, Hirschman maintains that voice option can also be used 
by those with less or no exit option. He argues that “the voice option is the only way in 
which dissatisfied customers or members can react whenever exit option is 
unavailable.”106 The role of voice, he says, would increase as the opportunities for exit 
decline, up to the point where, with exit wholly unavailable, voice must carry the entire 
burden of alerting management to its failings.107
 
 Accordingly, he claims that wherever 
options of exit are limited, voice will be activated. 
“Capital flight is obviously much less of a weapon in the largest and most powerful 
countries where the owners of capital feel there is no place else to go. Here it can be 
expected that voice will be activated by the impossibility of exit. Capitalists will 
make elaborate attempts to influence public opinion and public policy.”108
 
  
However, Hirschman also comments on the effect of voice of those with no exit option in 
generating leverage on the part of voice-exposed management, and argues that exit is the 
dominant strategy; that is, “sales losses and complaints or protests of those who remain 
members are not easily added to derive an aggregate recuperative effect.”109
                                                 
106 Ibid.   
 Therefore, 
just to reiterate once more, although voice can be used by those capitalists who cannot 
credibly threaten to exit, that is, owners of assets in HH sectors, it is not very likely to be 
107 Ibid., p.34 
108 Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the State,” p. 100.  
109 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty,” p.37 (emphasis added) 
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effective in bringing about responsiveness to their interests—unless the state is also highly 
dependent on that sector (like the oil sector). In contrasts, when business elite in sectors 
with low capital intensity, low economies of scale, and production and asset factor 
flexibility use their viable exit opportunities as a weapon, and voice their interests and 
demands, they are more likely to get a response to their concerns, and thus, restrain the 




Against this theoretical background, we can now clarify the hypotheses to be tested in 
this study. To begin with, I question whether and under what conditions autocratic rulers 
can be held accountable by a segment of the society. My main argument is that 
nondemocratic leaders who are financially dependent on extraction from domestic 
productive forces, may be indirectly held accountable by domestic capital owners and 
investors who are able to use the threat of exit while voicing their demands (i.e. credibly 
threaten to exit) and/or who can actually perform it (i.e. exit). Hence, the present study 
posits that indirect accountability may result from Voice or Exit. It is important to note 
that Exit and Voice may occur simultaneously. For, while Exit is private decision of the 
capitalists, Voice may involve collective action. Hence, it is possible that while the major 
business association of the leading sector engages in expressing their concerns (to the 
government), a part of business may decide not to further invest in that country/sector 
(investment strike) or to invest elsewhere (capital flight). In other words, due to 
multiplicity of the economic actors (investors) operating in the same sector, Voice and 
Exit are not mutually exclusive in an economic context. However, I do not hypothesize a 
joint impact of Exit and Voice (i.e. a joint necessity) for government responsiveness. On 
the contrary, controlling for other factors which might lead to government responsiveness 
to business (at least the leading sector’s) interests, I want to isolate the impact of the 
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MAIN HYPOTHESES  
 
(1) Indirect Accountability as a result of Voice (Responsiveness due to Credible 
Exit-Threat)  
 
I posit that leaders may be indirectly held accountable by capital owners and investors 
provided that the latter have adequate bargaining-power vis-à-vis rulers. Bargaining-
power of the capitalists is conditional on the joint existence of two factors: (1) Ability of 
the capitalists to threaten to exit, and (2) the potential to inflict losses on government 
revenue upon exiting.  
 Exit-credibility is a function of both sectoral attributes and strength and financial 
independence of the private sector. Sectoral attributes (the extent of capital specificity 
and mobility) determines the extent to which the sectoral characteristics allow investors 
to easily reallocate their business elsewhere or switch to another sector without losing 
much; and investment strength and independence of the private sector indicates the extent 
to which the private sector has the financial capacity to reinvest and to survive in the 
absence of government support and protection. The second condition of indirect 
accountability, ‘the potential to inflict some loss on government revenue upon exiting,’ is 
a function of the extent of financial dependence of the state on domestic productive 
forces—i.e. the share of tax revenue in total government revenue.  
More specifically, therefore, controlling for the factors which might induce pro-
capitalist policymaking in the absence of adequate bargaining power of capitalists, we 
expect to see responsiveness of the authoritarian incumbent to the leading business 
interests (i.e. indirect accountability) if and only if (1) the state is financially dependent 
on tax revenue, (2) exit-credibility is present—i.e. (a) the private sector is strong and 
independent of government rents, and (b) the capital of the leading sector is relatively 
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(2) Indirect Accountability as a result of Exit (Responsiveness due to Learning from 
Past Experience)  
 
I maintain that, controlling for other factors, increase in the level of pro-capitalist or pro-
leading sector policies as a result of capital flight and/or investment strike can also be 
regarded as responsiveness—i.e. as indirect accountability.   
 The argument about ‘exit-credibility’ is based on the assumption that rulers are 
rational and that they would take the necessary policy measures to avoid the twin threats 
of capital flight and investment strike—provided that they conjecture those to be viable. 
However, should the incumbents make wrong calculations (or because of some 
exogenous reasons) and should capital flight or investment strike occur, we expect to see 
a learning process on the part of financially or sectorally dependent rulers. In other 
words, I argue that those rulers dependent either on a single sector or tax revenue would 
step back and make pro-capitalist policies to re-attract capitalists. And I hold that such an 
attitude can be regarded as a case of indirect accountability. 
 The reader might have noticed that not just dependence on tax revenue (from the 
whole economy) but sectoral dependence also is cited as a condition of effective exit. If 
sectoral dependence (i.e. high levels of single sector contribution), by itself, results in 
greater levels of pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policies, we consider it as a case of 
responsiveness due to ‘structural dependence’—which is explained below as an 
alternative argument—but not accountability. However, capital outflows from a country 
and investment strike are indications of unwillingness of the capitalists to reinvest or 
even keep their money in a country; i.e. ‘reactions’ to the present business environment 
(for whatever reasons). If following a trend of capital flight or investment strike, 
financially or sectorally dependent rulers step back from the present policy attitudes and 
make policy concessions to (exiting) capitalists’ interests, then we can assume rulers 
respond to capitalists’ ‘reactions’—or held accountable by exiting capital owners.   
 Therefore, controlling for other factors, we expect to see responsiveness to 
business interests (indirect accountability) as a result of capital flight or investment strike 
if and only if incumbents are highly dependent on either (1) extraction from domestic 
productive forces or (2) a single sector.  
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ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES  
(Pro-Capitalist Policymaking but NO Accountability)  
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I underlined that not every kind of pro-capitalist 
policymaking can be considered as responsiveness or indirect accountability; and that 
indirect accountability indicates responding to business reactions only when the latter 
possesses adequate bargaining-power to extract policy concessions (i.e. the ability to 
punish the ruler by exiting). This argument indicates that there may be cases where 
policymaking may be in the interest of capitalists, even though either (1) there is no 




1) Exogenous Factors:   
This kind of policy-making is unilateral, because, government makes pro-capitalist or 
pro-leading sector policies while there is no intensive reaction of the private sector. Such 
a case might result from (a) a fiscal crisis; hence aims at appealing to domestic and 
foreign investment; (b) the conditionalities attached to a loan borrowed from an 
international institution.  
 
 
(a) Fiscal crisis:  
Unilaterally made policies favoring capitalist interests are likely to be implemented 
following a systemic crisis. The fiscal crisis that most developing countries (especially 
ME countries) went through during mid-80s, and the following economic liberalization 
attempts are good examples of this sort of interest realization. As Waterbury notes, 
governments were no longer able to mobilize or borrow the investment resources needed 
to stimulate economic growth in the economy. Thus, they had to attract indigenous, 
regional or foreign capital to undertake the task. A student of state-business relations in 
the Middle East, Peter Moore explains the process as follows:  
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“Following the optimism of independence and the soft budget constraints of the 
1960s and 1970s, many states witnessed economic near-reversal in the 1980s and 
1990s. In Africa and the Middle East, declines in exogenous revenue and persistent 
low economic growth rates have strained fiscal systems and induced chronic debt. 
…In tandem with global market shifts, demographic pressures in every developing 
country have made acute the need for more productive growth; that is, not merely 
greater economic expansion (higher output) but longer-term investment and 
developmentally nutritious private-sector expansion. The policy responses to and 
political effects of these pressures have not been uniform. Some states have pursued 
successful reform, some have retrenched, some have undergone regime change, and 
others continue to struggle with reform implementation. However, in almost every 
case, state officials have attempted to balance the need for increased domestic 




In brief, in those countries strained by financial crisis, in order to rid themselves of 
financial burdens and to mobilize private resources, the policy-makers had to ‘trade 
policy concessions for investment.’111 In Togo, for example, economic shock gave 
government the impetus needed to start the liberalization process.112 However, as 
Waterbury underlines, “such economic liberalization process was certainly in the interest 




(b)  External Pressures  
Sometimes policy changes may come through the pressures of international financial 
institutions rather than through the efforts of the investors themselves114 or economic 
shocks. Alan Richards notes that “in the midst of the financial crisis the region of the 
Middle East, many economists … advocated some variant of what has come to be known 
as the "Washington Consensus" to deal with this problem”115
                                                 
110 Moore, Doing Business in the Middle East, p. 2.   
 The term ‘Washington 
111 Waterbury, "From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p. 160. 
112 Hans P. Binswanger & Klaus Deininger, "Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in 
Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35, no.4 
(December 1997), pp. 1958-2005 cited in Takamasa Akıyama et al., Commodity Market Reforms: Two 
Lessons, World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2001),  p. 87-88.  
113 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.395. 
114 Waterbury, “From Social Contacts to Extraction Contracts,” p.161.  
115 Alan Richards, “The Global Financial Crisis and Economic Reform in the Middle East,” Middle 
East Policy, no.1 (February 1999). 
 38  
Consensus’ was originally coined by Williamson in 1990 “to refer to the lowest common 
denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington-based institutions to 
Latin American countries as of 1989.”116
 
 These policies were: 
- Fiscal discipline 
- A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high 
economic returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as 
primary health care, primary education, and infrastructure 
- Tax reform (to lower marginal rates and broaden the tax base) 
- Interest rate liberalization 
- A competitive exchange rate 
- Trade liberalization 
- Liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment 
- Privatization 
- Deregulation (to abolish barriers to entry and exit) 
- Secure property rights.117
 
 
As Richards states, the international agencies (IMF and World Bank) and the U.S. 
government actively and persistently promoted such policy changes throughout the world 
via conditionalities attached to financial assistance they provided.118
 
 In some Sub-
Saharan African countries, for example, it is noted that  
“the serious fiscal problems resulting from the sharp decline in commodity prices 
forced many governments to look to international organizations and donor countries 
for financial assistance. This assistance came with strings attached, in the form of 
conditionalities requiring market reforms.”119
 
 
Conditionality is the key term with regard to the concept of “external pressure” that 
we want to control for. “Conditionality links financial support to the implementation of a 
program of reforms that are considered critical for the country’s economic and social 
                                                 
116 John Williamson. “What Should the World Bank Think About the Washington Consensus?” World 
Bank Research Observer (Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 
Vol. 15, No. 2 (August 2000), pp. 251-264 cited in “Washington Consensus,” Center for International 
Development at Harvard University, Global Trade Negotiations Home Page 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washingtonlink.html#_2.  
117Ibid.  
118 Richards, “The Global Financial Crisis and Economic Reform in the Middle East”. 
119 Binswanger and Deininger (1997) cited in Takamasa Akıyama et al., Commodity Market Reforms 
– Two Lessons, p. 87-88.  
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development.”120 The IMF loans, for example, are “generally conditional on the adoption 
of appropriate policies to resolve a country's balance of payments difficulties, and to 
enable the government to repay the Fund,”121 and conditionality has been regarded as “a 
salient aspect of the Fund's involvement with its member countries.”122 The scope of 
conditionality has expanded, particularly since the early 1980s.123 In the 1970s, only 26 
percent of IMF loan disbursements involved substantial conditionality, but the Latin 
American debt crisis in the 1980s and the expansion of lending to Africa increased this 
figure to 66 percent by the end of the 1980s.124 Furthermore, structural conditions have 
become a major element of conditionality. While structural measures were rarely an 
element in Fund-supported programs until the 1980s, by the late 1980s, almost two thirds 
of Fund-supported programs contained structural conditionality—structural performance 
criteria, benchmarks or prior actions—and by the mid 1990s, nearly all arrangements 
included some structural conditions.125
                                                 
120 The World Bank Development Committee “Review of World Bank Conditionality,” The World 
Bank Operations Policy and Country Service (September, 2005), p.15.  
 It is noted that “a large share of the Fund's 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/20651860/DC2005-0013%28E%29-
Conditionality.pdf. Also see The IMF, Policy Development and Review Department, “Conditionality in 
Fund-Supported Programs—Overview,” (February 20, 2001)  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/policy/index.htm 
121 The IMF, “IMF Conditionality,” (September 2009),  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/conditio.htm 
122 IMF, Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs—Overview.  
123 Ibid.   
124 James M. Boughton, “Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund, 1979-1989,” 
(Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2001), p. 561. cited in Randall W. Stone, The Scope of 
IMF Conditionality, manuscript, January 23, 2008, pp. 5-6. 
125 The graph below displays the share of programs with structural conditions in total programs 
approved.  
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conditionality has been in the core areas of fiscal policy, the financial sector, and the 
exchange and trade system, and that these areas account for much of the increase in 
structural conditionality over the past decade.”126
  
 Overall, because the conditionalities 
attached to financial assistance programs are, by definition, of a pro-capitalist nature, we 
need to control for existence of a ‘relationship’ with an international agency.  
 
2) Dependence on a Single Sector  
In some cases, we may see responsiveness of an authoritarian incumbent to the concerns 
of the leading sector although the businesses in that sector possess limited exit-credibility. 
One sufficient condition for the existence of such an interest-realization is the state’s 
dependence on a single immobile sector.   
A student of the sectoral approach, Michael Shafer argues that for sectors with high 
production inflexibility and asset/factor inflexibility barriers to exit are insurmountable. 
As a result, he claims, owners of assets in those sectors demand for political, market-
resisting relief; they pursue strategies aimed at obtaining state protection against the 
market and change.127 From the perspective of the state, he also argues that high 
production inflexibility means that “market downturns have instantaneous, catastrophic 
consequences for the state; revenues and foreign exchange.”128
To account for the impact of sectoral dependence on economic policymaking, thus I 
control for the contribution of the leading sector of a country to total economic activity.  
 In such a case no actor, 
neither the state nor capitalists, have viable exit options: The state is dependent on a 
single sector for its revenue; and the leading sector is dependent on the state for its 
economic survival. As a result, the government voluntarily makes policies favoring the 
sector that generates a great portion of the government revenue.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
IMF, “Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs—Overview.” Also the IMF, Policy Development and 
Review Department, “Structural Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs, approved by Jack Boorman, 
(February 16, 2001), p. 8-9.  
126 IMF, Conditionality in Fund-Supported Programs—Overview  
127 Shafer, Winners and Losers, pp.33-4.  
128 Ibid.  





CHAPTER III  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN  
AND 
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES 
 
 
I conduct a time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis to examine the prospects of 
indirect accountability in non-democratic regimes. The time frame of the analysis is 
between 2001 and 2007, which is limited due to challenges of gathering data for non-
democratic countries.  
 
 
THE SAMPLE  
The sample of the present study is composed of the countries under non-democratic 
regimes. As explained in Chapter One, non-democratic regimes may take different forms, 
yet the defining feature of all of these regimes is the absence of the minimum criteria of 
electoral democracy: free and fair elections:129 “free and fair, both in the ability of 
opposition parties and candidates to campaign and in the casting and counting of the 
votes.”130 As Diamond underlines, those regimes (even if they have multiple parties and 
hold regular elections) lack at least one key requirement: an arena of contestation 
sufficiently fair that the ruling party can be turned out of power. 131
 The sample of the present study was constructed in light of these definitions of 
electoral democracy. That is, those countries which cannot satisfy even the minimum 
  
                                                 
129 Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” p. 6; Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, 2002, 
p.27. 
130 Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, p. 27. 
131 Ibid. 
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criteria of democracy—which are not even an electoral democracy—are included in the 
sample. To determine non-democracies I am using Freedom House’s Political Rights 
Index ratings in combination with the Electoral Democracies List.132 The Political Rights 
checklist, which is used to rate countries on the level of political rights, is composed of 
three subsections: Electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning 
of government. In accordance with the definition of “electoral democracy,” Freedom 
House uses only the subcategory on electoral process to form a list of electoral 
democracies. In spite of the practicality of the list, it covers a short period of time and 
does not have numerical data. Because of this, I am also relying on the ratings of the 





Table 1 - Freedom House, Political Rights Index ratings and the corresponding number of  
electoral democracies.    
 
 
*Does not include the countries which were no longer present by the end of 2007. 
  
 
The Political Rights ratings are on a 1 to 7 scale. Countries rated between 3 and 5 
(inclusive) have damaging elements that undermine political rights—such as “civil war, 
military involvement in politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party 
                                                 
132 The Freedom House, Political Rights Ratings and Checklist, and also their criteria for determining 
electoral democracies are presented in Appendix I.  
133 The other index of the Freedom House, Civil Liberties Index, pertains to the qualifications of 
liberal democracy, rather than the minimum requirements of electoral democracy. Accordingly, I am not 
using that Civil Liberties Index to determine non-democracies.   












the time At least once 
   1 – 2.5 Free 61 0 0 
2.6 – 3.5 Partly Free 30 0 3 (%10) 
3.6 – 4.5 Partly Free 25 1 (4%) 10 (%40) 
4.6 – 5.5 Partly Free 31 17 (55%) 22 (71%) 
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dominance.”134 Countries rated 6 on political rights “have systems ruled by military 
juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats;” and “for countries and 
territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent as a result 
of the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or severe oppression in combination 
with civil war.”135 We observe that a country which is listed as electoral democracy is 
generally rated 4 or less on the political rights in that particular year, although there are 
exceptions.136 Further, as presented on Table 1, those countries which are not listed as 
electoral democracies between 2001 and 2006 cluster within the category of 4.6 and 
above on the Political Rights Index ratings from 1972 to 2005. Based on this observation, 
I use the following criteria to determine the non-democratic countries to be added into the 
research sample: “Average Political Rights Index rating between 1972 and 2007 equals 
or is greater than 4.6 AND is not listed as electoral democracy more than three 
consecutive years between 2000 and 2007.” The second part of this criterion guaranties 
that the country in question is still not an electoral democracy, and enables us to work 
with robust non-democratic cases. However, as it might be expected, not all non-
democracies of the world are in the sample. Data availability highly constrains case-
selection when one works with non-democratic regimes. Thus, among non-democratic 
countries, only the ones having the necessary data were added into the research sample, 
which constitutes around 65 percent of the non-democracies in the world. Table 4 
presents a list of all the non-democratic countries ranked by the degree of nondemocracy. 
Those covered by the research are written in bold.137
 
 
                                                 
134 The Freedom House, Freedom in the World (Methodology),  http://www.freedomhouse.org  
135 Ibid.  
136 There are some countries which score 4 on political rights but are not listed as electoral democracy. 
For example, based on 2006 scores (2007 edition) Zambia, Kuwait, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tanzania, Fiji, 
and Malaysia score 4 on political rights, but are not listed as electoral democracy.  However, Comoros, 
Sierra Leone, Malawi, Nigeria, Guatemala, Bangladesh, Venezuela, score 4 on political rights and are also 
listed in the Electoral Democracies list.   
137  Besides data availability issues, Lebanon and Singapore were also excluded from the sample 
because they are atypical cases relative to the countries in sample. Lebanon is the only country in the 
sample whose leading sector is the service sector. And Singapore is a city-state which displays highly 
different economic characteristics relative to the sample-countries. Further Singapore scores very high on 
all the indicators of the pro-capitalist policy categories; thus, its inclusion in the analysis either boosts or 
drops the degree of almost all correlations. Hence, although exclusion of Singapore would mean dropping a 
country with a manufacturing sector (which is already scarce in the sample), after a careful consideration I 
decided to exclude that country to preserve sample coherence and avoid spurious correlations (especially 
during the phase of constructing the dependent variable) due to an outlier case.   
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Table 2 – The list of Nondemocratic Countries 
(Those covered by the sample are written in bold) 
 



























1 North Korea 1* 7.0 0.0  35 Congo (Brazzaville) 1 5.9 1.2 
2 Burma 1 6.9 0.2  36 Ethiopia 1 5.9 1.1 
3 Turkmenistan 1 6.9 0.3  37 Azerbaijan 1 5.9 0.4 
4 Vietnam 1 6.9 0.3  38 Kazakhstan 1 5.9 0.4 
5 Iraq 1 6.9 0.3  39 Tunisia 1 5.8 0.4 
6 Uzbekistan 1 6.9 0.4  40 Swaziland 1 5.8 0.7 
7 Equatorial Guinea 1 6.8 0.4  41 Bahrain 1 5.7 0.8 
8 Somalia 1 6.8 0.4  42 Liberia 0.6 5.7 0.9 
9 Cuba 1 6.7 0.5  43 UAE 1 5.7 0.6 
10 China 1 6.7 0.5  44 Iran 1 5.7 0.5 
11 Laos 1 6.7 0.6  45 Bhutan 1 5.6 1.1 
12 Libya 1 6.7 0.5  46 Cnt..African Rep.  0.6 5.6 1.6 
13 Afghanistan 1 6.6 0.7  47 Belarus 1 5.6 1.0 
14 Congo (Kinshasa) 1 6.5 0.5  48 Yugoslavia 0.6 5.6 0.9 
15 Eritrea 1 6.5 0.5  49 Uganda 1 5.5 1.1 
16 Guinea 1 6.5 0.5  50 Egypt 1 5.5 0.6 
17 Saudi Arabia 1 6.5 0.5  51 Gabon 1 5.5 0.7 
18 Angola 1 6.5 0.5  52 Tanzania 1 5.5 0.8 
19 Burundi  0.6** 6.5 0.9  53 Zimbabwe 1 5.3 1.0 
20 Rwanda 1 6.5 0.5  54 Yemen 1 5.3 0.6 
21 Syria 1 6.5 0.7  55 Maldives 1 5.2 1.0 
22 Cambodia 1 6.4 0.8  56 Burkina Faso 1 5.1 1.4 
23 Chad 1 6.3 0.5  57 Jordan 1 5.1 0.9 
24 Brunei 1 6.3 0.5  58 Lebanon 1 5.1 1.2 
25 Mauritania 1 6.3 0.6  59 Bosnia-Herzegovina 1 5.0 0.8 
26 Togo 1 6.3 0.6  60 Kyrgyzstan 1 5.0 0.8 
27 Cameroon 1 6.2 0.4  61 Djibouti 0.8*** 4.9 1.1 
28 Sudan 1 6.2 1.0  62 Kuwait 1 4.9 0.9 
29 Haiti 1 6.2 1.0  63 Comoros 0.5 4.8 0.8 
30 Oman 1 6.1 0.3  64 Pakistan 1 4.8 1.5 
31 Tajikistan 1 6.1 1.0  65 Tonga 1 4.8 0.6 
32 Algeria 1 6.0 0.6  66 Singapore 1 4.6 0.5 
33 Qatar 1 5.9 0.8  67 Zambia 1 4.6 1.0 
34 Cote d'Ivorie 1 5.9 0.3  68 Morocco 1 4.6 0.7 
 
* 1: Always listed as a non-democracy between 2001 and 2006; **0.6 At least once or twice was listed as 
an electoral democracy, but then has become a non-democracy again; ***0.8 More than twice listed as an 
electoral democracy.  
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THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE  
(Government Responsiveness to Business Interests)  
 
Assessing whether a non-democratic incumbent responds to the interests/demands of 
business due to ‘credible exit-threat’ or ‘exit’ of the private sector (or under the 
conditions specified by the hypotheses), requires, in the first place, specifying what those 
interests are. The structural dependence theory, conceptualizes capitalists as a unified 
body holding similar interests. Although the essence of my arguments is based upon that 
theory, I partly disagree with its view of capitalists. Instead, relying on the ‘sectoral view 
of business’, I maintain that while there may be some common capitalist interests such as 
a secure and free investment environment, for example, capitalists may have divergent 
interests on particular public policies due to the sectors and market structures they are 
located in.  
 One of the contemporary students of the sectoral approach, Michael Shafer, 
defines sector as a type of economic activity (mining, industrial plantation crop 
production, peasant cash crop production, or light manufacturing) that constitutes an 
enduring, coherent whole defined by a distinctive combination of four variables (capital 
intensity, economies of scale, production flexibility, and asset/factor flexibility), which 
covary.138 Shafer argues that sectoral differences in production flexibility and asset/factor 
flexibility shape the nature and the intensity of the interests of leading-sector capital and 
labor. Firms in sectors with production inflexibility, for example, cannot take evasive 
action when demand falters, and face disaster. Thus, their cries for help, Shafer argues, 
are for political, market-resisting relief.139
When there is one dominant sector in a country it is easy to define the nature of the 
prevailing business interests, and thus to assess the extent to which the rulers respond to 
those interests. However, in relatively diverse economies “economic policy is a vector of 
 Those in sectors with production flexibility, 
however, demand policies which would enable them to compete on an equal footing in 
the international market.  
                                                 
138 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p. 10.  
139 Ibid., p.33.  
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divergent and contending business interests that are sectorally determined.”140
 
 In such 
economies, it is highly challenging to evaluate responsiveness of an autocratic ruler. 
Accordingly, in this study, I mainly focus on the interests of the leading sector; assuming 
that a government is likely to be more attentive to the reactions, and thus, interests of the 
leading economic sector(s) of their country. By the leading sector I mean the most 
indispensable economic sector(s) for a government due to its contributions to revenue-
generation (directly, via corporate taxes, or indirectly, through expanding tax base for 
income and sales taxes) and to export earnings.  
The first step of the analysis therefore, is to identify the leading sectors of all the 
countries in the sample. I use general economic activity categories in that respect —such 
as agriculture, sub-categories of light or heavy manufacturing, mining, etc. Next we need 
to specify the policies (policy categories) prioritized by capitalists in those sectors—
assuming, based on sectoral approach, that their interests, hence, policy preferences are 
not the same. In that regard, I rely on the ‘sectoral approach’ which endogenizes interest 
formation to the degree of presence and absence of certain economic attributes in a 
particular sector. Finally, the level of those policies (policy categories), which we specify 
as prioritized by certain sectors, form the dependent variable(s) of the research. By using 
appropriate time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS) estimation techniques, I analyze the 
relationship between existence of ‘exit credibility’ or ‘exit’ (controlling for other factors 
as well) and the level of those sector-specific policies.  
 
 
A. Identifying of the Leading Economic Sector of a Country  
 
In general parlance, an economic sector is defined as an area of the economy in which 
businesses share the same or a related product or service. Agriculture, Industry, and 
Services constitute the broadest classification of sectors in an economy, and can be 
divided into more detailed categories of economic activities. Most time-series data 
indices cover the following main and sub-sectors 
                                                 
140 Haggard et al., “Theories of Business and Business State Relations,” p. 42.  
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- Light Manufacturing 
(Food, Beverages and Tobacco, Leather & Leather Products, Textiles, 
Clothing & Footwear, Wood Products) 
- Heavy Manufacturing  
(Chemicals, Machinery and Equipment, Processing of Rubber & Plastic, 
Electrical Engineering, Production and preliminary processing of Metals, 
Non-metallic Minerals; Transportation equipment; and Mineral Oil 
Refining & Coal) 
- Construction 
- Energy/Utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water)  
- Services, etc. 
(Transport, Storage and Communication, Wholesale, Retail Trade, Restaurants 
and Hotels (Tourism), Insurance and Financial services, etc.).  
 
As noted above, in this study, the leading sector is defined as the most indispensable 
economic sector(s) for a government due to its overall contributions to revenue-
generation (directly, via corporate taxes, or indirectly, through expanding the tax-base for 
income and sales taxes) and export earnings. Accordingly, to identify the leading 
economic sector of a country I used the average sectoral shares in GDP and export 
earnings during 1999-2007.141 Because sectoral employment data are not available for all 
countries of the sample, I was unable to include it to the measurement. Quantitative 
measurement was also supplemented by qualitative information from various sources142
 
 
to confirm and complement the results. Table 3 presents the list of the leading sectors of 





                                                 
141 Data sources for sectoral breakdown of GDP: World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) 
in combination with the United Nations-National Accounts Main Aggregates Database (NAD).  
Data sources for sectoral share in export earnings: World Bank -WDI and World Trade Organization 
(WTO) time-series merchandise trade and commercial services trade databases. All databases are available 
online.  
142 The main qualitative sources are The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Profile reports, IMF 
Article IV Consultation Staff Reports, The country reports of the Turkish Commercial Consular in various 
countries, Energy Information Administration - Country Analysis Briefs, etc.  
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After identifying the leading sector for each country in the sample, we now need to 
specify the interests of the capital owners and investors in those sectors; and accordingly, 
their likely policy demands from the incumbent policy-makers. 
 
 
B. Specifying the Interests of the Leading Sector Capitalists   
 
The interests of private-business are centered on maximizing their profit while growing at 
the same time. To achieve this goal businessmen have to master the nature of both their 
input and output-markets. Based on the source of their supplies (domestic or 
international) and also on the nature of the competition they face in the output-markets, 
capital owners and managers assess the opportunities and risks associated with their input 
and output-markets, and hence, develop strategies of survival. Besides firm-level survival 
strategies, they also aim at extracting favorable policy concessions from their government 
which could help them to achieve profit-maximization.  
To identify the policy preferences/priorities and demands of the businessmen in the 
leading sector of a country, I rely on the sectoral approach which basically argues that 
companies in different sectors have divergent interests shaped by the attributes of the 




  Table 3 - The List of the Leading Sectors  
 
The Leading Sector Product(s) Countries 
 
Agro-Industry    
     (Agriculture and first stage  
     processing of agricultural materials) Various (cotton, coffee, tea, timber, tobacco)  CAR, Tanzania, Togo 
 Coffee, cocoa,  Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Rwanda,  Uganda 
 Tobacco Zimbabwe 
 Cotton  Burkina Faso, Chad (before 2004), Uzbekistan  
 
Manufacturing    
     Clothing Industry  Haiti 
    Textile & Clothing Industries   Cambodia, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia 
    Chemicals Industry Pharmaceuticals Phosphate, Fertilizer Jordan 
    Machinery & Equipment  Consumer prod./appliances) China 
    Metal processing  Aluminum, etc. Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Tajikistan 
    Machine Building Tractor and agricultural machinery Belarus  
   
 
Mining  Precious metals-Gold Kyrgyzstan 
 Iron ore, gold Mauritania 
 Bauxite, Alumina Guinea 
 Copper & Cobalt Zimbabwe 
 
Mining & Quarrying of Energy 
Producing Materials & Mineral Oil 
Refining  
 
Petroleum, Natural gas  
 
 
Algeria, Angola,  Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Cameroon, Chad (starting 
2004), Rep. of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran,  
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, Yemen   
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Sectoral Approach  
Michael Porter claims that “the essence of strategy formulation is coping with 
competition.”143
1. Threat of new entrants  
 He argues that that the state of competition in an industry depends on 
five basic forces. These forces are 
2. Bargaining power of suppliers  
3. Bargaining power of customers  
4. Threat of substitute products or services  
5. Jockeying for position among current competitors.144
 
 
Porter asserts that “the collective strength of these forces determines the ultimate 
profit potential of an industry.” He says, “the collective strength of these forces may be 
painfully apparent to all the antagonists; but to cope with them, the strategist must delve 
below the surface and analyze the sources of each.”145 Accordingly, he offers a list of the 
underlying causes of each force.146
                                                 
143 Michael Porter, “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy” Harvard Business Review, No. 57 
(April-March 1979), p.1  
 While it may be feasible for an insider strategist, who 
has access to firm-based and sectoral data, to analyze the sources of each of these forces, 
and offer strategies of survival, as an outsider analyst with limited data I need a more 
144 Ibid.  
145 Ibid., p. 2.  
146 The threat of New Entry: Major sources of barriers to entry: economies of scale; product 
differentiation; capital requirements; cost disadvantages independent of size (learning); access to 
distribution channels; government policy.  
Bargaining Power of Suppliers: A supplier group is powerful if dominated by a few companies and more 
concentrated than the industry it sells to; its product is unique or at least differentiated, or if it has built up 
switching costs; it is not obliged to contend with other products for sale to the industry; it possess a credible 
threat to integrating forward into the industry’s business; the industry is not an important customer of the 
supplier group.  
Bargaining Power of Buyers: A buyer group is powerful if it is concentrated or purchases in large volumes; 
the product it purchases from the industry is standard or undifferentiated; the product is purchases from the 
industry form a component of its product and represent a significant fraction of its costs –likely to shop for 
favorable prices; it earns low profits, which create great incentive to lower its purchasing costs; the 
industry’s product is unimportant to the quality of the buyers’ products or services; the industry’s product 
does not save the buyer money; the buyers pose a credible threat of integrating backward to make the 
industry’s product.  
Substitute Products: By placing a ceiling on prices it can charge, substitute products or services limit the 
potential of an industry. Unless it can upgrade the quality of the product or differentiate it somehow (as via 
marketing) the industry will suffer in earnings and possibly in growth.  
Jockeying for Position: Intense rivalry is related to the presence of a number of factors: Competitors are 
numerous or are roughly equal in size and power; industry growth is slow, precipitating fights for market 
share.; the product or service lacks differentiation or switching costs; fixed costs are high or the product is 
perishable; capacity is normally augmented in large increments; exit barriers are high; the rivals are diverse 
in strategies, origins, and “personalities”.  Ibid. 
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systematic and aggregate way of assessing the extent of the forces affecting the nature of 
competition that companies face, and the strategies that they are likely to develop. 
Michael Shafer’s sectoral approach offers such a method, which, while assessing the 
collective strength of the forces Porter enumerates, and hence the nature of competition in 
a sector, also enables us to define the interests and the policy demands of the capitalists in 
different economic sectors.  
 
 
Sectoral Attributes, Market Structure and the Nature of Competition,  
and Policy Preferences 
As noted before, Shafer defines sector as a type of economic activity (such as mining, 
industrial plantation crop production, peasant cash crop production, or light 
manufacturing) that constitutes an enduring, coherent whole defined by a distinctive 
combination of four variables—capital intensity, economies of scale, production 
flexibility, and asset/factor flexibility—which covary.147 Among these variables, capital 
intensity and economies of scale, which relate to a sector’s production processes, are the 
core variables of sectoral analysis. Shafer defines capital intensity very broadly as “the 
capital costs of start-up, production, research and development, inventory, and 
distribution.148 The extent of economies of scale is defined as the extent to which 
efficiency demands large-scale production.149 In other words, it refers to the decrease in 
unit costs—or increase in efficiency of production—as the number of goods being 
produced increases. The others—production flexibility, and asset/factor flexibility—are 
composite variables and combine elements of capital intensity and economies of scale.150 
Production flexibility is the ability to meet short-term market shifts by varying output 
levels or product mix. Asset/factor flexibility refers to the sector-specificity of facilities, 
supporting infrastructure, and workforce skills.151
                                                 
147 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.10.  
 Since by definition sectoral attributes 
covary, Shafer argues that, it is possible to imagine a single continuum between two polar 
148 Ibid., p. 23 
149 Ibid., p. 24.  
150 Ibid., pp 10, 23.  
151 Ibid., p.10, 24. 
In the following sections, I present detailed definitions and operationalization of these variables. 
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ideal types: High/High (HH) Sectors, marked by high capital intensity, high economies of 
scale, and high production inflexibility and asset/factor inflexibility; and, Low/Low (LL) 
sectors, marked by the opposite.152
 Table 4 presents such a continuum constructed by using contemporary data. 
Because the process of measuring sectoral attributes is rather long and involves technical 
details, I present it separately in Appendix II. On the LL-HH Sectoral Attributes 
continuum displayed in Table 4, higher values indicate ‘LL’ sectors which are marked by 
low capital intensity and low economies of scale, and production and asset/factor 









*Higher values indicate ‘LL’ sectors which are marked by low capital intensity and low economies of 
scale, and production and asset/factor flexibility.153
                                                 
152 Ibid., p.10 
 The details of the measurement are presented in 
Appendix II. 
153 The ranking may seem to be in the ‘wrong’ direction—i.e. those sectors which are low on capital 
intensity and economies of scale are marked by higher values in this scale. Yet because I use the same scale 
to measure the extent of exit opportunities that the capital owners in a given sector posses, I mark those 
sectors with greater capital intensity, larger economies of scale, and production and asset/factor 
inflexibility, with low values—indicating limited exit opportunities.  
                  Sectors LL - HH  ( 0-1)* 
Fishery 1 
Leather & Leather Products 1 
Wood Products .9 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry .9 
Retail & Fixing .8 
Footwear & Clothing .7 
Hotels & Restaurants .7 
Processing of Rubber & Plastic  .6 
Food, Drink & Tobacco   .6 
Textile  .6 
Mechanical Engineering  .5 
Chemicals .5 
Production and preliminary processing of Metals .5 
Electrical (& Optical) Engineering  .4 
Non-metallic Minerals .4 
Mining & Quarrying of Energy Producing Materials .3 
Manufacture  & Assembly of Motor Vehicles  .2 
Refining of Coal and Mineral Oil  0 
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Shafer claims that “high/high and low/low sectors exhibit radically different market 
structures and pose equally different challenges to firms located in them.”154 Wherever 
sectors are marked with high capital intensity and high economies of scale, he claims, an 
oligopolistic market structure arises.155 And, where capital intensity and economies of 
scale are low, a competitive market develops.156 Porter’s five forces operate at different 
levels in these markets. Accordingly, firms confront different degrees of competition, 
thus, risks and opportunities in these markets.157
 
 Consequently, the strategies that they 
must pursue to survive, and the nature of the help they ask from the state differ 
considerably. Below I present the characteristics of these markets, the risks and 
opportunities associated with them, and the likely interests and demands of the 
companies located in them.  
 
a) Low/Low Sectors: Competitive Markets and Market-Conforming  Strategies  
 
Where capital intensity and economies of scale are low, competition prevails.158 A 
competitive market is one “with many buyers and sellers trading identical products.”159 
Shafer states that in competitive markets Porter’s five criteria work in full force. Lower 
capital costs and technical complexity, and also non-sector-specific management and 
labor force minimize barriers to entry; thus the number of firms in the market is large and 
their size is small. As a result, “there are no monopoly rents.”160 In other words, since 
firms are price-takers and at the mercy of the market, there is “no prospect of managing 
the market” 161
                                                 
154 Ibid., p.25. 
 as in the case of oligopoly. Shafer also notes that due to small firm size 
each firm is a negligible buyer of inputs, reducing the bargaining power with suppliers. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., p.23.  
158 Ibid., p. 25.  
159 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, Third Ed. (South-Western/ Thomson, 2003), 
p. 290. 
160 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.25.  
161 Ibid. 
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Also “the lack of proprietary technology and of product differentiation limits switching 
costs, putting customers on top.”162
All these forces work against the profitability of companies. Since collective 
responses and market control are out of the picture in competitive markets, firms must 
pursue individual market-conforming strategies.
  
163 That is, “they must improve their 
ability to follow the market and adjust quickly to changes in order to lose less than the 
competition in downturns and get more in upturns. Unable to shape their environment, 
firms must adapt themselves to its dictates better than their competitor do, or die.”164 
According to Shafer, the key areas that firms must especially concentrate on to improve 
their competitiveness, and thus profitability, are price, on–time delivery, and quality.165
Shafer also points out a “marvelous irony”: He states that “however competitive 
low/low sectors are, the dominance of market-conforming strategies locates the variables 
critical for success within the reach of local actors and the state, and ensures that they can 
compete on an equal footing with any player in the market place.”
  
166 Thus, “the help 
firms demand, in keeping up with the requirements of competitiveness in such sectors, 
can be economic (market-conforming), and easily granted by the state.”167
 
 As an example 
of such demands we can mention the complaints/demands uttered by the private sector 
representatives (except for the mining sector) at a roundtable organized by the Guinean 
government in 2002. The memorandum lists the main obstacles hampering development 
of the private sector, as follows:  
“Administrative harassment, difficult access to loans and foreign currency, taxation, 
the high cost of inputs, inadequate infrastructure and production equipment, banditry 










166 Ibid., p. 30. 
167 Ibid., p. 33.  
168Guinean Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Handicrafts (CCIAG), Guinean National Chamber 
of Agriculture (CNAG), Guinean National Employers’ Council (CNPG), "Mémorandum sur les difficultés 
du secteur privé guinéen adressé au Gouvernement" (May 2000) in World Trade Organization, “Trade 
Policy Reviews,” S153R1-4 (Republic of Guinea), p. 62.  
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b) High/High Sectors: Oligopolistic Market-Structure and Market-Resisting Relief 
Strategies   
 
As noted above, High/High sectors are marked by high capital intensity, high economies 
of scale, and high production inflexibility and asset/factor inflexibility. According to 
Shafer, these attributes, taken together, give rise to oligopoly,169 which is “a market 
structure in which only a few sellers offer similar or identical products.”170 An example 
of oligopoly is the world market for crude oil: A few countries in the Middle East control 
much of the world’s oil reserves.171
Shafer states that oligopoly has two faces: one is limited competition and high 
barriers to entry; and the other is high barriers to exit. The attributes of sectors such as 
“high capital costs, big economies of scale, technical complexity, and the need for 
specialized infrastructure, management, and labor pose high barriers to entry.”
  
172 The 
same factors, especially specialized infrastructure, management and labor, also create 
high barriers to exit. For Shafer says, “large sunk investments in sector-specific capital 
equipment, facilities, infrastructure, management, and skilled labor … guarantee high 
barriers to exit.”173 While high barriers to entry limit the number of competitors, and 
thus, insulate firms from profit-diminishing intense rivalry, high exit-barriers work in the 
opposite direction. Porter argues that “exit barriers … keep companies competing even 
though they may be earning low or even negative returns on investment. Excess capacity 
remains functioning, and the profitability of the healthy companies suffers as the sick 
ones hang on.”174 As a group therefore, oligopolists, “…must manage twin threats to 
profitability—new entrants and price competition…”175 For this purpose, firms in an 
oligopolistic market can cooperate and act like a monopolist. They might reach an 
agreement over production and price (collusion), or might act in unison (cartel).176
                                                 
169 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.33. 
 
170 Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics, p. 346. 
171 Ibid.   
172 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.25.  
173 Ibid.  
174 Porter, “How Competitive Forces Shape Strategy,” p. 7.  
175 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p. 25.  
176 Mankiw,  Principles of Microeconomics, pp. 347-8.  
Firms in oligopolistic markets confront a tension between cooperation and self-interest. Although 
oligopolists would be better off cooperating and reaching the monopoly outcome, each pursues its  own 
self-interest and thus, is tempted to raise production and capture a larger share of the market. As each of 
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Accordingly, any state policy against monopolistic ‘cooperation’ among oligopolists, that 
is, any policy that would induce firms in an oligopoly to compete rather than cooperate177
Besides price competition and the threat of new entrants, firms in high/high sectors, 
thus in oligopolistic markets, also face high risks due to production inflexibility. 
Production flexibility refers to ability to meet short-term market shifts by varying output 
levels or product mix. Shafer argues that the ability or inability to follow the market 
determines the intensity of sectoral actors’ interests and the nature of their demands.
 
(such as anti-trust laws) would be undesirable from the standpoint of oligopolists.  
178 In 
other words, firms’ (in)ability to respond to market downturns in the short-term shapes 
their interests. Firms with production inflexibility, he says, cannot take evasive action 
when demand flattens. That is, they cannot lower production, cut costs or lay off workers. 
On the contrary, “they must keep producing flat out even when glutted markets force 
prices below production costs. (…) So, they face disaster.”179 Against the risks inherent 
in high fixed cost and unstable markets, thus, Shafer says, “they must pursue political 
strategies aimed at obtaining state protection against the market and change.”180 In other 
words, because the state cannot help firms to compete, the help that firms in high/high 
sectors demand from the state is “market-resisting relief.”181 Market-resisting (MR) 
policies intend to protect firms against market fluctuations (risks) or to cover their losses. 
As Shafer nicely puts it, firms in high/high sectors are “obsessed with state policy.”182  
“Even in good times,” he says, “they cannot control many variables affecting 
profitability, and thus devote their energy to controlling those within their reach—such as 
taxes, tariffs, and transportation and port fees.”183
                                                                                                                                                 
them tries to do this, total production rises, and the price falls. … However, despite such incentives to 
defect, cartels sometimes manage to maintain collusive arrangements. The reason is that “the game” is 
played many times and as a result the threat of penalty appears. When they make their initial agreement to 
keep production low, they can also specify what happens if one party defects. They might agree, for 
example, that if one of them defects and increases production, the other will also do the same, and both of 
them will produce at the increased amount thereafter, which will in turn lower the price and thus their 
profit. As long as the players care enough about future profits, they may choose to forgo the one-time gain 
from defection and may be able to reach cooperation. (Ibid, pp.351, 361-2) 
  More specifically, for the mining 
177 Ibid., p.363.  
178 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.33.  
179 Ibid.   
180 Ibid., p. 34. (Emphasis added)  
181 Ibid., p. 33.  
182 Ibid., p. 43-4.  
183 Ibid. 
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firms, for example, he states that “the mining firms cannot take evasive action; 
consequently, they demand cuts in taxes, tariffs, and transportation and utilities rates to 
survive, exaggerating the pain that price drops inflict on the state.”184
* 
  
So far I have explained how I identify the leading economic sector of a country and 
the approach I pursue to determine the interests of the leading sector. In that regard, I 
summarized the rationale of the sectoral approach: The way sectoral attributes (capital 
intensity, economies of scale, production and asset/factor flexibility) shape market 
structures (competitive or oligopolistic) and the required “risk management strategies”185
In the following section, I explain the measurement of sector specific policies; or to 
state it better, the economic policies we assume (based on sectoral approach) to be  
prioritized by Low/Low and High/High sectors, along with those polices that are of 
common interests to all capitalists.   
 
(market-conforming or market resisting relief) so that firms overcome the challenges 
posed by the nature of sectors they are located in. The conclusions we draw from the 
preceding section is summarized in Table 5.  
 
                                                 
184 Ibid., p. 63 
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C. Measurement of the  Dependent Variable(s)  
 
In the light of the two different definitions of business—as capital, and hence as a unified 
body with common interests, and also as a sector with divergent interests shaped by the 
attributes of the sectors they invest in—I constructed a set of policy categories to measure 
the degree of common and sector-specific policies. These policy categories are  
 
- Common pro-Capitalist policies 
 
- Market-Conforming Policies (Policies assumed to be prioritized by capital owners 
in LL sectors  
 
- Market-Resisting / Particularistic Policies (Policies assumed to be prioritized by 
capital owners in HH sectors) 
 
In the following part of this section, under each policy heading, I present an 
overview of the items used to measure that variable, and also the measurement details of 
those items.  
 
 
Common pro-Capitalist Policies  
The first policy category is composed of a set of macroeconomic policies which, I 
assume, address common capitalist interests—regardless of sectoral differences. These 
policies guarantee a free and secure environment for investment and capital 
accumulation, and enable a stable and predictable pricing policy for the firms. The 
following five items, which form a single dimension on the factor analysis, are used to 
measure the extent of prevalence of pro-capitalist policies in a country: 
 
- Protection of property rights and the rule of law  
- Free banking system and ease of accessing competitive bank credits 
- Foreign investment freedom and freedom to access to foreign exchange  
- Lower inflation  (domestic price stability)  





a. Protection of Property Rights and the Rule of Law 
No capital accumulation is possible (or desirable) without a well functioning legal system 
which protects property rights, enforces contracts, and settles disputes in an impartial 
manner. Furthermore, in a competitive market structure, where many firms interact, the 
rule of law guarantees the peaceful functioning of the system.  
To measure the extent to which the existing legal environment in a country 
encourages private investment, an item from the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom (the 
Heritage Foundation) on ‘Property Rights’ is used.186 This item “scores the degree to 
which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will 
be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of 
corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce 
contracts.”187
                                                 
186The Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom (2008 edition)  
 On a zero-to-one scale, the less certain is the legal protection of property 
http://www.heritage.org/Index/ (The data published in the 2008 edition of the IEF refers to 2006-7 period. 
Hence, the data were recoded accordingly.) 
187 The authors use the following criteria to grade each country on a zero-to-100 scale: 
100—Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently 
and quickly. The justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. There is no 
corruption or expropriation.  
90—Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently. The 
justice system punishes those who unlawfully confiscate private property. Corruption is nearly nonexistent, 
and expropriation is highly unlikely. 
80—Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system enforces contracts efficiently but 
with some delays. Corruption is minimal, and expropriation is highly unlikely. 
70—Private property is guaranteed by the government. The court system is subject to delays and is lax in 
enforcing contracts. Corruption is possible but rare, and expropriation is unlikely. 
60—Enforcement of property rights is lax and subject to delays. Corruption is possible but rare, and the 
judiciary may be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is unlikely. 
50—The court system is inefficient and subject to delays. Corruption may be present, and the judiciary may 
be influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is possible but rare. 
40—The court system is highly inefficient, and delays are so long that they deter the use of the court 
system. Corruption is present, and the judiciary is influenced by other branches of government. 
Expropriation is possible. 
30—Property ownership is weakly protected. The court system is highly inefficient. Corruption is 
extensive, and the judiciary is strongly influenced by other branches of government. Expropriation is 
possible. 
20—Private property is weakly protected. The court system is so inefficient and corrupt that outside 
settlement and arbitration is the norm. Property rights are difficult to enforce. Judicial corruption is 
extensive. Expropriation is common. 
10—Private property is rarely protected, and almost all property belongs to the state. The country is in such 
chaos (for example, because of ongoing war) that protection of property is almost impossible to enforce. 
The judiciary so corrupt that property is not protected effectively. Expropriation is common. 
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b. Free Banking System and Ease of Accessing Competitive Bank Credits 
Banks provide an essential service for the development of private business; they lend 
money to start business or to finance expenses. Accessing credit is so vital for private 
business that “firms consistently rate access to credit as among the greatest barriers to 
their operation and growth.”189 An efficient financial market system reduces reliance on 
internal funds and money from informal sources such as family and friends by connecting 
firms to a broad range of lenders and investors.190
                                                                                                                                                 
0—Private property is outlawed, and all property belongs to the state. People do not have the right to sue 
others and do not have access to the courts. Corruption is endemic. 
 A major factor that precludes financial-
market efficiency is direct control of banks by government. Not only does it impede 
access to competitive, hence cheaper, financing opportunities, but it also usually involves 
corruption.  
Sources: The authors used the following sources for information on property rights, in order of priority: 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2005–2007; U.S. Department of Commerce, Country 
Commercial Guide, 2005–2007; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 
2005–2007; and U.S. Department of State, Investment Climate Statements 2007. 
William W. Beach and Tim Kane, “Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic Freedoms” in The 
Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom (2008 edition), pp.51-2. http://www.heritage.org/Index/   
188 To convert the raw scores to a zero-to-one scale the following formula was used:  
[1- ((Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin))]. Vmax and Vmin were set to 100 and 0, respectively.  
There are also other indices which assess the extent of protection of property rights and the 
functioning of the legal framework especially regarding private business issues. Global Competitiveness 
Index refers to two survey questions in this respect:  
 
- “Property rights, including over financial assets are poorly defined and not protected by law (= 
1) or are clearly defined and well protected by law (= 7).”  
 
-  “The legal framework in your country for private businesses to settle disputes and challenge the 
legality of government actions and/or regulations is inefficient and subject to manipulation (= 1) 
or is efficient and follows a clear, neutral process (= 7).  
 
Because the Index has limited country and time coverage, I am unable to use it for the actual analysis. 
However, for cross-checking/assessing the reliability of the measure I use, I believe that it is worthwhile to 
see the correlation between the combination of these survey items and the IEF-Property Rights item. Thus, 
I convert the survey results to a zero-to-ten scale and combine them. The correlation between the survey 
questions and the IEF measure is very high (.77).  
189 International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group), Doing Business: Measuring Business 
Regulations, Report on Algeria, p.28, http://www.doingbusiness.org/Downloads/ 
190 International Finance Corporation (World Bank Group), Enterprise Surveys, Country Profiles: 
Burundi (2006), p.6,  http://www.enterprisesurveys.org 
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To measure the extent of deregulation of the private banking system I employ the 
‘Financial Freedom’ component of the Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage 
Foundation).191 This item scores “the extent of government regulation of financial 
services; the extent of state intervention in banks and other financial services; the 
difficulty of opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and 
foreign individuals); and government influence on the allocation of credit.”192 On a zero-
to-one scale, one indicates negligible government influence and freedom to access 
competitive credits.193
                                                 
191 The Heritage Foundation, Index of Economic Freedom (2008 edition), 
   
192 Beach and Kane, “Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic Freedoms,” pp.49-50. 
193 The authors use the following criteria to grade each country on a zero-to-100 scale: 
100—Negligible government influence: Independent central bank supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions are limited to enforcing contractual obligations and preventing fraud. Credit is allocated on 
market terms. The government does not own financial institutions. Financial institutions may engage in all 
types of financial services. Banks are free to issue competitive notes, extend credit and accept deposits, and 
conduct operations in foreign currencies. Foreign financial institutions operate freely and are treated the 
same as domestic institutions. 
90—Minimal government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: Independent central 
bank supervision and regulation of financial institutions are minimal but may extend beyond enforcing 
contractual obligations and preventing fraud. 
80—Nominal government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: Independent 
central bank supervision and regulation are straightforward and transparent but extend beyond enforcing 
contractual obligations and preventing fraud. Government ownership of financial institutions is a small 
share of overall sector assets. Financial institutions face almost no restrictions on their ability to offer 
financial services. 
70—Limited government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: Credit allocation is 
slightly influenced by the government, and private allocation of credit faces almost no restrictions. Foreign 
financial institutions are subject to few restrictions. 
60—Significant government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: The central bank is 
not fully independent, its supervision and regulation of financial institutions are somewhat burdensome, 
and its ability to enforce contracts and prevent fraud is insufficient. The government exercises active 
ownership and control of financial institutions with a significant share of overall sector assets. The ability 
of financial institutions to offer financial services is subject to some restrictions. 
50—Considerable government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: Credit allocation is 
significantly influenced by the government, and private allocation of credit faces significant barriers. The 
ability of financial institutions to offer financial services is subject to significant restrictions. Foreign 
financial institutions are subject to some restrictions. 
40—Strong government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: The central bank is 
subject to government influence, its supervision and regulation of financial institutions are heavy, and its 
ability to enforce contracts and prevent fraud is weak. The government exercises active ownership and 
control of financial institutions with a large minority share of overall sector assets. 
30—Extensive government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: Credit allocation is 
extensively influenced by the government. The government owns or controls a majority of financial 
institutions or is in a dominant position. Financial institutions are heavily restricted, and bank formation 
faces significant barriers. Foreign financial institutions are subject to significant restrictions. 
20—Heavy government influence. Same as above with the following exceptions: The central bank is not 
independent, and its supervision and regulation of financial institutions are repressive. Foreign financial 
institutions are discouraged or highly constrained. 
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c. Investment Freedom and Access to Foreign Exchange  
The ‘Investment Freedom’ item from the Index of Economic Freedom (the Heritage 
Institute) is used to measure the extent of restrictions on foreign direct investment and 
also on access to foreign exchange internally. Questions used to examine and rate 
countries include  
“whether there is a foreign investment code that defines the country’s investment 
laws and procedures; whether the government encourages foreign investment 
through fair and equitable treatment of investors; whether there are restrictions on 
access to foreign exchange; whether foreign firms are treated the same as 
domestic firms under the law; whether the government imposes restrictions on 
payments, transfers, and capital transactions; and whether specific industries are 
closed to foreign investment.”194
                                                                                                                                                 
10—Near repressive. Same as above with the following exceptions: Credit allocation is controlled by the 
government. Bank formation is restricted. Foreign financial institutions are prohibited. 
 
0—Repressive. Same as above with the following exceptions: Supervision and regulation are designed to 
prevent private financial institutions. Private financial institutions are prohibited. 
Sources. Unless otherwise noted, the authors used the following sources for data on banking and finance, in 
order of priority: The Financial Sector Reform and Strengthening (FIRST) Initiative jointly undertaken by 
the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID), the International 
Development Agency of Canada, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs of Switzerland, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or 
World Bank), and the International Monetary Fund; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 
Country Profile, and Country Report, 2005 and 2006; official government publications of each country; 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2005 and 2006; Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative, 2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; and World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2006. (Ibid., pp.49-51.)   
For Angola and Burundi, for which data start in 2005, 2005 values were imputed for the period of 2001-
2004.  
194 The authors use the following criteria to grade each country on a zero-to-100 scale: 
100—Foreign investment (FI) is encouraged and treated the same as domestic investment, with a simple 
and transparent FI code and a professional, efficient bureaucracy. There are no restrictions in sectors related 
to national security or real estate. No expropriation is allowed. Both residents and non-residents have 
access to foreign exchange and may conduct international payments. Transfers or capital transactions face 
no restrictions.  
90—Same as above with the following exceptions: There are very few restrictions on FI in sectors related 
to national security. There are legal guarantees against expropriation of property. Transfers or capital 
transactions are subject to virtually no restrictions. 
80—Same as above with the following exceptions: A transparent FI code is subject to minimal bureaucratic 
or other informal impediments. There are very few restrictions on foreign exchange. Transfers or capital 
transactions are subject to very few restrictions. 
70—Same as above with the following exceptions: There are some restrictions on FI through general rules 
or in a few sectors such as utilities, natural resources, or national security. There are a few restrictions on 
access to foreign exchange or the ability to conduct international payments. 
60—Same as above with the following exceptions: FI is generally encouraged but may not receive equal 
treatment in a few sectors. The FI code is somewhat non-transparent, and/or FI faces bureaucratic 
impediments. Expropriation of property is highly unlikely, and the government guarantees compensation. 
Transfers or capital transactions are subject to some restrictions. 
50—Same as above with the following exceptions: Foreign investors face restrictions on their ability to 
purchase real estate. All investors face bureaucratic impediments and corruption. Residents and/or non-
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d. Domestic Price Stability (Lower inflation and price controls)   
Price stability (lower and less volatile inflation) is largely controlled by a country’s 
monetary policy. A monetary policy that endeavors to maintain stability provides 
investors and producers a less risky business environment where people can rely on 
market prices for the foreseeable future. Under conditions of stability, investment, 
savings, and other longer-term plans are easier to make, and individuals enjoy greater 
economic freedom. Inflation not only confiscates wealth like an invisible tax, but also 
distorts pricing, misallocates resources, and raises the cost of doing business.195
To measure the extent to which a country’s monetary policy provides price stability, 
I employ the ‘Monetary Freedom’ component of the Index of Economic Freedom. 
Monetary freedom combines a measure of price stability with an assessment of price 
controls.  
 
The score for the monetary freedom factor is based on two factors: 
- The weighted average inflation rate for the most recent three years and 
- Price controls.196
                                                                                                                                                 
residents face some restrictions on access to foreign exchange or their ability to conduct international 
payments. Transfers or capital transactions are subject to obvious restrictions. 
  
40—Same as above with the following exceptions: FI is somewhat restricted, the FI code is somewhat 
discriminatory, and FI is restricted outright in some sectors. Expropriation of property is rare. Transfers and 
capital transactions are subject to significant restrictions. 
30—Same as above with the following exceptions: FI is significantly restricted, the FI code is 
discriminatory, and foreign investors may purchase real estate only in limited circumstances. All investors 
face significant bureaucratic impediments and corruption. Residents and non-residents face strict 
restrictions on access to foreign exchange, and the government imposes many controls on international 
payments. 
20—Same as above with the following exceptions: FI is discouraged and prohibited in many sectors, the FI 
code is discriminatory, and the approval process is opaque and subject to widespread corruption. Few 
sectors are open to FI. Expropriation of property is common. The government imposes extensive controls 
on international payments, transfers, and capital transactions. 
10—Same as above with the following exceptions: Foreign investors may not purchase real estate. The 
government controls or prohibits most international payments, transfers, and capital transactions. 
0—Same as above with the following exceptions: FI is prohibited, foreigners may not own real estate, and 
the government prohibits international payments, transfers, and capital transactions. 
Sources: Unless otherwise noted, the authors used the following sources for data on capital flows and 
foreign investment, in order of priority: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2006 and 2007; official government publications of each 
country; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, Country Profile, and Country Report, 2005–
2007; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2007 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2005–2007. (Ibid., pp.48-49.) 
195 Ibid., p.46.  
196 IEF uses the following methodology to obtain a measure of Price stability and extent of price 
controls:   
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The component was recoded on a zero-to-one scale. Countries with higher inflation rate 
and price controls, thus receive lower ratings.  
 
 
e. Nominal Exchange Rate Stability   
Analyses of the political economy of exchange rate policy posit that firms and individuals 
in different sectors of the economy have distinct policy attitudes toward the stability and 
the level the exchange rate.197 Broz et al. argue that “capturing an industry’s (or an entire 
nation’s) sensitivity to exchange rate changes involves measuring the extent to which it 
sells products to foreign markets, uses foreign-made inputs, and, more indirectly, 
competes with foreign manufacturers on the basis of price.”198
 
 They find systematic 
patterns linking sector of economic activity to exchange rate policy positions. With 
respect to the nominal exchange rate regime, they note that firms with substantial cross-
border exposure are particularly sensitive to currency volatility, and thus, are likely to be 
more satisfied with a fixed exchange rate. In an open economy, they state,  
“the main advantage of a fixed-rate regime is to lower exchange rate risk and 
transactions costs that can impede international trade and investment. Volatile 
                                                                                                                                                 
The weighted average inflation rate for the most recent three years serves as the primary input into an 
equation that generates the base score for monetary freedom. The extent of price controls is then assessed 
as a penalty of up to 20 points subtracted from the base score. The two equations used to convert inflation 
rates into the monetary freedom score are: 
Weighted Avg. Inflationi = θ1 × Inflationit + θ2 × Inflationit –1 + θ3 × Inflationit–2 
Monetary Freedomi = 100 – α × √Weighted Avg. Inflationi – PC penaltyi 
where θ1 through θ3 (thetas 1–3) represent three numbers that sum to 1 and are exponentially smaller in 
sequence (in this case, values of 0.665, 0.245, and 0.090, respectively); Inflationit is the absolute value of 
the annual inflation rate in country i during year t as measured by the consumer price index; α represents a 
coefficient that stabilizes the variance of scores; and the price control (PC) penalty is an assigned value of 
0–20 points based on the extent of price controls. The convex (square root) functional form was chosen to 
create separation among countries with low inflation rates. A concave functional form would essentially 
treat all hyperinflations as equally bad, whether they were 100 percent price increases annually or 100,000 
percent, whereas the square root provides much more gradation. The α coefficient is set to equal 6.333, 
which converts a 10 percent inflation rate into a freedom score of 80.0 and a 2 percent inflation rate into a 
score of 91.0.”  
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Online; International Monetary 
Fund, 2008 World Economic Outlook; and Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 1999–2008, and 
Country Profile, 2004–2008. (Ibid.  pp.47-48.) 
197 J Lawrence Broz, Jaffrey Frieden, and Stephen Weymouth, Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct 
Evidence from Survey Data, IMF Staff Papers Vol. 55, No. 3 (2008), p. 419.  
198 Ibid. 
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exchange rates create uncertainty about international transactions, adding a risk 
premium to the costs of goods and assets traded across borders.”199
 
 
And in their empirical analysis, Broz et al. conclude that “in countries with a floating 
currency, manufacturers are more likely to report that the exchange rate causes problems 
for their business than are producers of nontraded goods and services, who typically do 
not require foreign exchange.”200
Because in this study the leading economic sector of a country is defined as the 
largest contributor to export earnings, I assume that investors in those sectors would 
prefer greater currency stability. To asses the extent of currency stability, I employ one of 
the widely used classifications of de facto (or natural) exchange rate regimes, that of 
Reinhart and Rogoff (R&R). They assess the probability of exchange rate changes 
staying within a band (a one, two, and five percent-wide band) over a rolling five-year 
period.
  
201 Some countries are partly or totally missing in the R&R dataset. If the missing 
years are between 2000 and 2004, the values were estimated based on another widely 
used classification of de facto exchange rate regime—by Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger.202
                                                 
199 Ibid., p. 420 
 If a country is totally missing on the R&R dataset, then the IMF’s de 
200 Broz et al. test the expectation about the exchange rate regime by using the World Bank’s World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES). As they explain it, “the survey tells us only the extent to which 
corporate respondents regarded the exchange rate as ‘‘a problem,’’ which in itself is of limited use. 
However, we also know the currency regime prevailing in the country at the time of the survey, the level of 
the real exchange rate, and many things about the firms in question. By relating the prevailing exchange 
rate policy and the firm’s economic characteristics to how ‘‘problematic’’ the currency is perceived to be, 
we can draw inferences about the sources of attitudes toward the exchange rate.” Ibid. pp. 418-9.  
201 Carmen M. Reinhart, Kenneth S. Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: 
A Reinterpretation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 1-48.  
Reinhart and Rogoff’s methodology differ from the previous classification methodologies in that 
while all the prior approaches to exchange rate regime classification, whether or not they accept the 
country’s declared regime, are solely based on official exchange rates, they also take into consideration 
parallel (black) market rates. More specifically, in cases where dual or multiple rates are present or parallel 
markets are active, they focus on the market-determined rates instead of the official exchange rates in 
determining whether a regime continues from one year to the next.  
The following databases are accessible at http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html: Annual 
coarse classification (1946-2007), Annual fine classification (1946-2007), IMF official classification 
(1970-2007).  
202 Eduardo Levy-Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger, De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate 
Regimes (December 2005), http://profesores.utdt.edu/~ely/papers.html.  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger’s dataset ends in 2004. The methodology used is discussed in detail in the 
following two documents:  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, "A de facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regimes: A Methodological 
Note,” American Economic Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (September 2003). 
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jure exchange rate classification was used.203 The correlation between the R&R and the 
IMF de jure classification is .59.204 On a zero-to-one scale, high values represent greater 
exchange rate regime stability.205
* 
  
 The five items explained above form a single dimension on the factor analysis.  
The Cronbach's Alpha reliability score also indicates that they can be combined to 
construct a new variable (α = 70). Inter-item correlations and the rotated factor analysis 
results are presented in Table 6 and 7.  These items were combined by simple averaging. 
On a zero to one scale higher values indicate higher degrees of pro-Capitalist policies. 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of the variable measuring the level of ‘Common pro-







                                                                                                                                                 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, "Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes: Deeds vs. Words," European 
Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 6 (August 2005) Pages 1603-1635. 
203 Available at  http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html.  
204 The countries totally or partly missing on R&R dataset are Angola (2001), Cambodia (2001),  Iran 
(2002-2007), Oman (2002-2007), Rwanda (2001-3), Uzbekistan (no data), Yemen (no data), Zimbabwe 
(2002-7).  
205 Classification used in the R& R and the IMF datasets is as follows:  
1) No separate legal tender, Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement, Pre announced horizontal 
band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De facto peg 
2) Pre announced crawling peg, Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, De 
factor crawling peg, De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
3) Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, De facto crawling band that is 
narrower than or equal to +/-5%, Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for 
both appreciation and depreciation over time,  Managed floating 
4) Freely floating 
5) Freely falling (For situations , almost invariably due to high inflation, in which there are mega-
depreciations in the exchange rate on a routine sustained basis, they argue that  it is inappropriate and 
misleading to lump these cases in with other floating rate regimes – which is mostly what all previous 
classifications (IMF or otherwise) done. Hence, they label those episodes as freely falling.)  
6) Dual market in which parallel market data is missing. 
Reinhart and Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,” 
Appendix I, pp. 30, 37. 
To reverse the order and to convert the original fine classification to zero-to-ten scale the following formula 
was used: [(Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin)]. The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 5 and 1, respectively. 
Items #6 (parallel market data is missing data) was recoded as missing.  
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*** Statistically significant at .00 level of significance.  
* Statistically significant at .05 level of significance.  
 
 
Table 7 - Rotated factor analysis (varimax rotation) results of the items used to measure 






































Free Banking System & Access to 
Competitive Credits  0.37***    
Foreign Investment & Foreign 
Exchange Access Freedom 0.41*** 0.52***   
Domestic Price Stability 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.45***  






Property Rights  & Rule of Law 0.66 0.56 
Free Banking System  0.72 0.48 
Foreign Investment & Foreign Exchange Access Freedom 0.74 0.45 
Domestic Price Stability 0.80 0.37 




Market-Conforming (pro-LL sector) Policies  
In the Section B of the present Chapter, I explained how the sectoral approach 
endogenizes the nature and the intensity of the interests to the certain sectoral 
characteristics (a summary of the arguments is presented in Table 5). In the light of these 
arguments we assume that investors in LL sectors (e.g. textile & clothing, footwear and 
leather products, food processing (agro-industry), peasant cash crop agriculture, etc.) 
prioritize ‘market conforming’ economic policies, which would enable them to compete 
in the international market on an equal footing and also enhance their adaptability to 
market fluctuations. In this study, I use the following indicators, which form a single 
dimension on the factor analysis, to measure the degree of market-conforming or pro-LL 
sector policies.  
 
- Ease of starting/ending and operating business (less time and red-tape)  
- Ease of exporting and importing (less time and red-tape)  
- Lower tax burden on profit (lower corporate income tax rate-CTR)  
- Flexibility of hiring/firing & employing workers. 
 
 
a. Ease of Starting, Operating and Ending Business (less time & procedures)  
Economies differ greatly in how they regulate the starting and closing of business. In 
some the process is straightforward and affordable. In others the procedures are so 
burdensome that entrepreneurs may have to bribe officials to speed the process—or may 
decide to run their business informally.206
 To assess the extent of ease of starting, operating and closing business (a standard 
small to medium-size company) in a country, I use the ‘Business Freedom’ component of 
the Index of Economic Freedom, which is based on the Doing Business Dataset.  The 
‘Business Freedom’ component covers the following 10 indicators: 
  
  
- Starting a business—procedures (number); 
- Starting a business—time (days); 
- Starting a business—cost (% of income per capita); 
- Starting a business—minimum capital (% of income per capita); 
                                                 
206 Doing Business 2007, Report on Algeria, p.8 
 70 
- Obtaining a license—procedures (number); 
- Obtaining a license—time (days); 
- Obtaining a license—cost (% of income per capita); 
- Closing a business—time (years) 
- Closing a business—cost (% of estate); and 
- Closing a business—recovery rate (cents on the dollar).207
 
  
The 0-100 scale was converted to a zero-to-one scale, on which higher values indicate 
ease of starting, operating and closing business in a country. 
 
 
b. Ease of Exporting and Importing (less time & procedures) 
Firms operating in countries with efficient customs, good transport networks and fewer 
document requirements for exports are likely to be more competitive in the international 
market due to less time and money costs. While export taxes or transport fees directly 
affect the price of the traded goods, delay in clearing customs may also incur costs for the 
firms by negatively affecting the sales or damaging the merchandise.208 According to a 
recent study “the cost of import delays exceeds tariff costs in every region, while the cost 
of export delays exceeds tariff costs in every region but East Asia and Western 
Europe.”209 The same study also notes that in Africa the cost of delays is four times the 
tariff payments that African exporters face.210 The relationship between time to export 
and volume of exports is also striking: “Each additional day that an export product is 
delayed reduces exports by more than 1%. For time-sensitive agricultural products, 
reducing delays by 10% increases exports by more than 30%.”211
                                                 
207Beach and Kane, “Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic Freedoms” in Index of Economic 
Freedom, pp.441-2. (In Doing Business Dataset, the data for ‘Starting and Closing business’ dates back to 
2002, and for ‘Obtaining a License’ only to 2004. For the missing years, IEF uses a subjective assessment 
with a score of 1 to 5—later converted to 0-100 scale.)  
 As noted in the Doing 
Business 2008 Report, just a few days less in exporting formalities can bring one into the 
208 Doing Business 2007, Report on Algeria, p.40.  
209 David Hummels, “Calculating Tariff Equivalents for Time in Trade.” Purdue University, 
Department of Economics, West Lafayette, Ind. (2007) cited in the World Bank and the International 
Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2008: Comparing Regulations in 178 Countries, (Washington: Office 
of the Publisher, The World Bank, 2008), p.47. 
210 Ibid.  
211 Simeon Djankov, Caroline Freund and Cong Pham, “Trading on Time.” Policy Research Working 
Paper 3909 (W ashington, D.C: W orld Bank, 2007) cited in Ibid., pp. 44-45.  
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market.212 Further, a need to file many documents is associated with more corruption in 
international trade.213
Against this background, the following items from the Doing Business Dataset are 
used to measure the extent of ease of trading across borders:  
  
 
- Documents for export and import (number)  
- Time for export and import (days). 214
 
  
The correlation between the two items is .58. The time coverage of the Doing Business 
dataset starts in 2004 for these items. Because the number of documents and the days to 
export seem pretty stable across time in each country, for the years 2001-2003 the values 
of the earliest available year (2004) were imputed. On a zero-to-one scale higher values 
indicate less burdensome export and import processes.215
 
   
 
c. Flexibility and ease of hiring, employing, and firing workers   
Labor market deregulation or flexibility provides businessmen with greater control of 
hiring and firing practices and also of wage determination. Especially for LL sectors, 
which are mostly labor-intensive, such flexibility is of crucial importance for an easy 
adaptation to market fluctuations—by increasing working hours or laying off workers, for 
example.  
One item from the Doing Business dataset is employed to measure the degree of 
labor market deregulation/flexibility: ‘Rigidity of Employment Index’.  The rigidity of 
employment index is the average of three sub-indices: difficulty of hiring, rigidity of 
hours and difficulty of firing indices.216
                                                 
212 Ibid., p.45 
 The order of the index was reversed so that on a 
213 Doing Business 2007, Country Report on Algeria, p.40.  
214 Documents for export and import: Documents recorded include port filing documents, customs 
declaration and clearance documents, and official documents exchanged between the concerned parties.  
Time to export and import: Time is recorded in calendar days, from start to finish of each procedure. 
215 To reverse the order and to convert the raw data to zero-to-one scale the following formula was 
used: [(Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin)]. The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at 17 documents and 92 
days, and 4 documents and 4 days (the average sample-maximum and minimum values for exports and 
imports together).  
216 Doing Business 2008, Methodology-Employing Workers (online version),  
http://www.doingbusiness.org/MethodologySurveys/EmployingWorkers.aspx 
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zero-to-one scale higher values indicate ease of employing workers—i.e. flexibility of 
contracts, less restriction on weekend and night work and annual leave, and also less 
regulation for dismissal of workers.  
 
 
d. Lower Tax Burden on Profit    
Because tax rates directly affect the profit collectable, they are of major concern for 
capital owners and investors. I use ‘Highest Marginal Corporate Tax Rate’ (CTR) to 
measure the extent of tax burden on companies. Although there are other forms of taxes 
levied on businesses, CTR is the most obvious (and an easily accessible) indicator of the 
tax burden on companies.217 The data were compiled from various data sources.218
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 On a 
All the sub-indices have several components:  
The difficulty of hiring index measures (i) whether fixed term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; 
(ii) the maximum cumulative duration of fixed term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a 
trainee or first time employee to the average value added per worker.  
The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) whether night work is unrestricted; (ii) whether weekend 
work is unrestricted; (iii) whether the work week can consist of 5.5 days; (iv) whether the workweek can 
extend to 50 hours or more (including overtime) for 2 months a year to respond to a seasonal increase in 
production; and (v) whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer.  
The difficulty of firing index has 8 components: (i) whether redundancy is disallowed as a basis for 
terminating workers; (ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such as a government agency) 
to terminate 1 redundant worker; (iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to terminate a 
group of 25 redundant workers; (iv) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate 1 
redundant worker; (v) whether the employer needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 25 
redundant workers; (vi) whether the law requires the employer to reassign or retrain a worker before 
making the worker redundant; (vii) whether priority rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether 
priority rules apply for reemployment.  
The original scale is zero-to-100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulation. To better reflect 
flexibility or deregulation of labor market, the order was reversed along with reducing the scale to zero-to-
one by using the following formula: [(Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin)]. Vmax and Vmin were set to 100 and 
0, respectively. The time coverage starts from 2002. For the missing year 2001, the 2002 scores were 
assigned. 
217 Among other taxes levied on companies are social contributions, labor taxes, property taxes, etc. 
The Doing Business Data set includes a more comprehensive measure of the extent of tax burden on the 
private sector: total tax rate as percent of profit. Total tax rate (TTR) measures the amount of all taxes and 
mandatory contributions borne by the business in the second year of operation, expressed as a percentage of 
commercial profits. The taxes included can be divided into 5 categories: profit or corporate income tax, 
social contributions and labor taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, turnover taxes and other small 
taxes. In spite of the comprehensiveness of TTR indicator, the limited time coverage of the data (starts from 
2004), precludes us from using it in this research.  
218 Word Development Indicators (The World Bank), Doing Business Database (The World Bank and 
The International Finance Corporation), Index of Economic Freedom (The Heritage Institute), Paying 
Taxes Reports (The World Bank and PricewaterhouseCoopers), Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide (issues 
2002 and 2005, Ernst & Young Global Limited), KPMG’s Corporate Tax Rate Survey (issues 2006 and 
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 The four items explained above form a single dimension on the factor analysis.  
The Cronbach's Alpha reliability score also indicates that they can be combined to 
construct a new variable (α = .69). Inter-item correlations and the rotated factor analysis 
results are presented in Table 8 and 9.  These items were combined by simple averaging. 
On a zero-to-one scale higher values indicate higher degrees of Market-Conforming (i.e. 
pro-LL sector) policies. Figure 3 displays the distribution of the variable measuring the 







Table 8 - The correlations between the items used to measure the Market-Conforming 














*** Statistically significant at .00 level of significance.  





                                                                                                                                                 
2008, KPMG’s International Tax Center), PKF’s Worldwide Tax Guide 2007 (PKF The International 
Taxation Committee).  
219 To reverse the order and to convert the raw corporate tax rates to zero-to-one scale the following 
formula was used: [(Vmax − Vi) / (Vmax − Vmin)]. Vmax and Vmin were set to 54% and zero (sample 












Ease of Exporting & Importing 0.34***   
Lower  Tax Burden   0.42*** 0.29***  
Flexibility of Hiring/Firing & 
Employing Workers 0.26*** 0.15** 0.48*** 
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Table 9 - Rotated factor analysis (varimax rotation) results of the items used to measure 





Figure 3 – Distribution of the variable measuring the level of ‘Common pro-Capitalist 















Market-Resisting / Particularistic (pro-HH sector) Policies  
 
It is important to underline that specifying the above listed policies as LL-sector interests, 
does not mean that capitalists in other sectors (i.e. HH sectors) would not want such 
policies be in effect. They may, as well; yet because firms in high/high sectors, which are 
marked by production and asset/factor inflexibility and high capital intensity and 






Starting/ Ending & Operating Business 0.73 0.47 
Ease of Exporting & Importing 0.59 0.66 
Lower  Tax Burden   0.81 0.34 




or the number of employees, I assume that they are more preoccupied with policies that 
would provide them protection against market fluctuations and/or relief from such 
changes—such as protection, exemption from tariffs or taxes, or subsidies. Further, these 
sectors display oligopolistic market structures, and hence, are concerned with the threat 
of new entrants who might interfere with their profitability.   
Due to difficulty of colleting data on sector specific and/or particularistic policies in 
all non-democratic countries covered by the sample, I employ only two indicators as 
proxies for particularistic (i.e. targeting only the leading sector) market-resisting policies. 
These policies are   
 
- Tariff protection for the semi/final product(s) of the leading sector  
 
- Tariff Exemptions for the inputs/supplies of the leading sector.220
 
   
It has to be underlined, again, that, I do not claim that capitalists in LL sectors would 
not want protection or import tariff concessions. But for the businesses operating in 
highly capital intensive (i.e. HH sectors), it is crucial, for example, to secure tariff 
exemptions for their highly expensive machinery and equipment. Also due to inflexibility 
of production in HH sectors, securing a domestic market protected by high tariffs (hence 




                                                 
220 These two particularistic policies do not correlate with each other, indicating that the causal 
mechanism behind them might be different.  
Another good indicator for market-resisting policies could be ‘tax exemptions’ granted for the leading 
sector firms. However, due to the special character of the fiscal regimes applied in the extractive sectors* 
(hydrocarbons and mining), neither the extent of tax burden, nor special incentives guaranteed to 
companies in those sectors can be easily assessed. One of the publicly available measures of the tax burden 
in extractive sectors, ‘Government Take’ data are not available for all the countries covered by the present 
study. Further, as pointed out in a briefing note by African Development Bank Group, on revenue and tax 
levels in Africa, “no current literature convincingly has captured (by actual empirical evidence) exactly 
what level of taxation African governments (the government take) are in fact able to achieve. A challenge 
is that the vast majority of contracts between governments and the extractive industry are not available for 
public scrutinization. At present, evidence is mainly “anecdotal” in nature, in the sense that it is based on 
statements by government officials or others, but not based on statistical data or other verifiable 
documentation.” (African Development Bank Group, Development Research Department, “Briefing Note 
on Revenue and Tax Levels, Mineral Taxation in Africa, March 2008, p.2.)  
*The special character of the tax regimes applied in the extractive sectors is explained in Appendix III.  
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Tariff Protection for the Semi or Final Product of the Leading Sector  
Protection indicates insulation of a particular sector (or certain products) from 
international competitors by high import tariff walls set for the products or substitute of 
products of that sector. In that sense, it is a very specific form of market-resisting 
policies.   
To measure the degree of protection, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) simple 
average applied tariff rate221 for the product / product group of the leading sector is used. 
Data were gathered from various sources.222 It turned out to be almost impossible to 
gather complete tariff data for the whole period of the study. Thus, some years had to be 
imputed based on the last available year’s tariff rate.223
 
 On a zero-to-hundred scale higher 
values indicate higher protection for the leading sector’s final products. Figure 4 displays 
the distribution of this variable.  
 
Figure 4 – Distribution of the variable measuring the level of ‘Tariff Protection for the 












                                                 
221 MFN Applied Tariff Rate (Simple Average): This indicator is calculated as the simple average of 
the MFN applied tariff rates (includes ad valorem and ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs) that a 
country applies to its trading partners.  The World Bank, World Trade Indicators 2008 (online version)  
222 The World Bank-World Trade Indicators, UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, WTO Comprehensive 
Tariff Data (WTO data includes MFN Historical Applied Tariff documents and Tariff Profiles for 
individual countries. Tariff profiles are available only for 2006 and 2007 in most cases. For the earlier 
years,  WTO’s MFN Historical Applied Tariff documents were analyzed individually for each country.)  
223 The method of using the last available year’s tariff rate is also employed in the Economic Freedom 
of the World (Frazer Institute) and Index of Economic Freedom (Heritage Institute) Datasets.  
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Import Tariff Exemptions for the Inputs and Supplies of the Leading Sector 
In developing countries, firms in HH sectors are in need of importing high cost 
machinery and equipment especially during the initial phases of their business. The costs, 
and hence the import taxes on these supplies are so high that, as Sunley et al. state 
(specifically for the hydrocarbons sector) “if there were no special treatment for import 
duties, these would be an attractive way for the government to secure an up-front revenue 
stream.”224
To determine whether the governments respond to tariff exemption/reduction 
demands of such sectors I rely on qualitative data on the tax system. In the Algerian tax 
regime, for example, it is clearly indicated that “investment goods and products directly 
used in hydrocarbon exploration and production”
 Thus, due to high start-up costs, import tariff exemptions are highly attractive 
to investors. As a result, especially in the HH sectors, in which production inflexibility 
precludes cost-reducing adjustments, such as lowering the production levels or laying off 
workers, tariff policy is very likely to be a prominent area of lobbying.  
225 are exempt from import tax. 
Similarly, in Angola’s tax system it reads that “purchases of oil companies” are exempt 
from tariffs.226
 
 Thus, relying mostly on the World Trade Organization’s ‘Trade Policy 
Review-Secretariat Reports’ and the IMF’s ‘Article IV Staff Reports’ and ‘Statistical 
Appendices’, I examined the extent of import tariff exemptions granted for the leading 
sector (or other sectors) in each country. The coding of the variable is as follows:  
 (1) Tariff concessions for qualifying firms ONLY in the leading sector (comprises 
all or selective raw materials and machinery & equipment) 
(.7) Tariff concessions for qualifying firms mainly in the leading sector AND in a 
few OTHER sectors (comprises all or selective raw materials and machinery & 
equipment) 
(.5) Tariff concessions (in general) for raw materials/machinery & equipment for all 
qualifying firms in ALL sectors 
(.3) Tariff exemption for SELECTIVE projects, investments, goods, geographical 
location (free zones or goods originating from a specific location), etc. 
 (0) Tariff exemptions for sectors OTHER than the leading sector OR NO concession 
 
                                                 
224 Emil M. Sunley, Thomas Baunsgaard and Dominique Simard, “Revenue from the Oil and Gas 
Sector: Issues and Country Experience,” Background Paper prepared for the IMF conference on fiscal 
policy formulation and implementation in oil producing countries (June 5-6, 2002), pp. 10-11.  
225 IMF Country Report No. 05/51, p. 47, Report No. 06/102, p. 46.  
226 IMF Country Report No. 06/120, p.46.  
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On zero-to-one scale, thus, higher values indicate more favorable (particularistic) 
treatment of the leading sector with respect to import tariff policy. Figure 5 displays the 
distribution of this variable.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the level of ‘Tariff Exemptions 






Import Tarif f  Concessions










THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 
Table 10 presents the list of the independent variables used to test the main and 
alternative hypotheses outlined at the end of Chapter Two. The details of the 
measurement are explained in the following part of this section.  
 
 
Table 10 - The list of the independent variables used to test the main and alternative 
hypotheses 
Responsiveness to Common pro-
Capitalist or Sector-Specific 
Interests due to  … 
The Independent Variables* 
 ‘Credible Exit-Threat’ 
(Indirect Accountability)  
 
FINDEP – Financial Dependence of the Government on Tax 
Revenue (Tax Revenue / Total Government Revenue)  
 
PRVSECT – Strength and Independence of the Private Sector 
(Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) / Total GFCF & 
Subsidies (% GDP)  
 
MOBILITY – Sectorally determined Exit opportunities (LL-HH 
sectoral attributes continuum based on Capital Intensity & 




CAPTFLWS – Capital In + out Flows (% GDP)  
(Capital Flight is indicated by the negative range of CAPTFLWS)  
 
 
PRVINVSTM – Annual percent change in Private GFCF 
(Investment Strike is indicated by the negative range of 
PRVINVSTM)  
Fiscal Crisis  
FISCAL – Budget Balance and Public Debt (% GDP) 
(Fiscal Crisis is indicated by the negative values = Budget deficit > 
3 % GDP & Public Debt > 60% GDP)  
External Pressures (Conditionalities 
Attached to a Loan)  LOAN – IMF loan (%GDP)  
Dependence on a Single Sector   
(Also to accounts for the impact of 
the ‘size’ of the leading sector)  
 
(Controlling for the impact 
of similar or different 
sectoral interests that exist 
in the economy) 
 
 
LEADSECT – The Leading Sector's Contribution to Economy 
(Sectoral share in total export earnings) 
 
HHDOMN – The share of High/High Sectors in total export 
earnings  
SERVDOMN – The share of commercial service exports in total 
export earnings  
 
Existence of similar interest in 
public and private sectors   PUBLIC – Extent of public dominance in the leading sector  
The Level of  Authoritarianism  NONDEMOCR – The Freedom House Political Rights index 
*All the independent variables measured as lagged three-year average 
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Voice 
The idea of extracting policy concessions by ‘credibly threatening to exit’ assumes 
existence of voice channels to translate business preferences / complaints to the rulers. 
Yet it is beyond the scope of this research to assess whether businesses in the major 
sector(s) of each country have voiced their demands on specific policy issues. Even my 
endeavor to review the availability of channels through which voice can be expressed (as 
a proxy measure) turned out to be futile to cover all countries in the sample. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to assume that in each country there is at least one type of 
voice channel to translate business interests/demands to the ruler. For a preliminary 
research on business associations showed that in most countries there is at least one 
Chamber of Industry or Commerce. And, out of 27 countries for which I was able to 
confirm existence of a Chamber of Industry/Commerce, in 23 of them the leading sector 
was represented in the Chamber. In most agro-industry countries, there are formal 
‘boards’ (corporatist structures) to mediate between farmers, first stage processors and 
the government—who, in most cases, controls export channels. Further, for the 
hydrocarbons sector, it is not unreasonable to assume that investors, from the very 
beginning, have channels to voice their demands. Because the oil sector is structured in 
the form of joint-ventures or product-sharing agreements with national or multinational 
companies, from the very first day the investors and the government officials sit at the 
same table and bargain for various policies. Therefore in the context of this study, I 
assume that there is at least one form of channel to translate (not necessarily lobby for) 
the leading sector’s preferences to the government.  
 
 
Financial Dependence of the State on Extraction from Domestic Productive Forces 
(FINDEP)  
To measure the degree of financial dependence of the state on the domestic economy, I 
use the share of tax revenue (including social contributions and excluding extractive 
sector revenue) within the total government revenue (including grants). The greater is the 
share of tax revenue in total government revenue, the higher is the dependence of the 
state on the overall economy.     
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 Not including extractive-sector tax revenue (or counting only non-extractive 
sector tax revenue) enables us to assess the extent of dependence of policymakers on the 
domestic economy as a whole. For, the actors of the mining or oil sector constitute a very 
small minority within the total economy, but their contribution to the total government 
revenue is immense. However in most cases it is not distinguishable which part of 
extractive sector revenue is due to taxes and which part due to share of profit or direct 
sales revenue. As a result, extractive sector revenue is measured as a distinct category, 
under the title of ‘dependence on a single sector’.  
The government finances data are generally based on “consolidated central-
government budgets, which include budgetary and extra-budgetary accounts. In some 
cases, however, data are available only for “general government budget,” which also 
includes local government budgets as well.227
The IMF’s Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001, defines Total 
Revenue as composed of Tax Revenue, Social Contributions, Grants, and Other 
Revenue.
   
228 To measure the degree of dependence of the state upon domestic forces as a 
whole, I use the share of both tax revenue and social contributions within the total 
revenue—considering that social security contributions are also revenue collected from 
the citizens so that the government can provide social benefits.229
Tax Revenue is composed of taxes on (1) income, profits, and capital gains; (2) 
payroll and workforce; (3) property; (4) goods and services; (5) international trade and 
transactions: and (6) other taxes. Social Security Contributions are defined as receipts 
either from employers on behalf of their employees or from employees, self-employed, or 
non-employed persons on their own behalf that secure entitlement to social benefits for 
the contributions, their dependents, or their survivors.
   
230
It is highly challenging to obtain reliable data on government revenue and its 
components especially for developing countries. Data available through the most widely 
used databases (such as IMF Government Financial Statistics or World Bank-World 
  
                                                 
227 Countries for which General Government Budget is used are Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Yemen.  
228 The IMF, Government Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2001, Companion Material, p.3.  
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfs/manual/comp.htm)  
229 In GFSM 1986 version, social contributions were counted within tax revenue; in the 2001 version, 
this item is listed separately.   
230 GFSM 2001, Revenue (Chapter V),  pp. 56-7. 
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Development Indicators) do not contain data on some of the countries included in this 
study. Thus, a variety of databases and reports were used to gather data on government 
finances.231
The raw ‘tax revenue / total revenue’ ratios were rescaled on a zero-to-one scale by 
simply dividing by 100, so that high values indicate higher dependence on tax revenue—
and hence, on domestic productive forces as whole. Figure 6 displays the distribution of 





Figure 6 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring Financial Dependence of the 




















                                                 
231 The data sources are as follows (in the order used): World Bank World Development Indicators 
(based on IMF Government Finance Statistics 2001 Manuel), IMF Statistical Appendices, IMF Article IV 
Consultation -Staff Reports, OECD-African Economic Outlook (various issues), The Economist Intelligent 
Unit Country Profiles.  
 83 
Strength and Independence of the Private Sector (PRVSECT) 
As noted before, the bargaining power of the private sector is partly shaped by their 
investment strength and capacity to operate on their own—i.e. without continuous 
support and protection of the state. Two items are used to measure the extent of the 
strength and independence of the private sector:  
 
- The ratio of private gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) to total GFCF 
- The ratio of Subsidies to GDP 
 
The GFCF “comprises all additions to the stocks of fixed assets (purchases and own-
account capital formation), less any sales of second-hand and scrapped fixed assets.” 232
 The ratio of private GFCF to total GFCF (rather than to GDP) provides a proxy 
measure for the investment strength the private sector in a country—investment strength 
defined as the dominance of the private sector investment (as opposed to public 
investment) within an economy. I acknowledge that there may be an endogeneity 
problem with the use of private-sector GFCF share as an indicator of the investment 
strength of the private sector in the model I construct. GFCF is physical investment. 
Greater private GFCF in an economy increases the bargaining-power of private sector 
vis-à-vis the government, and thus its ability to shape the policies in their own favor. But, 
it is also directly affected by the government’s economic policies already in effect. In 
other words, because the dependent variable is composed of the kind of economic 
policies that directly affect the private sector’s willingness to invest, a circular causality 
emerges.  
 
When a direct measure of private GFCF value was not available I employed 
‘Government Capital Expenditures’ as a proxy measure of public GFCF. And, private 
GFCF was obtained by subtracting this amount from the total GFCF.  
Given that there is no better measure (with the data available) to assess the 
investment strength of the private-sector in an economy, I try to overcome the 
endogeneity problem by using lagged three-years average private-sector GFCF share (e.g. 
2001 value is the average of 1998 to 2000).  By doing this, I partly eliminate the possible 
                                                 
232 The World Bank, World Development Indicators (WDI) Database, Notes (online version) 
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causality running from the dependent variable to the independent variable; i.e. the 
possibility that the  polices that are in effect at time t (the ones that constitute  the 
dependent variable) might have shaped the present degree of private-sector GFCF. On  a 
zero-to-ten scale higher values indicate greater private-sector GFCF share within total 
GFCF, hence a stronger private sector.  
To measure the degree of (in)dependence of the domestic businesses from the 
government, I used one current-costs related indicator: the ratio of subsidies to GDP. This 
ratio measures the percent of total output value subsidized by the government. “Subsidies 
are current unrequited payments that government units make to enterprises on the basis of 
the levels of their production activities or the quantities or values of the goods or services 
they produce, sell, export, or import. Subsidies may be designed to influence levels of 
production, the prices at which outputs are sold, or the remuneration of the 
enterprises.”233
Unfortunately, there are no adequate cross-country data on subsidies transferred 
specifically to private enterprises. Instead, a general category of subsidies appear in time-
series databases and state-budgets; which includes subsidies made to public or quasi-
public enterprises as well. In spite of this lack of precision, the data in hand can still be a 
proxy for the dependence of the bourgeoisie. Large amounts of subsidies to public 
enterprises indicate a large public sector, and hence existence of a small, and most 
probably, a weak/dependent capitalist strata. However, for some countries even the 
general “subsidies” category is not available. For such countries a more general category 
of ‘subsidies and other transfers’ was used. 
  
234
                                                 
233 GFS Manual 2001, pp.70-1.  
 Most countries for which only the latter 
Only ‘explicit subsidies’ which appear on state budgets are used in this study; since it is almost impossible 
to reach adequate data on ‘implicit subsidies’ (which operate via price controls) for all the countries.  
234 Subsidies and other transfers: “Subsidies, grants, and other social benefits include all unrequited, 
nonrepayable transfers on current account to private and public enterprises; grants to foreign governments, 
international organizations, and other government units; and social security, social assistance benefits, and 
employer social benefits in cash and in kind.” (The World Bank, WDI Database, Notes (online version) 
For the following eight countries ‘subsidies and other transfers’ item was used instead of subsides: 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon,  Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Rwanda, Togo. For 
these countries the converted zero-to-one scale scores on ‘transfers and subsidies/GDP’ (not the raw ratios) 
were used.  
Data sources for both subsidies and subsidies & transfers are IMF Statistical Appendices and Article 
IV Consultation-Staff Reports, World Bank Public Expenditure Reviews, IMF Government Finance 
Statistics, World Bank-Word Development Indicators, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Profile 
Reports.  
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variable is available score lower on the ratio of ‘subsidies and other transfers / GDP’ 
(below 5 per cent). This guarantees a lower margin of error on the overall measurement 
of subsidies.235
The relationship between ‘Private GFCF / Total GFCF’ and ‘Subsidies / GDP’ 
changes depending on the leading sector of the countries in question. Table 11 presents 
the degree and the direction of correlations for within three country groups defined by a 
broad classification of their leading sectors. Except for the countries where 
manufacturing (both light and heavy manufacturing) is the leading sector, the correlation 
is negative; that is, as the share of private sector investment within total investment 
increases, subsides (as % of GDP) decrease.    
 
The two items (already on a zero-to-one scale) were combined by simple averaging. 
On zero-to-one scale one indicates highest share of GFCF in total GFCF and lowest level 
of subsidies, hence, a strong and independent private sector. Figure 7 displays the 
distribution of the combined variable.  
  
 
Table 11 – Correlations between Private GFCF (% Total GFCF) & Subsidies (% GDP) 










                                                 
235 To fill in the missing values on Subsidies, various methods were used. Where there was a high 
correlation (above .90) between ‘transfers and subsidies’ and the few available ‘subsidies’ values for a 
country, the missing values were predicted based on the former. If a value between two years was missing, 
the average of the previous and following years was imputed. And, for the missing beginning and end 
years, the last available year’s score was used. To convert the raw ratio scores to zero-to-one scale the 
following formula was used:  (Vmin − Vi) / (Vmin − Vmax). The values for Vmax was set at 9.6 % of GDP 




The Leading Sector Correlation  Coefficient 
Agro-Industry -0.34 
Oil & Mining Industries -0.40 
Manufacturing   0.44 
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Figure 7 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring Strength and Independence of the 














Sectorally Determined Exit Opportunities of the Leading Sector (MOBILITY)   
Exit, in the context of this study, means ceasing to invest in a particular sector or country. 
As noted before, sectoral analysis provides us with tools to analyze whether capitalists in 
a particular sector have viable exit opportunities. The four economic variables, proposed 
by Michael Shafer, help us to determine the degree of exit-viability for a sector.  
 Shafer states that sectoral analysis builds on two core variables in sectors’ 
production processes, capital intensity and the extent of economies of scale, and two 
composite variables, production flexibility and asset/factor flexibility, that recombine 
elements of capital intensity and economies of scale.236 Because these economic variables 
covary across sectors, it is possible to think about them along a single continuum between 
two polar ideal types: High/high (HH) sectors (which are marked by high capital 
intensity, high economies of scale, and high production inflexibility and asset/factor 
inflexibility); and low/low (LL) sectors, marked by the opposite.237
Shafer argues that the core variables, capital intensity and the extent of economies of 
scale account for “…the sector-specificity of capital equipment and other assets, and the 
 
                                                 
236 Shafer, Winners and Losers, pp. 1- 48.  
237 Ibid. p.10.  
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rigidity of barriers to exit from the sector.”238 In HH sectors, he states, “high capital 
costs, big economies of scale, technical complexity, and the need for specialized 
infrastructure, management, and labor pose high barriers to entry.”239 The same factors, 
especially specialized infrastructure, management and labor, also create high barriers to 
exit. For Shafer says, “large sunk investments in sector-specific capital equipment, 
facilities, infrastructure, management, and skilled labor … guarantee high barriers to 
exit.”240
To determine the extent of exit viability of the leading sector of a particular country, 
we need to locate that sector on the LL-HH sectoral attributes continuum, presented in 
Table 12. As noted before, measurement details of the LL-HH continuum is explained in 
Appendix II. On the LL-HH continuum higher values indicate lower levels of capital 
intensity and economies of scale, hence greater opportunities for exit.  
 LL sectors are marked by the opposite characteristics—lower capital costs and 
technical complexity, and also non-sector-specific management and labor force.  Thus, 
both barrier to entry and exit is low in LL sectors. Therefore, the lower are capital 
intensity and economies of scale (and hence, asset/factor inflexibility) the lower the 
barriers to exit are.  
 It is important to note that in some countries the leading sector is composed of a 
chain with up-stream and down-stream production processes. For example, where cotton 
production is the main agricultural activity, first stage cotton processing (and sometimes 
textile industries) are the down stream production processes; or for oil producing 
countries, while oil exploration and exploitation constitute the up stream production, oil 
refining is the down stream production process. Hence, wherever both up and down 
stream production processes of an economic activity are available in a country, I use the 
average sectoral attributes scores of both up and down steam industries to measure 





                                                 
238 Ibid., p.24. 




Table 12 – Low/Low-High/High Sectoral Attributes Continuum indicating the extent of 




*Higher values indicate ‘LL’ sectors which are marked by low capital intensity and low economies of 











Exit Opportunity of the LS






                  Sectors LL - HH  ( 0-1)* 
Fishery 1 
Leather & Leather Products 1 
Wood Products .9 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry .9 
Retail & Fixing .8 
Footwear & Clothing .7 
Hotels & Restaurants .7 
Processing of Rubber & Plastic  .6 
Food, Drink & Tobacco   .6 
Textile  .6 
Mechanical Engineering  .5 
Chemicals .5 
Production and preliminary processing of Metals .5 
Electrical (& Optical) Engineering  .4 
Non-metallic Minerals .4 
Mining & Quarrying of Energy Producing Materials .3 
Manufacture  & Assembly of Motor Vehicles  .2 
Refining of Coal and Mineral Oil  0 
 89 
 
Capital In/Out Movements (CAPTFLWS)  
Capital flight denotes private capital outflows from a country. Various methodologies 
have been used for measuring capital flight.241
 
 One standard methodology is the 
‘Residual Method’:  
“This measures the ‘residual’ of the ‘sources of funds’ over the ‘uses of funds’. 
Sources of funds include all net official inflows (increases in net external 
indebtedness of the public sector) and the net flow of foreign direct investment. Uses 
of funds include the current-account deficit and additions to reserves. Outward 




In other words, economists  
“subtract foreign currency payments for imports, debt service, and additions to 
official reserves from total sources of foreign exchange (exports, borrowing, 




In this study, I rely on the estimates of capital in/out flows measured by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).244 However, the EIU database does not cover all the 
countries of the sample. Hence, I adopted their methodology and replicated the 
measurement for the countries covered by the EIU database, and also estimated capital 
movements (capital flight) for other countries.245
EIU departs from the relationship between the capital and the current accounts 
components of the Balance of Payments, which is defined as:  
      
 
Current account = - Capital account  
cur a/c = -(Δres + fdi + Δdebt + capital flight)  
 
                                                 
241 For an overview of various methodologies used for measuring capital flight see Stijn Claessens and 
David Naude, “Recent Estimates of Capital Flight,” The World Bank Working Papers, No.1186, 
International Economics Department (September 1993).   
242 Ibid.  p.4.  
243 Darryl McLeod, Capital Flight, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics.  
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/CapitalFlight.html.  
244 The Economist Intelligence Unit Data Services (http://www.eiu.com/)  
245 The correlation between the EIU estimates and my replication of their estimates is .99.  
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where cur a/c is the current account balance (positive is in surplus), Δres is the change in 
international reserves (positive is an decrease in reserves, as running down reserves is an 
equivalent to obtaining a capital inflow), fdi is net FDI inflows (positive is an inflow), 
Δdebt is the change in the external debt stock (positive is an increase in debt). Capital 
flight is all other capital flows (positive is an inflow, negative is capital flight). To define 
capital flight, we rearrange the equation to give:  
 
Capital Flight = - cur a/c - Δres - fdi - Δdebt  
 
This implies that capital flight is all the flows on the capital account not accounted for by 
changing foreign exchange reserves, net FDI and changes in external debt.  
One important point in this measurement is the way the change in the debt stock is 
calculated. EIU data service notes that it should be calculated by adding up each 
individual type of net debt inflow (rather than looking at the change in the aggregate debt 
stock).246
I use the following indicators to replicate (and estimate) capital flight measures:  
  
- Current account balance (BoP, current US$) 
- Change in Total reserves (includes gold, current US$) 
- Foreign direct investment, net (BoP, current US$) 
- Net flows on debt, total long-term (NFL, US$) 
- Short-term debt net flows (NFL, US$) 
- Net financial flows, IMF concessional & non-concessional (current US$).247
 
 
To assess the impact of capital flight on government responsiveness I calculated 
average ‘capital in/out flow / GDP’ ratio for the last three years preceding the year 
dependent variable is measured. Figure 9 displays the distribution of capital movements 
as a percent of the GDP.  Capital flight is indicated by the negative range of the variable. 
 
 
                                                 
246 Hence, the change in the external debt stock is composed of   
Net medium and long term debt inflows (inflows less repayments) + Net IMF credits + Net short term 
debt inflows (short term debt stock at t - short term debt stock at t-1) 
247 Data sources: The World Bank World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance 
databases, The EIU database (which relies on the IMF International Financial Statistics, UN Development 
Reports, individual central bank reports), the IMF World Economic Outlook database, and IMF staff 
reports and statistical appendices.  
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Figure 9 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring In and Out Capital Flows as a percent 
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Changes in Private Sector Investment (PRVINVSTM)  
Investment strike denotes that the domestic investors abstain from investing in a 
particular country. To measure the investment trend in a country, I first calculate the 
annual percent change in private gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) / GDP ratio. To 
account for a possible policy-changing impact of drop in the level of private investment 
(i.e. investment strike), I employ lagged three-year average annual percent change in 
private GFCF/GDP.  Figure 10 displays the distribution of the variable. Negative values 
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Dependence on a Single Sector / The Leading Sector’s Contribution to the Economy   
(LDSEC-CONTB)  
The best measure to assess the degree of the state’s dependence on an economic sector 
would be the share of the revenue generated by that sector within overall government 
revenue. Yet those kinds of data are only available for the hydrocarbons exporting and 
partly mining sector-dominant countries. Hence I resort to a proxy measure, which is the 
sectoral share in the total export earnings. The correlation between the share of export 
earnings and sectoral contribution to revenue is .71 (measured for 17 hydrocarbons and 1 
mining-sector dominant countries for which data were available between 1998 and 2007). 
The correlation increases to .81 when UAE is excluded.  
To measure the degree of dependence on a single sector, thus, I use three-years 
lagged average share of the leading sector in total export earnings. 248
 
 On a zero-to-one 
scale, higher values indicate, greater dependence on a sector. Figure 11 displays the 
distribution of the variable.  
                                                 
248 Data sources: World Bank-WDI, UN-Handbook of Statistics, World Trade Organization-
Merchandise and Commercial Services Export databases. 
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Figure 11 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the Leading Sector’s Contribution to 




































The Extent of Similar or Divergent Interests in an Economy (HHDOMN) 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, when the economy of a country is not dominated by a single 
sector (i.e. a relatively diverse economy) prevalence of similar or divergent interests  may 
contribute (or preclude) responsiveness of the rulers to the leading sector’s interests. 
Thus, to control for the effect of similar or divergent interest (depending on the 
dependent variable used) I include into the model a variable measuring the share of HH 
sectors in total export earnings. HH sectors include oil, mining, chemicals, machinery & 
equipment, and metal processing-mainly iron & steel industries.249
 
 On a zero-to-one scale 
higher values indicate greater share of HH sectors in the economy.  
 
Fiscal Crisis  
As noted in Chapter Two, following the fiscal crisis of the 1980s and 90s, some of 
governments who were deprived of extensive exogenous revenue, and thus, strained by 
fiscal crisis, had to implement certain economic reforms to mobilize private resources for 
investment. Those reforms were “in the interests of, but not dictated by, the (private) 
bourgeoisie or its organizations.”250
 Fiscal crisis is defined here in its literal meaning (in budgetary terms) as drop in 
budget revenues and chronic debt. To measure the extent of fiscal constraints I rely on the 
criteria specified by the European Commission in the Protocol on the excessive deficit 
procedure. The reference values (cut points) referred to in Article 104 (c) of this Treaty 
are: 
 Therefore, to account for this kind of a 
correspondence between economic policies and capitalists’ interest (which cannot be 
considered as indirect accountability), we need to control for the effect of financial crisis 
upon responsiveness to capitalists interests.  
- 3 percent for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross 
domestic product at market prices, and  




                                                 
249 Data source: UN-Handbook of Statistics (online version) 
250 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products” p,359.  
251 http://www.eel.nl/documents/ectreaty/maasprot.html 
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The most comprehensive data for both budget balance and public debt are available 
in the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) database. Budget balance is defined as “central 
government receipts minus central government outlays, as a percentage of GDP.”252
Total debt (in EIU database, again) refers to “total debt (both local and foreign 
currency) owed by government to domestic residents, foreign nationals and multilateral 
institutions such as the IMF, expressed as a percentage of GDP.”
 The 
data available via EIU were crosschecked by using IMF statistical appendices and 
country reports to verify that the data indeed refer to the budget deficit/surplus after 
grants. For not taking into consideration the grants would overstate the extent of budget 
debt, and thus, budgetary constraints on rulers.  
253 There are no 
government or public debt data available for 14 of the countries covered by the 
sample.254 However, another debt indicator, ‘long-term external debt of the public sector 
(Public sector LDOD - US$)’255
To control for the effect of fiscal constraints on economic policymaking, first I 
rescaled the items separately to a ‘-1 to 1’ scale, where the negative values  indicate that 
government debt is greater than 60 percent of GDP and budget deficit is greater than 3 
percent of GDP. To account for the combined effect of budget deficit and public debt, I 
averaged the rescaled items to obtain a measure of fiscal status, where negative values 
indicate fiscal crisis. And finally, to allow for fiscal crisis to take effect on policymaking, 
I use the average fiscal crisis score over the three years preceding the year that the 
dependent variable is measured—considering that a crisis should endure for a period of 
time so that it could inflict a constraining effect on policymakers. On the ‘-1 to 1’ scale, 
 is available for all the countries. The correlation between 
government debt and external debt of the public sector is high (.89). Hence, based on the 
latter, I predicted ‘government debt (percent GDP) ratios for the missing countries.  
                                                 
252 EIU data are based on various databases and reports (such as IMF International Financial Statistics, 
IMF staff reports and statistical appendices, World Bank Global Development Finance and World 
Development Indicators, official country data, etc).   
253 The Economist Intelligence Unit Data Services (http://www.eiu.com/) 
254 The countries for which public sector LDOD/GDP ratio was used are as follows: Belarus, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mauritania, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Togo.  
255 Public sector LDOD is the long-term debt of public sector borrowers (central government, state 
and local government, and central bank). Long-term debt outstanding and disbursed (LDOD) is the total 
outstanding long-term debt at year end. Long-term external debt is defined as debt that has an original or 
extended maturity of more than one year and that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign 
currency, goods, or services.  The World Bank, Global Development Finance database, Notes.   
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hence, -1 indicates the greatest fiscal constraint on an incumbent. Figure 13 displays the 
distribution of the fiscal status variable—negate values indicate fiscal crisis.   
 
 
Figure 13 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the Fiscal Status (Fiscal crisis 













Figure 14 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the External Pressures (The Use of 














As noted in Chapter Two, the international agencies (such as IMF and World Bank) have 
actively and persistently promoted pro free-market oriented policy changes by attaching 
policy conditionalities to the financial assistance they have been providing. Because such 
policies are, by definition, of pro-capitalist nature (i.e. result in responsiveness to 
capitalist interests in the absence of—in most cases—bargaining power of the private 
sector—we need to control for the existence of a relationship with an international 
agency as well.  
As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, by the mid 1990s nearly all IMF-
supported programs contained some structural conditions.256 Accordingly, I employ the 
ratio of IMF loans to the GDP of a country as an indicator of existence and extent of 
external pressures for economic adjustments.257 To account for the ‘policy-changing’ 
effect of loans, I employ the average use of IMF credit (% GDP) over the three years 
preceding the year that the dependent variable is measured. The data were obtained from 
the World Bank Global Development Finance, World Development Indicators and Joint 
External Debt Hub databases.258
.  
 On a zero-to one scale higher values indicate greater 
external pressure. Figure 14 displays the distribution of the variable on external pressure.  
 
                                                 
256 The IMF Policy Development and Review Department, “Structural Conditionality in Fund-
Supported Programs,”  (February 16, 2001), p. 46. 
257 The use of IMF credit (% GDP) - current US$:  The item covers total outstanding IMF credit and 
loans as of the end of the reference period. Outstanding IMF credit and loans outstanding—representing the 
sum of (1) the use of IMF credit within the General Resources Account and (2) outstanding loans under the 
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF), the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Trust 
Fund—are denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) and are converted to US dollars using the end-
period exchange rate. The data are sourced from IMF records. Data on total IMF credit and loans are also 
disseminated in the IMF’s statistical publication, International Financial Statistics.  (World Bank, Global 
Development Finance (online version) 
Conditionalities may be attached to loans borrowed from other international and intergovernmental 
agencies as well. World Bank, Global Development Finances database provides data on ‘public and 
publicly guaranteed multilateral loans (PPG, multilateral (DOD, US$)’, which include loans and credits 
from the World Bank, regional development banks, and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies.  
However, not all the countries are covered by the database.  
258 The Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH)—jointly developed by the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank (WB)—brings together external debt data and selected foreign 
assets from international creditor/market and national debtor sources. 
(http://www.jedh.org/jedh_home.html).  
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Public Sector Dominance in the Leading Sector:  
Based on qualitative data on the organizational structure of the leading sector, I construct 
an ordinal variable. On zero-to-one scale, higher values indicate greater public sector 
dominance in the leading economic sector of a country.  Figure 15 displays the 
distribution of the variable measuring public sector dominance in the leading sector.  
 
   (1)  Nationalized (for the oil sector: only buy-back contracts are allowed  
(.75)  Mostly dominated by the public sector with some private sector involvement    (e.g. 
in the oil sector: joint ventures/Product Sharing Agreement (PSA); in agro-
industry: small scale agriculture with central planning or monopsony) 
(.50)  Dominated both by the public and private sectors (joint ventures / PSA with almost 
equal shares) 
(.25)  Dominated mostly by the private sector with some state involvement (in the form 
of shares in some companies) 
   (0)  Dominated totally by the private sector and is open to foreign direct investment 
 
 
Figure 15 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the Public Dominance in the Leading 


















The Degree of Nondemocracy  
Working with a sample of non-democracies does not guarantee that the country in 
question has had the same level of authoritarianism over time. In other words, not only 
do the cases in the sample not display the same regime type, but also they do not have the 
same degree of authoritarianism over time. To account for such differences, an 
independent variable measuring the level of authoritarianism of a country—the Political 
Rights Index rating—is also used in the model. On a zero to one scale, higher values 
indicate greater authoritarianism.  
 
 
Figure 16 – Distribution of the Variable Measuring the degree of Nondemocracy 
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DATA & ESTIMATION CHALLANGES 
The data structure of the present study is time-series-cross-sectional (TSCS). Due to 
repeated observations for multiple countries, TSCS data display interesting cross-
sectional and dynamic characteristics, which usually cause violation of the OLS 
assumptions, and hence, estimation challenges. Main cross-sectional issues are cross-
sectional heterogeneity (e.g. country specific effects), cross-sectional/spatial 
dependence;259 and the main dynamic issue is temporal (within-unit time-serial) 
dependence of observations. Such characteristics, if unaccounted by model specification 
and/or specific estimation techniques, may result in violation of the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions, which show up in the error process as non-zero mean errors for some 
subsamples (heterogeneity), panel heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous correlation of the 
errors, and/or serially correlated errors.260
                                                 
259 “Unit heterogeneity means that units (countries, states, etc.) differ in ways not explained by 
observed independent variables. In other words, potentially important local factors are unobservable to the 
researcher… In the context of the RCM [Random Coefficient Model] …. heterogeneity could also exist in 
terms of the effects of observed variables on the dependent variables (i.e., the slope coefficients vary across 
units.”   Sven E. Wilson, Daniel M. Butler, “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-
Section Analyses to Simple Alternative Specifications,” Political Analysis (2007) 15, p. 104  
 As a result, the OLS estimation produces 
Spatial dependence refers to “relationships between the various units. [W]e would expect the 
observations of the various countries in a TSCS study to be interrelated.” Nathaniel Beck, “Time-Series-
Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?” Annual Review of Political Science, 
2001- 4, p. 280. 
260 Panel heteroskedasticity (A type of inter-unit heterogeneity): “Each country may have its own 
error variance. … If nations vary so that the error variance varies from nation to nation, we expect to 
observe panel heteroskedasticity; alternatively, we may observe panel heteroskedasticity because one or 
two units do not fit the basic specification well.” 
Contemporaneous correlation of the errors: “The error for one country may be correlated with the 
errors for other countries in the same year. … We will observe contemporaneously correlated errors if 
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inefficient coefficient estimates and incorrect standard errors. Especially, if country-
specific effects and intra-country similarities are not accounted for by model 
specifications, the coefficient estimates are likely to be inconsistent due to omitted 
variable bias (OVB).  
 An approach is to treat such OLS violations as a nuisance and correct for them 
using some feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation technique. However, as 
Beck notes typical FGLS estimates has bad properties for small T samples, and may 
underestimate the standard errors. He says,  
 
“We have shown (Beck &Katz 1995) that the properties of the Parks estimator for 
typical TSCS Ts are very bad, and that, in particular, the estimated standard errors 
could be underestimating variability by from 50% to 200%, depending on T. The 
FGLS standard errors underestimate sampling variability because FGLS assumes 
that ‘sigma’ is known, not estimated. Our conclusion is that the Parks-Kmenta 
estimator simply should not be used.” 261
 
  
Rob Franzese also notes, for example, that whether FGLS enhances efficiency and 
improves standard-error estimation truly, and not merely apparently, depends on how 
many parameters (relative to observations) one must estimate in [the first] step, which 
degrees-of-freedom consumption FGLS will ignore in its next step.”262 Given that FGLS 
is inappropriate for my dataset, which is a small T dataset, I resort to both the ‘Model 
it!’263 approach and the OLS technique with panel corrected standard errors suggested 
by Beck and Katz (1995, 1996).264
 
 Regarding the use of FGLS and OLS estimation 
techniques with TSCS data, Beck notes that   
                                                                                                                                                 
unobserved features of some countries are related to unobserved features in other countries. (Although we 
use the term errors, these are only errors of the observer, i.e. omitted variables.) Thus, if the Dutch and 
German economies are linked, then we would expect omitted variables for each country also to be linked.” 
Serially correlated errors:  “The errors for a given country are correlated with previous errors for that 
country.”   
Beck, “Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?,” p. 275.  
261 Ibid., p. 276 
262 Robert J. Franzese, Jr., “Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data,” 
Political Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4  (2005), p.  436  
263 ™ Robert J. Franzese, Jr., “Empirical Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section Data,” Lecture Notes, 
(2009), http://www-personal.umich.edu/~franzese/SyllabiEtc.html 
264 Nathaniel Beck, Jonathan N. Katz, “What to do (and not to do) with Time-Series Cross-Section 
Data,” The American Political Science Review, Vol.89, No.3 (September 1995), pp. 634-647.  
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“…. the FGLS correction for panel heteroskedasticity is, in my view, inherently 
flawed. This does not mean, however, that OLS is a good estimator for TSCS data; 
the errors are likely, after all, to show both panel heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors. Under these conditions, OLS is still 
consistent, though inefficient, and the OLS standard errors maybe wrong. Although 
inefficiency may be an important issue, it is easy to at least compute panel correct 





Addressing Dynamic Issues  
Because TSCS data are annual it shows dynamic issues; e.g. serially correlated errors. 
One way to address this issue is, as noted before, to treat it as a nuisance and estimate 
with FGLS. As Beck notes, however, we can think about the serial correlation as part of 
the model specification, and address it by adding a lagged dependent variable into the 
model.266 Economic polices are generally put in practice in an incremental (step by step) 
way to alleviate likely reactions of the affected parties. For the economic structure of a 
country comprises many conflicting interests (some are based on sectoral characteristics, 
as noted before). Hence, it is not unreasonable to think that policies at time t are 
correlated with the policies in effect during the previous years. Adding a lagged 
dependent variable into the model specification allows us, therefore, to control for (i.e. to 
model) dynamic effects. Beck notes that “in typical situations the inclusion of a lagged 
dependent variable in the specification will eliminate almost all serial correlation of the 
errors (since the lagged dependent variable implicitly includes lagged error terms into the 
specification).”267 Still, we can test if any serial correlation remains via “the TSCS 
analogue of the standard Lagrange multiplier test.”268
                                                 
265 Beck, “Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years,” p. 278. 
Also see Franzese, “Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data”.  
 Further, “modeling of dynamics via 
266 Beck, “Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years,” pp. 279-
280. 
267 Nathaniel Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Methodology,   Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. Brady, David Collier (ed.), Oxford University Press 
(2008). (I used the draft version of this article available at http://as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2576/beck.pdf, p.3.) 
268 “We can test for serially correlated errors (with or without a lagged dependent variable) via the 
TSCS analogue of the standard Lagrange multiplier test. Just run OLS, capture the residuals, and regress 
the residuals on all the independent variables (including the lagged dependent variable if present) and the 
lagged residual. If the coefficient on the lagged residual is significant (with the usual t-test), we can reject 
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Addressing Cross-Sectional Issues  
As noted before, cross-sectional complications of TSCS data, and hence, violations of the 
Gauss-Markov, assumptions, may display themselves as panel heteroskedasticity (i.e. the 
errors for the different units may have differing variances) and contemporaneous 
correlation of the errors (i.e. the errors for the different units may be correlated across 
units).270
 Again, it is possible to treat panel heteroskesticity and contemporaneous 
correlation of errors as a nuisance and deal with them via special estimation techniques. 
Beck stresses that “researchers worried about correcting standard errors due to 
contemporaneously correlated and panel heteroskedastic errors can use ‘panel corrected 




 Franzese also notes that 
“in pooled samples, incorporating correlation information to enhance efficiency and 
improve standard-error estimation is just another application of FGLS (e.g., Parks 
procedure if degrees of freedom suffice, or some more-limited parameterization 
thereof if not) and/or consistent Standard errors. Beck and Katz (1995, 1996) panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) would suffice to render standard errors consistent 
to one common form of cross-subsample correlation (contemporaneous correlation in 
a TSCS context).” 272
 
 
However, it is substantively more appealing to see cross-sectional issues as 
interesting properties of TSCS data to be modeled. Starting with panel heteroskedasticity, 
we should keep in mind that apparent panel heteroskedasticity may result from cross-sub-
sample heterogeneity—e.g. omitted interaction terms. While the theory and our specific 
                                                                                                                                                 
the null of independent errors.” (Beck, “Longitudinal Data - Summer, 2001 - Day 1,” Lecture Notes,  p. 7. 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/_nbeck.)  Also see Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” Draft, pp.3-4.   
269 Beck, “Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years,” p. 280. 
270 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” Draft,” p.5. 
271 Ibid. FGLS techniques can also be used to address such cross-sectional issues. But as noted before, 
“Beck and Katz (1995) showed that this procedure has extremely poor statistical properties unless T >> N, 
which is rare. Thus this method is seldom used any more.” Ibid.  
272 Franzese, “Empirical Strategies for Various Manifestations of Multilevel Data,” p. 440.  
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hypotheses tell us whether we need interaction terms, in case we detect heteroskedasticity 
via tests or graphs, we should inquire whether all units are governed by the same 
regression equation—i.e. whether the effect of a specific variable varies across a sub-
group of countries.  
 When it comes to contemporaneous correlation of errors, modeling is, again, a 
necessity. Beck mentions two kinds of correlation:  
 
“We would expect contemporaneous correlation of the errors to be likely in studies 
of political economy in open economies; shocks that affect one nation can also be 
expected to affect its trading partners (either as a common shock or through the 
unexpected impact on trade.”273
 
 
Franzese and Hays also emphasize that we should distinguish between interdependence 
and common shocks.  
 
“Interdependence refers to processes by which outcomes in some units, yj, affect 
outcomes in others, yi. We distinguish such interdependence process, which will 
induces spatial correlation, from responses to spatially correlated outside 
influences—call these exogenous-external conditions or common shocks—and/or to 
spatially correlated unit level factors, both of which will also induce spatial 
correlation across units can arise through any of these components of our generic 
model. For example, a country might respond to spatially correlated internal or 
exogenous-external political economic shocks by lowering its capital tax rate (the 
unit-level or contextual terms,…) , and its response to the external or internal shocks 
may depend on contextual or domestic conditions (the term reflecting context 
conditionality… ), but the magnitude of its response may further depend on how its 
competitors respond and, conversely, its own response may affect the tax rates that 
policy makers in other countries choose (the term reflecting spatial interdependence, 
ρΣ j≠i wij yjt).”274
 
 
They also underline that spatial interdependence is a substantively meaningful property 
of TSCS data, not just a nuisance to correct.  
 
“Relegating spatial interdependence to nuisance is often problematic on econometric 
grounds and, more often and importantly still, on substantive grounds because many 
political science contexts imply substantively meaningful and interesting 
                                                 
273 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” Draft,” p.5. (Emphasis added) 
274 Robert J. Franzese, Jr., Jude C. Hays, “Spatial Econometric Models of Cross-Sectional 
Interdependence in Political Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-Section Data,” Political Analysis, 
Vol.15 (2007), p.142.  
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interdependence across units of observation. The frequently ignored spatial 
relationships in TSCS data are an important part of the politics that political 
scientists aim to study. In comparative politics, for example, likelihoods and 
outcomes of demonstrations, riots, coups, and/or revolutions in one country almost 
certainly depend in substantively crucial ways on such occurrences in other countries 
(e.g., through demonstration effects or snowballing).”275
 
 
When it comes to how to model spatial interdependence, we first assume an a priori 
specified weighting matrix which ties units. As Beck notes, “the spatial methods are only 
superior if the specified weights are close to being correct” and notes that “Beck, 
Gleditsch and Beardsley (2006) argued that for studies of political economy it is often 
better to assume that nations are tied together by their level of trade (in proportion to 
GDP).”276 I follow the same logic and use trade relationships to construct a weights 
matrix. I also assume that the spatial effect operates with a temporal lag. Accordingly, I 
add into the model a term ρWyt-1 (ρΣ j≠i wij,t-1yjt-1) which is the weighted average of the 
time lagged dependent variable for all the units except unit i. The weight (wij,t-1) 
represents the relative influence of j on i during time t-1. In other words, for each 
observation on yit, the corresponding element of Wyt-1 gives a weighted average of the y 
j,t-1  (lagged y in the other units), with weights given by the relative connectivity from j to 
i during tt-1.277 And, ρ is the spatial autoregressive coefficient, which estimates the overall 
interdependence strength. 278
Finally to account for common shocks I include in the model a set of dummies for 




                                                 
275 Ibid., p.141.  
  
276 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” Draft,” p.3.  
277 To obtain the weight (wij), I first ordered the data as N observations at t0 and then N observations at 
t1 then the N at t2 and so on through the N at tT. To obtain a NxN W matrix for each time period, I 
calculated (imports from j to i plus exports from i to j) / GDP of i. (I gathered trade data from 
UNCOMTRADE database.) Hence, I obtained a NxN W matrix for each time period which has zeros on 
the diagonal. This weights matrix (W) represents the relative influence of j on i. I ‘row-normalized’ this 
weights matrix, by dividing each element of each row of W by the sum of that row. The spatial lag (Wy) is 
matrix W times vector y. Finally, to get time lagged Wy, I simply used Wy with one year time lag; i.e., for 
each observation on yit, the corresponding element of Wyt-1 gives a weighted average of the y j,t-1  (lagged y 
in the other units), with weights given by the relative connectivity from j to i during tt-1.  
278 Franzese and Hays, “Spatial Econometric Models of Cross-Sectional Interdependence in Political 
Science Panel and Time-Series-Cross-Section Data,” p. 144. Also see Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section 
Methods,” pp. 5-7.  
279 Franzese, “Empirical Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section Data,” Lecture Notes.  
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Addressing Unit-Heterogeneity  
Lastly, I also want to mention how I address unit-heterogeneity. The sample of the 
present study is compiles the nondemocracies of the world, to the extent data allows. 
These countries differ in many ways, many of which not observable to the researcher. 
Wilson and Butler warn us against possible bias which may result from the use of OLS 
on pooled data, and graphically present likely estimation mistakes (Figure 17). They 
argue “when researchers use OLS on data pooled from different units, they implicitly 
assume that unobserved local factors do not exist (meaning that αi is constant across 
countries: αi = αj = α).”280 They provide four graphs which clearly illustrate “the severe 
consequences that can result from using OLS inappropriately on pooled data.”281 Beck 
also, referring to (Green, Kim and Yoon, 2001), emphasizes  that “if the fixed effects are 





Figure 17 – The severe consequences that can result from using OLS inappropriately on pooled TSCS data. 
The thick line in each panel is the estimated slope from the pooled regression. (a) Pooled regression 
correctly estimates slope; (b) pooled regression overestimates slope; (c) pooled regression underestimates 
slope; and (d) pooled regression estimates incorrect sign for slope.  
                                                                                                                                                 
The F-Test is conducted by using the following formula: 
 
280 Wilson and Butler, “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to 
Simple Alternative Specifications,” p. 104. 
281 Ibid.  
282 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” p.3. 
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The simplest way to address unit-heterogeneity is “to allow the intercepts to vary by 
unit, the ‘fixed effects’ model [FEM]”283  This is equivalent to including a set of country 
dummies into the model. Fixed effects (or Least Square Dummy Variables-LSDV) model 
is also called ‘within-group estimator’, because, it uses only the variation in yit and xit 
within each group (country) to estimate the β coefficients. Any variation between 
countries is assumed to spring from the unobserved fixed effects.284 As a result, time-
invariant variables cannot be included in the model, and slowly moving variables will 
have high standard errors because they will be highly correlated with the fixed effects and 
the fixed effects will soak up most of the explanatory power of those slowly changing 
variables.285 In the literature, there is a divergence about whether one should include 
fixed effects in the presence of slowly changing variables when the F-test marginally 
indicates their inclusion. Beck argues that “it may be better to decide not to include fixed 
effects if the test of the null of no fixed effects only marginally rejects that null. But 
where fixed effects are needed in the model, failure to include them can lead to omitted 
variable bias.”286
 
 Wilson and Butler’s stance, however, is for the inclusion of fixed 
effects even when one ‘loses’ explanatory power of the time-invariant and slowly 
changing variables. They say,  
“… some might argue that when theory suggests a certain set of explanatory 
variables, those variables should be included instead of unit effects. After all, should 
not our models be parsimonious and theoretically motivated? Of course. But to use 
theory as an argument against the diagnostic value of FEM is to fundamentally 
misunderstand the role of statistical analysis in theory evaluation. If we knew the 
true model (not that a model is ever really ‘‘true’’) and had all the appropriately 
measured data, then this would be a valid argument. But absent divination of the true 
specification, we first use regression analysis to test our theories against plausible 
alternatives. Unit heterogeneity represents the alternative explanation (almost always 
a plausible one) that unobserved local factors drive, at least in part, the cross-country 
variation in the dependent variable. In most cases, researchers are painfully aware of 
                                                 
283 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” p.7  
284 Franzese, “Empirical Models for Time-Series-Cross-Section Data,” Lecture Notes 
285 Wilson and Butler, “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to 
Simple Alternative Specifications,” p. 106 and Beck, “Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We 
Learned in the Past Few Years,” p. 285.  
286 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” p.3 
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potentially important variables that are missing from the analysis. Accounting for 
these missing variables is not atheoretical; it is simply careful science.”287
 
 
They also add that the FEM can also be a simple diagnostic tool; 
 
“… by comparing the pooled OLS and FEM coefficient estimates, a researcher can 
tell whether unit effects influence the parameters of interest and they can identify 
which panels (or groups of panels) differ most significantly from the mean. Standard 
F tests can determine the statistical significance of the unit effects individually, in 
subsets, or globally. 288
  
 
Because most variables used in the present research are slowly changing indicators, I 
followed Wilson and Butler’s steps and used FEM as a diagnostic tool. Thus, for each 
analysis I checked the possibility of fixed effects by estimating the model with and 
without a full set of country dummies but one; and tested, via standard F-test, the null 
hypothesis that all the fixed effects are jointly insignificant.289
  
 Whenever I detected unit 
effects, rather than estimating the model with fixed effects, and relying on within unit 
variation—which is not very reasonable with the small T data that I have—I looked for 







                                                 
287 Wilson and Butler, “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to 
Simple Alternative Specifications,” p. 106.  
288 Ibid., p. 105. 
289 Beck, “Time-Series Cross-Section Methods,” p.3 
An alternative to FEM is the random-effects model (REM), which can be estimated with GLS or maximum 
likelihood estimation. Hsaio shows that fixed effects are appropriate if one wants to make inferences to the 
observed units, whereas the random effects model (which assumes that the effects are drawn from some 
distribution) is appropriate if one thinks of the observed units as a sample from a larger population and if 
one wants to make inferences about the larger population. (Referred to in Beck, “What Have  We Learned 
in the Past Few Years” p. 284) While the random effects model better suits the ‘sample’ character of my 
dataset, it  requires that the unit effects are uncorrelated with the regressors—which is not the case in my 
dataset. (Wilson and Butler, “A Lot More to Do: The Sensitivity of Time-Series Cross-Section Analyses to 
Simple Alternative Specifications,”  p. 104)  
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TESTING INDIRECT ACCOUNTABILITY:  
GOVERNMENT RESPONSIVENESS TO CAPITALIST INTERESTS   
DUE TO ‘EXIT-THREAT’ OR ‘EXIT’ 
 
 
Let us begin by recalling the main argument of this study. In essence, I question the 
possibility and the conditions under which the unlimited power of nondemocratic rulers 
can be constrained by a segment of the society. My main argument is that those 
nondemocratic leaders who are financially dependent on extraction from domestic 
productive forces can be indirectly held accountable by capital owners and investors who 
are able to use the threat of exit and/or who can actually perform it. In other words, if an 
autocratic ruler is financially dependent on extraction from domestic productive forces, 
and if those productive forces are strong and independent enough to ‘punish’ the ruler by 
exiting in case their interests are not met, government responsiveness to capitalists’ 
interests to avoid their exit can be regarded as a form of accountability, and hence 
restriction, on the policymaking power of the ruler. I underline once more that not every 
kind of pro-capitalist policymaking can be considered as indirect accountability. Indirect 
accountability implies responsiveness to business reactions only when capital owners 
possess adequate bargaining-power to extract policy concessions—i.e. only when the 
private sector can credible threaten to exit (or actual exit), and when the (potential) exit is 
likely to inflict some sort of loss on the part of the ruler. Accordingly, any pro-capitalist 
policymaking in the absence of one of these conditions should be considered as a 
function of a different causal mechanism (structural or contextual reasons—such as 
dependence on a single sector; fiscal crisis, or conditionalities attached to a loan, etc.), 
which cannot be considered as accountability. 
Table 13 presents the Model which I use to test the presence of responsiveness as a 
result of exit-threat or exit, controlling for other causal mechanism which may generate 
rulers’ responsiveness to the interests of capitalists in the leading sector of their country.  
In order to clearly present all the terms related to a particular hypothesis, the model is 
displayed in parts—as a result of which some terms appear more than once (written in 
italic), although they are obviously used only once in the estimation. A list of the 
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independent variables is also presented again in Table 14 to facilitate the reading of the 
model. 
Responsiveness (the dependent variable) in this model indicates an increase in the 
level of the variables measuring (1) Common pro-Capitalist policies, (2) Market-
conforming (MC) or pro-LL sector policies, and (3) Market-resisting (MR) or 
particularistic pro-HH sector policies. The items used to measure each variable are as 
follows—details of have been previously presented in Chapter Three. 
 
Common pro-Capitalist Policies:  
Protection of property rights and the rule of law 
Foreign investment freedom and freedom to access to foreign exchange  
Free banking system and ease of accessing competitive bank credits 
Lower inflation (domestic price stability)  
Exchange rate stability 
 
Market-Conforming (pro-LL sector) Policies  
Ease of starting/ending and operating business (less time and red-tape)  
Ease of exporting and importing (less time and red-tape)  
Lower tax burden on profit (lower corporate income tax rate)  
Flexibility of hiring/firing & employing workers 
 
Market-Resisting Particularistic (pro-HH sector) Policies (two separate items used) 
Import tariff concession (exemptions or reductions) for the leading sector  input, 
supplies and machinery and equipment  
Tariff protection for the leading sector’s final products  
 
I have estimated the model by OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE). The 
model includes a time lagged dependent variable to account for autocorrelation, and also 
time-lagged spatial lag dependent variable to control for cross-unit interdependence. 
Wherever F-test indicates that time effects are necessary, I include a full set of year 
dummies but one into the model. However, because most of the variables are slowly 
changing within the time period of the study, wherever units-effects were found to be 
necessary, I followed Wilson and Butler’s advice and used fixed-effects results only as a 
diagnostic tool to determine country or country groups which differ from the mean. 
Accordingly, I estimated pooled models with statistically significant country and group 
effects. Table 15 presents the results of four analyses. All the analyses apply the same 
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model presented previously in Table 13. The F-test results for time and unit effects, and 
for fixed vs. pooled models (with controls) are provided in Table 16.   
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Table 13 – A Model of Responsiveness to the Interests of Capital Owners  
   
*The Dependent Variable(s) measures the level of three distinct policy categories in four separate analyses: (1) Common pro-Capitalist policies, (2) Market-
conforming (MC) or pro-LL sector policies, and (3) Market-resisting (MR) or particularistic pro-HH sector policies.  An increase in the level of these variables 
is considered as responsiveness to the interests of capital owners.  
**The terms written in italic appear more once in this model only to clearly present all the terms related to a particular hypotheses.  
Responsiveness* =  
(Credible Exit-Threat)       βo  +  β1 (FINDEP) + β2 (PRVSECT)+ β3 (MOBILITY)   
+ β4 (FINDEP*PRVSECT) + β5 (FINDEP*MOBILITY) + β6 (PRVSECT*MOBILITY) 
+ β7 (FINDEP*PRVSECT*MOBILITY) 
 
(Capital Flight)  + β8 (CAPTFLWS) +  β1 (FINDEP)** + β19 (LDSEC-CONTB) + β3 (MOBILITY)   
+ β9 (CAPTFLWS*FINDEP)  
+ β10 (CAPTFLWS*LDSEC-CONTB) +  β11 (CAPTFLWS*MOBILITY) + β19  (LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY) 
+ β12 (CAPTFLWS*LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY ) 
 
(Investment Strike)  + β13 (PRVINVSTM) +  β1 (FINDEP) + β18 (LDSEC-CONTB) + β3 (MOBILITY) 
+ β14 (PRVINVSTM*FINDEP)  
+ β15 (PRVINVSTM*LDSEC-CONTB) + β16 (PRVINVSTM*MOBILITY )+ β19 (LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY) 
+ β17 (PRVINVSTM*LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY) 
 
(Single Sector Dependence)   + β18 (LDSEC-CONTB) +β1 (FINDEP) + β3 (MOBILITY)   
+ β19 (LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY) + β20 (LDSEC-CONTB*FINDEP) + β5 (FINDEP*MOBILITY) 
+ β21 (LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY*FINDEP)  
 
(Fiscal Crisis)   + β23 (FISCAL) +  β1 (FINDEP) +  β24 (FISCAL*FINDEP) 
(Other Alternative             + β25 (IMF-LOAN) + β26 (PUBLIC-LS) + β27(HHDOMN ) + β28 (SRVSDOMN) + β29 (NONDEMOCR)  
Arguments &                            + β30 (lnGNIpc) + β30 (Lagged Dependent Variable) +   β31  (Spatial Interdependence - Wyt-1) 
Control Variables )                            + β (time dummies) + β (country dummies) + e 
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Table 14 - The list of the Independent Variables used to test the main and alternative hypotheses. 
 
 
Responsiveness to the Interests of 
Capital Owners due to  The Independent Variables (3 year lagged average)  
 ‘Credible Exit-Threat’ 
(Indirect Accountability)  
 
FINDEP – Financial Dependence of the Government on Tax Revenue (Tax Revenue / Total Government Revenue)  
 
PRVSECT – Strength and Independence of the Private Sector (Private Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) / Total 
GFCF & Subsidies (% GDP)  
 
MOBILITY – Sectorally determined Exit opportunities (LL-HH sectoral attributes continuum based on Capital Intensity 
& Economies of Scale measures – Low values indicate less exit opportunities / mobility) 
 ‘Exit’ 
(Indirect Accountability) 
CAPTFLWS – Capital In + out Flows (% GDP)  
(Capital Flight is indicated by the negative range of CAPTFLWS)  
 
 
PRVINVSTM – Annual percent change in Private GFCF (Investment Strike is indicated by the negative range of 
PRVINVSTM)  
Fiscal Crisis  FISCAL – Budget Balance and Public Debt (% GDP) (Fiscal Crisis is indicated by the negative values = Budget deficit > 3 % GDP & Public Debt > 60% GDP)  
External Pressures (Conditionalities 
Attached to a Loan)  IMF-LOAN – IMF loan (%GDP)  
Dependence on a Single Sector   
(Also to accounts for the impact of 
the ‘size’ of the leading sector)  
 
(Controlling for the impact 
of similar or different 
sectoral interests that exist 
in the economy) 
 
 
LDSEC-CONTB  – The Leading Sector's Contribution to Economy (Sectoral share in total export earnings) 
 
HHDOMN – The share of High/High Sectors in total export earnings  
SRVSDOMN – The share of commercial service exports in total export earnings  
 
Existence of similar interest in 
public and private sectors   PUBLIC-LS – Extent of public sector dominance in the leading sector  
The Degree of Authoritarianism  NONDEMOCR – The Freedom House Political Rights index 
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TABLE 15  -  REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors  (PCSEs) 
 
 Common Pro-Capitalist Policies  
Market Conforming 
Policies  
Protection for  
the Leading Sector  
Import Tariff 
Concessions for the 
Leading Sector 
                
 Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z| 
FINDEP .50 (.24) .04  .42 .09 .00  8.25 12.60 .51  -.16 .14 .25 
PRVSECT .11 .11) .33  .15 .04 .00  -5.88 6.74 .38  .28 .07 .00 
MOBILITY .57 .28) .05  .52 .13 .00  39.62 35.52 .27  -.79 .18 .00 
FINDEP*MOBILITY  -1.34 .48) .01  -1.01 .21 .00  -40.43 51.57 .43  .68 .23 .00 
FINDEP*PRVSECT -.15 .25) .55  -.36 .08 .00  20.73 12.66 .10  -.36 .12 .00 
PRVSECT*MOBILITY -.83 38) .03  -.47 .17 .01  44.07 34.04 .20  -1.02 .30 .00 
FINDEP*PRVSECT*MOBILITY 1.08 .53 .04  1.03 .25 .00  -85.30 52.36 .10  1.36 .42 .00 
LDSEC-CONTB   .12 .10 .24  .15 .05 .00  31.62 11.65 .01  -.40 .12 .00 
LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY .29 .38 .45  -.21 .14 .13  -141.20 54.29 .01  1.62 .55 .00 
LDSEC-CONTB* FINDEP .09 .22 .69  -.24 .10 .02  -54.96 19.84 .01  .53 .29 .07 
LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY*FINDEP -.50 .56 .37  .31 .22 .16  219.76 81.71 .01  -2.18 .81 .01 
CAPTFLWS .40 .22 .07  -.15 .10 .13  -30.19 14.25 .03  1.57 .28 .00 
CAPTFLWS *FINDEP .17 .34 .61  .44 .15 .00  7.92 12.67 .53  .66 .27 .01 
CAPTFLWS* LDSEC-CONTB -.57 .31 .07  .27 .12 .02  53.89 18.60 .00  -2.24 .37 .00 
CAPTFLWS *MOBILITY -.57 .53 .28  -.53 .27 .05  79.11 44.78 .08  -3.79 .55 .00 
CAPTFLWS* LDSEC-CONTB*MOBILITY .72 .74 .33  -.12 .40 .76  -232.83 72.07 .00  4.79 .97 .00 
PRVINVSTM -.24 .09 .01  -.24 .07 .00  -0.44 7.43 .95  .19 .13 .14 
PRVINVSTM *FINDEP .07 .07 .31  .24 .06 .00  9.92 10.19 .33  .13 .11 .25 
PRVINVSTM* LDSEC-CONTB .32 .11 .01  .25 .09 .01  -5.54 8.98 .54  -.24 .17 .16 
PRVINVSTM *MOBILITY .44 .15 .00  -.09 .09 .33  -33.28 22.56 .14  -.51 .20 .01 
PRVINVSTM* LDSEC-CONTB* MOBILITY -.62 .21 .00  -.03 .12 .83  57.37 27.27 .04  .41 .32 .20 
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TABLE 15  -  REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS – continued  
 
Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors  (PCSEs) 
 
 Common Pro-Capitalist Policies  
Market Conforming 
Policies  
Protection for  
the Leading Sector  
Import Tariff 
Concessions for the 
Leading Sector 
                
 Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z|  Coef. SE P>|z| 
FISCAL .11 .04 .01  -.04 .01 .00  -3.35 1.80 .06  -0.05 .03 0.06 
FISCAL *FINDEP -.11 .05 .03  -.05 .02 .04  -0.06 3.08 .99  -0.03 .04 0.45 
PUBLIC-LS .25 .06 .00  .01 .01 .33  4.63 1.22 .00  -0.13 .02 0.00 
IMF-LOAN .03 .03 .23  .00 .01 .77  -4.95 (2.53) .05  -.09 03) .00 
NONDEMOCR .08 .04 .06  -.05 .02 .06  5.24 3.67 .15  .07 .06 .26 
HHDOMN -.19 .06 .00  -.07 .02 .00  -5.13 3.48 .14  .03 .04 .34 
SRVSDOMN .08 .06 .13  -.12 .03 .00  -3.44 5.08 .50  -.13 .04 .00 
lnGNIpc .14 .08 .06  .09 .03 .00  -10.07 3.84 .01  -.08 .04 .02 
lagged Dependent Variable .49 .11 .00  .80 .04 .00  .57 .12 .00  .59 .08 .00 
Spatial Interdependence  .28 .07 .00  -.07 .05 .49  -.03 .06 .54  -.27 .19 .16 
Time Effects                
Country Effects                
Constant -.20 .18 .26   -.03 .05 .85   -2.86 5.82 .62   .65 .12 .00 
Number of obs  301    301    301    301  
N. of groups    43    43    43    43  
Obs per group:   7    7    7    7  
R-squared            0.95    0.97    0.96      0.95  
Wald chi2(37)        30974   23568222   10257   10427658  
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Table 16- F-test Results for Time and Unit Effects  
Dependent Variable 
Time Effects Unit Effects 
 
Fixed effects vs. 
Pooled Model with country/country group controls 
F-stat 
F-Critical 




























EAC, EMCCA, EAEC, Ex-Communist, 
 North Africa, Middle East 
Bahrain, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethiopia, 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tunisia, Zimbabwe. 
Tariff Protection for the 
Leading Sector’s Final 
Product   





Algeria, CAR, Gabon, Haiti, Jordan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Import Tariff Concessions 




EAC, WAEMU, EAEC 
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Central African Republic, Jordan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, Yemen, Zimbabwe. 
* The level of significance for the F-Critical
                                                 
290 Country Groups:  
East African Community (EAC): Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda 
West African Economic & Monetary Union (WAEMU): Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA): Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon 
Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC): Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan (after 2005)  
Ex-Communist Countries (Ex-Com): Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Uzbekistan 
North Africa:  Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia  




TESTING ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES 
 
External Pressures – Conditionalities attached to IMF loans  
One of the factors which may bring about common pro-capitalist or market-conforming 
policies, in the absence of bargaining-power of the private sector, is external pressures 
from a money lending institution, mainly the IMF. For in most cases IMF loans are 
conditional on adopting economic liberalization policies. Therefore, we expect to see an 
increase in the level of pro-capitalist or market-conforming policies and a decrease in 
the level of particularistic policies when a government borrows from the IMF.  
 
For pro-capitalist and market conforming policies we expect that  
H: d R / d IMF-Loan = βIMF-loan > 0  (H0: βIMF-loan ≤ 0) 
and, for particularistic policies 
H : d R / d IMF-Loan = βIMF-loan  <  0   (H0: βIMF-loan ≥ 0) 
 
Table 17– Hypothesis Test of whether Borrowing from IMF affects the level of pro-
Capitalist  and Market-Conforming Policies  
 
d R/ d IMF 
s.e. 




 ≤ 0 
One-tailed p-
Value 






Capitalist  0.032 0.026 1.206 0.115 0.885 [-0.021, 0.084] 
Market 
Conform. -0.003 0.009 -0.291 0.386 0.614 [-0.020, 0.015] 
 
 
Table 18 – Hypothesis Test of whether Borrowing from IMF affects the level of 
Protection for the Leading Sector and the Degree of Import Tariff Concessions  
 
d R/ d IMF 
s.e. 




 ≤ 0 
One-tailed 
p-Value 





Protection  -4.950 2.534 -1.953 0.974 0.026 [ -9.918, 0.018] 
Tariff 





Table 18 shows that borrowing from the IMF has no statistically significant effect on 
the level of common pro-Capitalist or market-conforming policies (we can reject neither 
of the directional hypothesis). However, Table 17 shows that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that borrowing from the IMF increase the level of market conforming policies 
In conformity with our hypothesis, borrowing from the IMF decreases both the level of 
protectionism guaranteed for the products of the leading sector and also the sector-
specificity (directed at the leading sector) of import tariff concessions.  
 
 
Fiscal Crisis  
Fiscal crisis may also lead policy-makers to make pro-leading-sector (both market-
conforming and market-resisting) or pro-capitalist policies in order to attract greater 
private investment. Fiscal status variable is based on both the level of budget balance and 
government debt (as percent of GDP). The negative values on that variable indicate fiscal 
crisis. Specifically, we expect to see an increase in the level of all policies of interest 
when governments go through a fiscal crisis. We expect that effect to be more robust at 
high levels of financial dependence.  
 
The part of the model that accounts for the effect of fiscal crisis is as follows:  
R = …+ βFS (Fiscal Status) + βFD (Financial Dependence) 
           + βFS_FD (Fiscal Status*Financial Dependence) + …  
 
And, the marginal effect of fiscal status on the level of the policies of interest is given by  
d R / d Fiscal Status =  βFS + βFS_FD (Financial Dependence) 
 
Accordingly, I hypothesize that  
H:  βFS + βFS_FD (Financial Dependence) < 0291
H0: βFS + βFS_FD (Financial Dependence) ≥ 0  
    
                                                 
291 Because Fiscal Crisis is indicated by the negative range of the Fiscal Status variable, we expect to 
see a negative marginal effect indicating an increase in the level of the policies of interest.  
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Table 19 – Hypothesis Test of whether Fiscal Status affects the level of pro-Capitalist 
Policies  
 
d R/d FS 
s.e. 
(d R / d FS) t-Statistic 
One-tailed 
 p-Value 













Financial Dependence= .25 0.081 0.046 1.768 0.960 0.039 [0.170, -0.009] 
Financial Dependence= .55 0.048 0.053 0.908 0.817 0.182 [0.152, -0.056] 
Financial Dependence= .97 0.002 0.067 0.034 0.513 0.486 [0.134, -0.129] 
 
 
Table 20 – Hypothesis Test of whether Fiscal Status affects the level of Market-
Conforming Policies  
 
d R/d FS 
s.e. 
(d R / d FS) t-Statistic 
One-tailed 
 p-Value 













Financial Dependence= .25 -0.05 0.02 -3.30 0.001 0.999 [-0.02, -0.08] 
Financial Dependence= .55 -0.06 0.02 -3.22 0.001 0.999 [-0.03, -0.10] 
Financial Dependence= .97 -0.08 0.03 -2.98 0.002 0.998 [-0.03, -0.14] 
 
 
Table 21 – Hypothesis Test of whether Fiscal Status affects the level of Protection for 
the Leading Sector 
 
d R/d FS 
s.e. 
(d R / d FS) t-Statistic 
One-tailed 
 p-Value 













Financial Dependence= .25 -3.36 1.68 -2.01 0.0228 0.977 [-0.61, -6.11] 
Financial Dependence= .55 -3.38 1.96 -1.72 0.0434 0.957 [0.29, -7.06] 
Financial Dependence= .97 -3.40 2.86 -1.19 0.1176 0.882 [1.30, -8.10] 
 
 
Table 22 – Hypothesis Test of whether Fiscal Status affects the degree of Import Tariff 
Concessions  
 
d R/d FS 
s.e. 
(d R / d FS) t-Statistic 
One-tailed 
 p-Value 













Financial Dependence= .25 -0.06 0.03 -1.80 0.036 0.963 [0.00, -0.12] 
Financial Dependence= .55 -0.07 0.04 -1.66 0.049 0.951 [0.01, -0.14] 












































































































Figure 18 - Marginal effect of Fiscal Status on various policy categories, conditional on financial 
dependence, with 95 percent confidence intervals.292
 
 (Fiscal crisis is indicated by the negative range of the 
Fiscal Status variable.)   
 
Tables 19 through 22 present the hypothesis testing for the effect of fiscal status on 
the four policy categories, conditional on three levels of financial dependence. And, 
Figure 19 displays the marginal effect of fiscal status the same policy categories 
conditional on a continuous range of financial dependence. Because fiscal crisis is 
indicated by negative values on the scale of fiscal status, the part of the graph below zero 
should be read as an increase in the level of the policy of concern. 
 When the dependent variable measure pro-Capitalist policies, we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis that financial crisis has no or negative effect on the level of pro-capitalist 
policies at all levels of financial dependence. In other words, financial crisis, does not 
                                                 
292 We can reject a null hypothesis of no effect only when both upper and lower levels of the 
confidence interval are below or above zero, otherwise we fail to reject the null hypothesis.    
For a comprehensive discussion of interaction effects see Cindy D. Kam & Robert J. Franzese, Jr., 
Modeling and Interpreting Interactive Hypotheses in Regression Analysis (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2007) and William Roberts Clark et al., “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving 
Empirical Analyses,” Political Analysis, Vol. 14 (2006):63–82.  
 121 
seem to positively affect the on the level of common pro-capitalists policies. On the 
contrary, at low levels of financial dependence (i.e. in rentier-economies), we reject the 
null hypothesis that good fiscal status has no or negative effect on the same policies. That 
is, good fiscal status positively (or fiscal crisis negatively) affects the level of pro-
capitalist policies.  
For the market-resisting particularistic policies, at low level of financial dependence 
(in rentier economies, again), we reject the null hypothesis that fiscal crisis has no or 
negative effect on the level of the protection and import tariff concessions granted to the 
leading sector. In such countries, fiscal crisis positively affects the level of particularistic 
policies.  
And, for market-conforming policies, we observe that at all levels of financial 
dependence, we can reject the null hypothesis that fiscal crisis has no effect on the level 
of pro-LL sector (or market-conforming) policies. Fiscal crisis emerges as a factor which 
brings about an increase in the level of market-conforming policies. In conformity with 
our hypothesis, this effect is positively mediated by the level of financial dependence.  
 
 
Dependence on a Single HH Sector  
The sectoral dependence hypothesis, informed by Shafer’s arguments, is specifically 
about dependence on a HH sector. As Shafer notes, in countries where the ruler is 
dependent on a single HH sector (oil or mining sector) “market downturns have 
instantaneous, catastrophic consequences for the state; revenues and foreign 
exchange.”293
In a similar vein, one may also wonder if dependence on a LL sector, or even the 
leading sector’s contribution per se (in diverse economies), matters in generating pro-
capitalist or sector specific policies. The data reveals we can distinguish three different 
scenarios in which we can evaluate the role that the leading sector plays in policymaking.  
 Accordingly, we expect that those rulers whose revenue depends on the 
wellbeing of a single sector, responds to the interests of investors in those sectors, even if 
sectoral attributes highly constrain the opportunities of exit them. 
                                                 
293 Shafer, Winners and Losers.  
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Single Sector Dominant Rentier Economies: These economies are marked by low 
financial dependence of the rulers on domestic productive forces and high single 
sector contribution. In all cases the dominant sector is a HH sector (oil sector).  
 
Single Sector Dominant non-Rentier Economies: These economies are marked by 
high financial dependence of the government on domestic productive forces and high 
single sector contribution. The dominant sector may be a LL or a HH sector–other 
than oil sector.  
 
Sectorally Diverse non-Rentier Economies: These economies also are characterized 
by high financial dependence of the government on domestic productive forces, yet 
there is no single sector that dominates the economy of the country. The leading 
















































































































































































































































Figure 19- Distribution of the cases across ‘the leading sector’s contribution to economy’ and ‘financial 
dependence of the government on tax revenue. Case numbers indicate sectoral characteristics—lower 





Figure 19 displays the distribution of the cases across ‘financial dependence on tax 
revenue’ and ‘leading sector’s contribution to economy’. Below 40 percent of tax 
revenue share in total government revenue (which is considered by Luciani as a cut point 
to indicate rentier economies) we observe only the countries with a HH leading sector (oil 
sector) whose contribution to economy is greater than 50 percent. Above the 40 percent 
threshold, we also observe a few cases where the leading sector’s contribution to 
economy is relatively high. In all these cases, the leading sector is agro-industry.  
Returning back to the hypothesis, therefore, we expect to see a positive relationship 
between the leading sector’s contribution to the economy and the related sector-specific 
policies. We expect this positive relationship to be higher in rentier economies where 
both leading sector and the state have no or very limited exit opportunities.   
To account for the each of the above mentioned scenarios, we need to include 
interaction of three variables: the level of leading sector’s contribution to economy 
(LDSEC-CONTB), an indicator of sectoral characteristics (the score on the LL-HH 
sectoral attributes continuum –MOBILITY), and the level of financial dependence of the 
government on tax revenue.  
The following part of the model allows us to test (1) the impact of the ‘size’ of the 
leading sector per se on the four policy categories, and (2) its impact conditional on 
sectoral attributes and the level of financial dependence of the government.  
 
R =  … + βLDS (L.Sect.Contribution) + βFD (Financial Dependence) + βMOB(Mobility) 
 + βLD_MOB(L.Sect.Contb.*Mobility) + βLD_FD(L.Sect.Contb.*Financial Dependence)  
 + βFD_MOB(Financial Dependence * Mobility) 
 + βLDS_MOB_FD(L.Sect.Contribution * Mobility * Financial Dependence) + …  
 
 
The marginal effect of the leading sector’s contribution on the level of the policies of 
interest is given by   
d R / d LSC = βLDS + βLDS_MOB (Mobility) + βLDS_FD(Financial Dependence)  





Po-capitalist policies:  
H: (d R / d L.Sect.Contribution) > 0    (Ho: d R / d L.Sect.Contribution ≤ 0)  
 if Financial Dependence > .4 (non-rentier economies) or  
 if Mobility ≤ .3 (HH sectors) 
 
The graphs in Figure 20 display the marginal effect of the leading sector’s 
contribution to economy on the level of general pro-capitalists policies, conditional on 
sectoral attributes of the leading sector (mobility) and financial dependence of the 
government on domestic taxation. As noted before, these policies guarantee a free and 
secure environment for investment and capital accumulation, and enable a stable and 
predictable pricing policy for the firms. We observe that at around the mean financial 
dependence range for each sectoral category, there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the level of leading sector’s contribution and the level of pro-
capitalist policies. In other words, within the ranges, where both the upper and lower 
levels of confidence intervals are above zero, we reject the null hypothesis that increase 
in the size of a sector  is no or negative effect on the level of pro-capitalist policies. In 
conformity with our hypothesis, among rentier economies, also, where the leading sector 
is a HH sector (Figure 20 – a), increase in sectoral contribution (hence, sectoral 
dependence) is positively correlated with the level of common pro-capitalist policies.  
In the sample, 34 percent of the cases fall into the statistically significant category of 
a HH leading sector (Mobility=.15) and zero to 55 percent financial dependence  range’ 
(Figure 20-a). 19 percent of the cases are in the category of an upper HH leading sector 
(Mobility score between .3 - .5) and 10 to 90 percent tax revenue range (Figure 20-b). 
And, 20 percent of the cases fall into the category of a LL leading sector (Mobility above 



























































































Figure 20 - Marginal effect of the leading sector’s contribution to economy on common pro-capitalist 
polices, conditional on the sectoral attributes of the leading sector and financial dependence of the 
government on tax revenue, with 95 percent confidence intervals.  
A fixed effects model estimated by OLS with PCSEs. 
 
 
Mobility = .15  (HH)  
Oil Sector  
 
  Mobility= .45 (HH)  
  High Manufacturing  
 
 
 Mobility = .70 (LL)  
 Light Manufacturing  
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Market-conforming policies:  
H: (d R / d L.Sect.Contribution) > 0     (Ho: d R / d L.Sect.Contribution ≤ 0) 
 if Mobility > .5 (relatively LL sectors) and  
       Financial Dependence > .4 (non-rentier economies) 
  
The graphs in Figure 21 display the marginal effect of the leading sector’s 
contribution on the level of pro-LL sector policies (market-conforming policies), 
conditional on sectoral attributes and financial dependence of the government on tax 
revenue. When the leading sector is LL sector (Mobility=.70) increase in sectoral 
contribution has no statistically significant effect on the level of market-conforming 
policies (we fail to reject the null hypothesis that dependence on a LL sector has no effect 
on the level of pro-LL sector policies). When the leading sector is a relatively upper HH 
sector (Mobility score between .3 and .5), increase in those sectors’ contribution to 
economy seems to have a negative effect on the level of market conforming policies 
when the level of financial dependence is above around 75 percent (statistically 
significant only at .05 (one-tail) level). In the sample, 14 percent of the cases fall into this 
sectoral attributes category within the level of financial dependence greater than 70 
percent.  
The striking part of the graph is the statistically significant positive relationship 
between sectoral contribution of very HH sectors (i.e. oil sector) and the level of market-
conforming policies when the degree of financial dependence is below around 35 
percent—i.e. in rentier economies. The lower is the level of financial dependence 
(implicitly meaning, the greater is the degree of sector’s contribution to government 
revenue), the greater is the magnitude of the marginal effect of sectoral contribution on 
the level of market-conforming policies. In the sample, 29 percent of the cases are in this 


































































































































Figure 21 - Marginal effect of the leading sector’s contribution to economy on the level of pro-LL sector 
(market-conforming) policies, conditional on sectoral attributes and financial dependence of the 
government on tax revenue, with 95 percent confidence intervals. (A pooled regression controlling for 
statistically significant country and country group effects, estimated by OLS with PCSEs.)  
 
 
Mobility = .15  (HH)  
Oil Sector  
 
  Mobility= .45 (HH)  
  High Manufacturing  
 
 
 Mobility = .70 (LL)  




Market-resisting particularistic policies: (Protection and Tariff Concessions for the 
Leading Sector)  
 
H: (d R / d L.Sect.Contribution) > 0   (Ho: d R / d L.Sect.Contribution ≤ 0) 
 if Mobility ≤ .5 (relatively HH sectors) and  
       Financial Dependence ≤ .4 (rentier economies 
 
In Figure 22, the graphs display the marginal effect of the leading sector’s 
contribution on the level of protection granted for the leading sector’s final product(s). 
Our first finding is that, sectoral contribution (sectoral dependence) has a weak positive 
effect (statistically significant only at .05 one-tail level) on protection of oil sector 
products (a HH leading sector) only in the absence of financial dependence—i.e. in pure 
rentier states. Only 6 percent of the cases fall into this category.  When the leading sector 
scores higher than .40 on the HH-LL continuum (i.e. heavy manufacturing and up), at the 
upper levels of financial dependence (above around 80 percent), however, we observe a 
positive relationship between dependence on upper HH and LL leading sectors and the 
level of protection these sectors receive. The higher is the level of financial dependence 
and the degree of LL sector attributes, the greater is the magnitude of this positive effect. 
In the sample, 21 percent of the cases fall into the statistically significant region. 
(Although there seems to be a negative effect below 50 percent tax revenue share, this 
finding is substantively meaningless, since there are only a few cases in this seemingly 
very large range.) 
 
 
BOX  I -  Main Sectoral Attributes Categories (Mobility) present in the sample  
 
         .15 = Hydrocarbons (Extraction and Refining) 
 .30 - .40 = Mining of non-energy producing materials 
 .35 - .5 = Heavy manufacturing (Machinery and Transport Equipment, Chemicals, Metal  
    Processing) 
.65 - .70 = Light Manufacturing (Textile & Clothing; Clothing)        
        .75 = Agro-industry (Peasant cash crop agriculture and first stage processing of agricultural  










































































































Figure 22 - Marginal effect of the leading sector’s contribution to economy on the level of protection for 
the leading sector’s final product(s), conditional on the sectoral attributes of the leading sector and financial 
dependence of the government, with 95 percent confidence intervals (90 percent for the graph where the 
leading sector Mobility=.15). A pooled regression controlling for statistically significant country and 
country group effects, estimated by OLS with PCSEs.  
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 Finally, when the dependent variable measures a very particularistic policy—
import tariff concessions / exemptions—we observe that contrary to our expectations, at 
very low levels of financial dependence (i.e. in rentier states) the leading HH sector’s 
contribution (oil sector) has a negative effect on the degree of import tariff concession. 
Yet this negative effect is statistically significant only at .05 one-tail level of significance. 
In the sample 23 percent of the cases fall into the category of a HH leading sector and a 
financial dependence level below 25 percent. We see a similar negative effect at the other 
side of the HH-LL continuum with greater precision. When the leading sector is a LL 
sector and the state is highly financially dependent on tax revenue, increase in sectoral 
contribution is negatively related with the extent of leading sector-specific import tariff 
concession; and the higher is the level of financial dependence, the greater is the 
magnitude of this negative effect. (Again, the seemingly positive relationship at lower 
levels of financial dependence—for upper HH and LL sectors—is substantively 
meaningless since there are very few cases in those ranges.) 
 
 
 In sum, we find evidence for the sectoral dependence hypothesis for the common 
pro-capitalist policies and market-resisting protectionist polices for almost all types of 
leading sectors within their observable ranges of financial dependence. The interesting 
part of the findings is that, in conformity conforming Shafer’ argument, the sectoral 
dependence thesis holds for market-conforming policies in rentier states (HH leading 
sectors)), but not for those financially dependent states with LL leading sectors. Further, 
the level of particularistic policies (which we assumed to be prioritized especially by HH 
sector actors, is either weakly (protection) or negatively (leading-sector-specific import 



























































































































Figure 23 -  Marginal effect of the leading sector’s contribution to economy on the level of Import Tariff 
Concessions for the leading sector, conditional on the sectoral attributes of the leading sector and financial 
dependence of the government on tax revenue, with 95 percent confidence intervals (90 percent for 
EXTOPT=.15). A pooled regression controlling for statistically significant country and country group 
effects, estimated by OLS with PCSEs.  
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TESTING THE MAIN HYPOTHESES 
 
Indirect Accountability as a result of Voice 
(Responsiveness due to Credible Exit-Threat of the Leading Sector)  
Having examined the alternative ‘sectoral dependence’ hypothesis, we can now return to 
the main argument of the study—responsiveness to business interests due to exit-
credibility. I posit that autocratic leaders may be indirectly held accountable by capital 
owners and investors provided that the latter have considerable bargaining power vis-à-
vis the rulers. The extent of the leading sector’s bargaining power is conceptualized as a 
function of two factors: Ability to threaten to exit and potential to inflict losses on 
government revenue upon exiting. Exit-credibility is a function of both sectoral attributes 
and strength and independence of the private sector. Sectoral attributes (whether a HH or 
a LL sector) determine the extent to which the sectoral characteristics allow investors to 
easily reallocate their business elsewhere or switch to another sector without incurring 
too much cost; and investment strength and independence of the private sector indicates 
the extent to which the private sector has the financial capacity to reinvest and to survive 
in the absence of government support and protection. Finally, ‘the potential to inflict 
some loss on government revenue upon exiting’ is measured by the share of tax revenue 
in total government revenue, indicating financial dependence of the government on 
domestic productive forces.  
 We assume that indirect accountability exists only when the autocratic ruler 
responds to pro-LL sector interests due to a threat or a potential future loss—i.e. exit-
credibility; since we assume that in case one of the conditions mentioned above is absent 
(or even lower than the hypothesized high level), the ruler would conjecture either that 
the actors in the leading sector cannot go anywhere without having to incur too much 
cost, and that they will necessarily choose to stay and be loyal under any policy 
environment; or that even if they exit, this would not inflict much loss on the government 
revenue. Hence s/he would not respond to business interests due to the bargaining-power 
of the capitalists or a future threat (no indirect accountability)—but maybe due to some 
other factors if responsiveness exist at all.  
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Holding constant other factors—which may bring about pro-leading sector policies 
in the absence of adequate bargaining power of the leading sector—we expect to see 
an increase in the level of general pro-capitalist or sector specific policies (i.e. in 
responsiveness to LS interests) if and only if (1) the state is financially dependent on 
tax revenue,  and (2) exit-credibility is present—i.e. (a) the private sector is strong 
and independent of government rents, and (b) the leading sector possesses viable 
exit-opportunities.   
More specifically, because Exit-Credibility is composed of two variables, we expect 
that increase in the level of strength and independence of the private sector, for 
example, will have a positive impact on the level of above mentioned policies if and 
only if the other component of Exit-Credibility, that is, viable exit-opportunities and 
also financial dependence on tax revenue are high.  
 
Let us recall the part of the model relevant for this hypothesis:  
 
R = … + βFD (Financial Dependence) + βPRSEC (Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect) +βMOB(Mobility)   
 + βFD_PRSEC (Financial Dependence*Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect)  
 + βFD_MOB (Financial Dependence*Mobility)  
 + βPRSEC_MOB (Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect*Mobility)  
 + βFD_PRVSECT_MOB (Financial Dependence*Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect*Mobility) 
 
First, I test an implicit proposition of the hypothesis. The hypothesis posits that the 
effect of ‘credible exit-threat’ (Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect*Mobility) on common or sector-
specific policies increases in financial dependence.294
 
 Substantively speaking, the greater 
the degree of financial dependence, the greater is the effect of a joint increase in strength 
and independence of the private sector and the exit-opportunities of the leading sector. 
Therefore, we expect that the joint effect of ‘Strength and Independence of the Private 
Sector and Mobility  be smaller or equal to zero when Financial Dependence  is zero:  
                                                 
294 This is implicitly stated in the hypothesis. Otherwise, we cannot see a positive relationship when 
the level of financial dependence is high.  
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d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect =   βPRSEC  + βPRSEC _MOB(Mobility)     
      + βPRSEC _FD(Financial Dependence) 
     + βPRSEC_MOB_FD(Mobility*Financial Dependence) 
 
d (d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect) / d Mobility =  
       βPRSEC_MOB + βFD_PRVSECT_MOB (Financial Dependence)  
 
H: βPRSEC_MOB  ≤ 0   (Ho: βPRSEC_MOB > 0)   if Financial Dependence = 0 
 
As seen in Table 15 (regression output), except for the protectionist polices, in all the 
analyses the coefficient measuring the joint effect of Strength and Independence of the 
Private Sector and Mobility in the absence of Financial Dependence (βPRSEC_MOB) is 
smaller than zero at statistically significant level. Therefore we reject the null hypothesis 
that in the absence of a financial dependence of government on tax revenue, exit-
credibility has a positive effect on pro-capitalist, market conforming or import-
concession policies.  
 Figure 24 presents a series of graphs displaying the joint marginal effect of 
Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and Mobility (Credible Exit-Threat) on 
the relevant policy categories conditional on Financial Dependence. We observe that, 
except again the protectionist measures and also common pro-capitalist macroeconomic 
policies, at high levels of financial dependence, a joint increase in the strength and 
independence of the private sector and mobility of the leading sector has positive effect 
on the level of market-conforming and (even) leading-sector-specific tariff concession 
policies. For pro-capitalists macroeconomic policies, however, while the marginal effect 
of credible exit-threat increases as the level of financial dependence increases, this effect 
is not sufficient to bring about a positive impact on the level of pro-capitalist policies. 
And for protectionist measures, a joint increase in the strength and independence of the 
private sector and mobility of the leading sector has a negative effect on the level of 
protection granted for the leading sector’s products.295
                                                 
295 This effect is statistically significant only at .05 (one-tail) level of significance.  
 We have seen in the previous 
analysis that increase in the level of sectoral dependence was sufficient to bring about 




















































































































Figure 24 – The joint effect of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and the Leading Sector’s 
Mobility on the relevant policy categories conditional on Financial Dependence, with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. (a) Pro-capitalists macroeconomic policies; (b) Market-conforming (pro-LL sector) policies; (c) 
Protection for the leading sector’s final product (90 percent confidence interval); (d) Import tariff 
concessions (exemptions) for the leading sector.  
 
 
 Having tested the strict version of the hypothesis, we conclude that in conformity 
with the ‘indirect accountability resulting from credible exit-threat’ hypothesis, we 
observe a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of market-
conforming and import-concession categories, and the joint presence of a strong and 
independent private sector and existence of sectorally determined viable exit-
opportunities, and also a highly financially dependent government  
 
 The fact that we find evidence for responsiveness to market-conforming policies 
not due to (high) sectoral contribution of LL sectors, but when, we assume, the private 
sector has bargaining power vis-à-vis the government, enables us to conclude that rulers 
respond to such kind of polices due to ‘credible exit-threat’. Furthermore, given that we 
observe a joint positive marginal effect of the conditions of indirect accountability not 
just for market-conforming policies (which we assume to be prioritized by the LL 
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sectors) but also for highly particularistic import concession polices as well, strengthens 
our conclusion on the empirical power of the hypothesis of ‘exit–credibility’. For, we 
find that the conditions specified by that hypothesis—which we assume to result in 
responsiveness due to bargaining power of the private sector, hence accountability—
bring about even the kind of policies not highly prioritized by those sectors. Further, the 
fact that in the case of import tariff concessions, the positive effect is valid only at very 
high levels of financial dependence, strengthens our conclusion that this effect is in 
evidence for indirect accountability.  
     * 
 A closer look at the regression output reveals in the absence of Strength and 
Independence of the Private Sector, the magnitude of the negative effect of ‘Financial 
Dependence and Mobility of the Leading Sector’ on common pro-capitalist and market-
conforming policies is substantively greater than the other partial interaction coefficients. 
And similarly, in the absence of Financial Dependence, the magnitude of the negative 
effect of ‘Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and a Mobile Leading Sector 
on import concessions for the leading sector is also significantly greater than the other 
partial interaction coefficients. This preliminary observation on the components of the 
interaction term warns us that although we observe a positive relationship between the 
level of certain sector specific policies and the joint existence of the components of 
credible exit-threat and financial dependence of the government at their high levels, 
under other conditions, Strength and Independence of the Private Sector or Financial 
Dependence might be sufficient to bring about responsiveness to business interests. If so, 
we face the question of whether this kind of ‘responsiveness’ can be considered as 
accountability or simply a different version of ‘sectoral dependence’. To shed some light 
on these questions, in the following section, I present the marginal effects of the 







Common pro-Capitalist Policies  
In the previous section, we have seen that increase in the level of the leading sector’s 
contribution was sufficient to bring about an increase on the level of common pro-
capitalist policies. Also we have seen in Figure 24 that while the marginal effect of exit-
credibility on pro-capitalist policies increases as the level of financial dependence 
increases (though not a positive effect), this effect becomes statistically insignificant as 
we step in the category of non-rentier states. Hence, to further investigate the marginal 
effects of the three variables on pro-capitalist policies, separately, we analyze the effect 
of one variable at substantively meaningful values of the other two variables.  
The graphs in Figure 25 display the marginal effect of the Strength and 
Independence of the Private Sector on pro-capitalist policies, conditional on Sectoral 
Attributes (viability of exit-opportunities) and Financial Dependence. We expect to see a 
positive relationship between Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and pro-
capitalist policies, when the leading sector possesses exit opportunities (mobility) and 
when the ruler is financially dependent on tax revenue.  
 
d R / d Str.& Indep.Priv.Sect =   βPRSEC  + βPRSEC _MOB(Mobility)     
      + βPRSEC _FD(Financial Dependence) 
     + βPRSEC_MOB_FD(Mobility*Financial Dependence) 
 
H: (d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect ) > 0    
(Ho: (d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect )  ≤ 0) 
if Financial Dependence > .4 & Mobility > .5 
 
We find that increase in the level of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector 
has no effect (substantively or statistically) on the level of common pro-capitalist 
policies. At higher levels of Financial Dependence and leading sector mobility, we fail to 
reject the null hypothesis that increase in the level of strength and independence of the 
private sector has no or negative effect on pro-capitalist policymaking. Also, at lower 
ranges of financial dependence, the seemingly negative marginal effect is substantively 
meaningless, since at low financial dependence levels (< 50 percent) there are only a few 
cases with a upper HH or LL leading sector.  
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Figure 25 - Marginal effect of the Strength and Independence of the Private Sector on Common pro-
capitalists policies, conditional on exit-opportunities (mobility) of the leading sector  and the level of 
financial dependence of the rulers, with 95 percent confidence intervals.   
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I also analyze the marginal effect of Financial Dependence on the same policy 
category. The marginal effect is given by the following equation. 
 
d R / d Financial Dependence = + βFD  + βFD_PRSEC (Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect)  
       + βFD_MOB (Mobility) 
      + βFD_PRVSECT_MOB (Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect*Mobility) 
 
H: (d R / d Financial Dependence ) > 0    
(Ho: (d R / d Financial Dependence )  ≤ 0) 
if Str.& Indep. Priv.Sect > .5 & Mobility > .5 
 
As seen in Figure 26, increase in the level of financial dependence does have a strong 
positive effect when the leading sector is a HH sector with limited exit-opportunities (oil 
sector or mining) and when there is at least some private sector contribution in the 
economy (for mining-like sectors, a relatively stronger private sector is necessary for this 
effect to be significant—not presented on the graph). However, this effect is not mediated 
by the level of strength and independence of the private sector—contrary to expectation.  
 
 Only one of the variables of the ‘joint-effect’, Financial Dependence, and only in 
countries with a HH leading sector has a statistically significant effect on pro-capitalist 
policies. It is obvious that this kind of a policy-making cannot be considered as 
‘responsiveness’ or accountability, because above all, the effect is not mediated by the 
degree of strength and independence of the private sector. Therefore, increase in the level 
of pro-capitalist policies in countries where the leading sector is a HH (with limited exit-
opportunities), regardless of the status of the private sector, could simply be considered 
as some kind of maneuver of the rulers to attract greater capital/investment  to the 
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Figure 26 - Marginal effect of the Financial Dependence on pro-capitalists policies, conditional on exit-
opportunities (mobility) of the leading sector  and the level of financial dependence of the rulers, with 95 
percent confidence intervals.   
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Market-Conforming (pro-LL sector Polices)  
The market conforming policies—measured in this research by the degree of business 
bureaucracy, ease of trade, flexibility of hiring/firing and employing workers, and 
corporate tax rate—enhance adaptation to market changes and competition in the 
international market. As a result, we assume that they are of crucial importance for the 
firms operating in relatively LL sectors, and hence, within competitive markets. Still, we 
have found that dependence on a single HH sector is one of the factors which bring about 
increase in the level of the market-conforming policies. It may seem counterintuitive to 
not observe a similar positive relationship for dependence on a LL sector. Yet as the 
following examination will reveal, we witness a different causal mechanism in countries 
with relatively LL leading sectors—indirect accountability.   
Initially we have seen that a joint increase in the level of sectorally determined exit 
opportunities (less capital intensity and lower economies of scale, mainly) and strength 
and independence of the private sector is sufficient to generate an increase in the level of 
market conforming policies (Figure 24 – b)—provided that the government is financially 
dependent on tax revenue (above 60 percent). Because we find all the components of 
indirect accountability are at work in that context, we can argue that the policy changes 
result from an increase in the bargaining-power of the private sector.  
When we also examine the marginal effect of strength and independence of the 
private sector. We expect to see an increase in the level of market-conforming policies 
when the leading sector is a LL sector and when the government is dependent on tax 
revenue.  
 
d R / d Str.& Indep.Priv.Sect =   βPRSEC  + βPRSEC _MOB(Mobility)     
      + βPRSEC _FD(Financial Dependence) 
     + βPRSEC_MOB_FD(Mobility*Financial Dependence) 
 
H: (d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect ) > 0    
(Ho: (d R / d Str.&Indep.Priv.Sect )  ≤ 0) 

























































































































































Figure 27 - Marginal effect of the Strength and Independence of the Private Sector on Market-Conforming 
(pro-LL sector) policies, conditional on sectoral attributes and the level of financial dependence, with 95 
percent confidence intervals.    
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Figure 28– Marginal effect of the Financial Dependence on Market-Conforming (pro-LL sector) Policies, 
conditional on sectoral attributes and Strength and Independence of the Private Sector, with 95 percent 
confidence intervals.   
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Figure 27 display a set of graphs depicting the marginal effect of strength and 
independence of the private sector conditional on financial dependence at within different 
sectoral groups. We see that, in accordance with our hypothesis, when the leading sector 
is an upper HH or LL sector (with relatively feasible exit-opportunities) and when tax 
revenues constitute more than 65 percent of the government revenue, increase in the 
private sector’s investment strength and independence from government rents results in a 
positive change in the level of market-conforming policies. As the level of financial 
dependence increases, the magnitude of the positive marginal effect of strength and 
independence of the private sector on responsiveness also increases.  
In the sample, around 30 percent of the cases fall into this range. As we move 
downward on the HH-LL continuum, towards sectors high on capital intensity and 
economies of scale—and thus, with limited exit-opportunities—in accordance with our 
hypothesis, we see that the effect of strength and independence of the private sector on 
market-conforming policies diminishes, and for very HH sectors (in non-rentier 
economies), it turns to negative. In the sample 10 percent of the cases are in this ‘negative 
relationship’ range.  
When we consider the marginal effect of financial dependence on market-
conforming policies, again, we find supporting results for the ‘exit-threat’ hypothesis 
(Figure 28). For, when there is a LL leading sector with a weak bourgeoisie, increase in 
financial dependence of the government leads to a negative effect on the level of market-
conforming policies. In other words, holding constant other factors, among countries with 
a LL leading sector and a weak private sector, financially dependent governments are less 
responsive the interests of the LL leading sectors. Because, according to the ‘exit-
credibility’ hypothesis, the rulers would conjecture that although the sectoral attributes of 
the leading sector may allow capitalists to reallocate their business when their interests 
are not met, because their investment capabilities are weak and they depend partly on 
government support, ‘loyalty’ would be the ‘dominant strategy’ for them. Hence, there is 
no need for the rulers to restrict their authority on the economic issues by cutting taxes, 
lowering bureaucratic burden or allowing firms to decide on hiring, firing or employment 
policies—all of which would diminish the an autocrat’s direct control of the economy. (In 
the sample, 10 percent of the cases are in this range).  
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When the private sector is relatively strong in LL sectors, increase in financial 
dependence has no statistically significant effect on the level of MC policies. The same is 
valid for the effect of sectoral attributes. When there is a strong private sector, change in 
sectoral attributes of the leading sector has no statistically significant effect on the level 
of market-conforming policies, either.  
 The ‘unexpected’ part of Figure 27 is the very low financial dependence range 
(below 25 percent tax revenue share) where we only find cases with a very HH leading 
sector—i.e. the rentier, hydrocarbon-sector-dependent economies. Surprisingly, where 
we expect to see either an insignificant or a negative marginal effect of SIPS on MC 
policies, we observe a statistically significant positive relationship. In the sample, 23 
percent of the cases fall into this range.  
 This finding supports both the ‘sectorally determined interests’ assumption and 
the ‘exit-credibility’ hypothesis—with the help of ‘sectoral dependence’ argument. In 
rentier economies the average level of the leading sector’s (oil sector’s) contribution to 
economy (share in total export earnings) is around 80 percent. Hence the rulers are 
‘sectorally dependent’ for revenue.296
“the voice option is the only way in which dissatisfied customers or members can 
react whenever exit option is unavailable……. [I]t can be expected that voice will be 
activated by the impossibility of exit. Capitalists will make elaborate attempts to 
influence public opinion and public policy.” 
 We can argue, thus, that ‘sectoral dependence’ 
works as ‘financial dependence’ and yields responsiveness to increasing strength and 
independence of the private sector. In other words, although the capital owners in the oil 
sector do not possess viable exit-opportunities due to the sectoral attributes of that 
industry, because the state is dependent on a single HH sector, as the private sector gains 
greater leverage in a rentier economy, their ‘voice’ becomes stronger and more effective. 




 Because the state has no exit option in this case—due to structural dependence on a 
single HH sector—as Shafer argues, the ruler responds to capitalist interests by putting in 
effect even the kind of policies which are not so greatly prioritized by the HH sectors—
                                                 
296 There is high correlation between the oil sector’s share in export earnings, and the share of oil 
revenue within total government revenue.  
297 Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, p.33 (emphasis added), and Hirschman, “Exit, Voice, and the 
State,” World Politics, p.100. 
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yet still in the interest of capitalists in general. As we will see in the following parts, the 
same mechanism works for a highly particularistic policy, import tariff concessions. 
Nevertheless, we should also recall what Hirschman says about the effect of voice under 
on exit option: “sales losses and complaints or protests of those who remain members are 
not easily added to derive an aggregate recuperative effect.”298
 Another finding which supports the idea that the positive relationship between 
Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and pro-LL sector policies dose not a 
result of bargaining power of the private sector is that, in countries where the oil sector is 
the leading one, while increase in the level of financial dependence is positively 
correlated with the level of MC policies (Figure 28), the private sector’s strength and 
independence mediates this relationship. More specifically, the magnitude of this positive 
relationship is greatest when there is a very weak private sector, and it decreases as the 
level of SIPS increases. We also recall that in the same group of countries increase, in the 
level of financial dependence is positively correlated with the level of common pro-
capitalist policies yet that effect is not mediated by the level of Strength and 
Independence of the Private Sector.  
 By the same token, we 
notice that the magnitude of the positive effect between Strength and Independence of the 
Private Sector and MC policies in HH sector dependent countries is almost the same as the 
one we see in the category of cases with ‘a financially dependent government and an 
upper HH leading sector (heavy manufacturing). However, increase in the level of exit-
viability positively mediates the effect of SIPS on MC policies; and the magnitude of the 
positive effect of SIPS on MC polices among the  countries with a LL sector is almost 
twice as big as the one we observe in those with an upper HH or very HH sector. 
Furthermore, when we take out the sectoral dependence component from this equation, 
i.e. when we consider the non-rentier oil producing countries (like Egypt, Cameroon, 
Kazakhstan—with mean sectoral contribution around 35 percent) we observe a negative 
relationship between increase in strength and independence of the private sector and 
market-conforming policies.  
 Taken together, these findings lead us to conclude that the kind of 
‘responsiveness’ to capitalist interests (in general) is just an attempt to attract private 
                                                 
298 Ibid.  
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sector investment when faced with greater fiscal needs. When there is already a strong 
private sector (i.e. the HH sector is run by the private sector), increase in the level of 
financial dependence is less effective in generating market conforming policies—since 
we would expect rulers to care less for market conforming kind of polices and prefer (or 
be content with) satisfying particularistic interests.   
 
 
Leading Sector-specific Import Tariff Concessions 
Next we examine the policy category of ‘sector specific import tariff concession.’ The 
level of concessions is measured on an ordinal scale where highest values indicate 
greatest coverage and particularity of the policy (i.e. all supplies and raw material 
covered and only for the leading sector). As we go down on the scale, import concessions 
take more general form.299
 We recall from Figure 24–c that only at a very high level of financial dependence, 
increase in the level of viable exit-opportunities and of strength and independence of a 
private sector, jointly, increases the extent of import concessions.  
 This particularistic (but not necessarily market-resisting) 
policy, one may assume, is desired by all investors, but as Shafer also notes, for investors 
in HH sectors, it is of crucial importance due to the necessity of importing very high cost 
specialized machinery and equipment.   
The marginal effect of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector, conditional 
on financial dependence and sectoral attributes (Figure 29) also suggests that in the 
context of a LL sector and a highly financially dependent government (FD > 80), increase 
in the level of strength and independence of the private sector is positively correlated with 
the extent of leading sector specific concessions (16 percent of the cases are in this 
category). The same relationship, within the same financial dependence range, is valid for 
                                                 
299 (1) Tariff concessions for qualifying firms ONLY in the leading sector (comprises all or selective 
raw materials and machinery & equipment) 
(.7) Tariff concessions for qualifying firms mainly in the leading sector AND in a few OTHER sectors 
(comprises all or selective raw materials and machinery & equipment) 
(.5) Tariff concessions (in general) for raw materials/machinery & equipment for all qualifying firms 
in ALL sectors 
(.3) Tariff exemption for SELECTIVE projects, investments,  goods, geographical location  (free 
zones or goods originating from a specific location), etc 
(0) Tariff exemptions for sectors OTHER than the LS  OR NO concession 
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upper HH sectors (heavy manufacturing); yet there are only 5 percent of the cases in that 
category. When we evaluate the marginal effect of financial dependence on the level of 
concessions (Figure 30), in the contexts of both LL and upper HH leading sectors, again, 
increase in the level of financial dependence is positively related with greater import 
concessions granted for the leading sector. This relationship is positively mediated by 
Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and LL sector attributes. That is, the 
stronger is the private sector and the greater is viable exit-opportunities of the leading 
sector, the greater is the impact of increasing financial dependence on the extent of 
import concessions. Taken together, therefore, we conclude that although ‘import 
concessions’ is a particularistic policy desired mostly by the HH sector actors, joint 
presence of a financially  dependent government, strong and independent private sector 
and a leading sector processing viable exit-opportunities’ is sufficient to increase the 
level of leading-sector-specific concession.  
 We should also note that there is another mechanism at work in the context of 
countries with both LL and upper HH leading sectors (with relative exit-opportunities). 
We observe a positive relationship between increase in financial dependence and sector 
specific concessions even when the private sector is very weak (Figure 30). Considering 
that the magnitude of the effect is low, we can simply argue that these are rather general 
and selective import concessions granted to support a nascent private sector in countries 
dependent on domestic extraction.   
 The marginal effect of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector, 
conditional on Financial Dependence and sectoral attributes, also reveals that there is 
more to add to this picture. We also observe a positive relationship between increase in 
the level of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector and the extent of import 
concessions at low levels of financial dependence (FD < 50 percent) when the leading 
sector is a very HH sector (oil sector).300
                                                 
300 The relationship is substantively and statistically insignificant for a relatively higher category of 
HH sectors—the mining industry.   
 We already know that in the context of very HH 
sectors, low levels of financial dependence indicate greater sectoral dependence. 
However, we have found out earlier that sectoral dependence (the degree of the leading 
sector’s contribution to economy) has no statistically significant effect (or even a 
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negative effect in pure rentier economies) on the extent of leading-sector specific 
concession. Furthermore increase in financial dependence has no statistically significant 
effect on the level of import concession within the context of HH leading sectors. 
Accordingly, we can conclude that it is only an increase in the strength and independence 
of the private sector that leads to an increase the sector specificity and extent of 
concession for HH leading sector. I hold that we should treat this situation as a special 
case of responsiveness to capitalist interests; for increase in the level of responsiveness to 
a particularistic pro-HH sector policy does not stem from structural factors, but, we 
assume, of voice of the oil sector investors.  Still, considering (1) that oil sector investors 
constitute a very small minority within the totality of an economy (and in almost all cases 
composed of multinational companies—if not the public sector alone), and (2) that  
‘bargaining’ between that minority of capitalists and the government takes place within 
‘network-like’ relations, around a table and behind closed doors, it is highly difficult to 





Protection for the Leading Sector’s Product  
Finally we examine a particularistic and market-resisting (MR) policy: ‘protection for the 
leading sector’s final product(s)’. The level of protection is measured by raw import tariff 
rate. In the previous section, we have seen that ‘sectoral contribution / dependence’ is 
suffice to generate an increase in the level of protection both in rentier and non-rentier 
economies. When we consider the joint marginal effect ‘exit-credibility’, we see that at 
higher levels of financial dependence, existence of a LL sector accompanied by a strong 


























































































































































Figure 29 – Marginal effect of the strength and independence of the private sector on Import Tariff 
Concessions, conditional on sectoral attributes and the level of financial dependence, with 95 percent 
confidence intervals.    
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Figure 30 – Marginal effect of the financial dependence on import tariff concession, conditional on 
sectoral attributes and SIPS, with 95 percent confidence intervals.   
 
 The marginal effect of increase in the level of strength and independence of the 
private sector display different characteristics even among countries with HH leading 
sectors (Figure 31). Where the leading sector is the oil industry (a HH sector), above 25 
percent level of financial dependence, increase in strength and independence of the 
private sector is positively related with the level of protection for oil products. The effect 
of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector is not statistically significant in pure 
rentier economies (FD < 25 percent); outside the context of rentier states, however, the 
magnitude of the positive effect augments as the level of financial dependence increases 
(16 percent of the cases fall into this range.). Also, in the same type of economies, when 
 
 
 Mobility = .70 (LL)  
 Light Manufacturing  
 
     Mobility= .50 (HH)  
     High Manufacturing  
 152 
there is a relatively strong private sector, increase in the level of financial dependence 
leads to an increases in the level of protection for oil products (16 percent of the cases) 
(Figure 31).  In other words, when the level of sectoral dependence is lower (indicated by 
FD >.25 –i.e. outside the context of pure rentier economies) existence of a strong private 
sector is sufficient  to secure a particularistic policy–increase in the level of protection. In 
that context it is not unreasonable to think that oil producers want their products to be 
protected against the products of stronger rentier economy industries. The question at this 
point is, of course, whether we should consider the increase in the level of protectionism 
as a response to increasing bargaining power of the private sector or simply response to a 
necessity (i.e. sectoral dependence). The fact that the bulk of the cases in this category are 
within 25 to 50 percent range of  ‘tax / total revenue’ ratio  (12 percent of the total cases) 
with an average oil sector’s contribution level as 73 percent, leads us to lean towards the 
‘sectoral dependence’ argument. Increase in the level of Strength and Independence of 
the private sector could be read simply as greater private sector contribution in the oil 
industry (vs. public sector dominance) and hence greater need/demand on the part of the 
private sector to be protected (as noted above) against stronger oil industries of the world 
(i.e. oil industries in pure rentier Gulf countries).301
 Within the other HH leading sector category—the mining sector—increase in 
SIPS is also positively related with the level of protection, and the degree of financial 
dependence of the government on tax revenue has a slightly decreasing impact on the 
effect of Strength and Independence of the Private Sector. In the sample only 8 percent of the 
cases fall into this category.  
 The other side of the coin, illustrated 
in Figure 17 is that when there is a relatively strong private sector (in oil producing 
countries), increase in the level of financial dependence leads to an increase in protection. 
In this category, where there are 15 percent of the cases, the fact that the average sectoral 
contribution level is around .68, leads us to draw the same conclusion about sectoral 
dependence.   
 Initially we assumed that market-resisting policies are on the top of the list of HH 
sectors. In accordance with this assumption, and contrary to previous policy categories, 
                                                 
301 The countries in this category are Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Republic of Congo, Gabon, Iran, 
Syria and Yemen.  
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the results are inconclusive for the contexts where the leading sector is a LL sector. As a 
general idea, we can say that at lower ranges of financial dependence, increase in SIPS 
seems to be positively related to protection. But the confidence interval is too large—only 
a few poor agro-industry countries (such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, etc. 
lie within the lower ranges of financial dependence. In most cases, protection is granted 
to industries during the early phases of economic development—simply to allow the 
domestic industries to survive and accumulate capital without facing harsh competition of 
the imported (cheaper) substitutes. Hence, it seems that policy-makers in poor countries 
(which rely on grants or loans for revenue) protect their LL leading sectors as the private 
sector takes a greater role in the economy— but still statistically we cannot rely on these 
results. At the high end of the financial dependence spectrum, increase in the level of 
SIPS seems to be negatively correlated with the level of protection—the results are 
inconclusive.  
     * 
 Overall, we find evidence for indirect accountability—i.e. responsiveness of 
autocratic governments to business interests as a result of ‘exit-credibility’ or bargaining-
power of the leading sector—for two sector-specific policy categories: market-
conforming and import tariff concession policies. We assume that while market 
conforming polices are prioritized by capitalists in LL sectors, particularistic policies are 
at the top of the agenda of capitalists in HH sectors. We have observed that when the 
three conditions (financial dependence of the ruler on domestic productive force, and 
exit-credibility of capitalists–i.e. strong and independent private sector and a leading 
sector possessing viable exit-opportunities) are jointly present, we see an increase in the 
level of market conforming and import concession policies. Due to the ‘existence of 
viable exit-opportunities’ component of the joint effect, we necessarily observe indirect 
accountability only in the context of countries with a LL leading sector. The fact that, we 
find evidence for a positive relationship between the ‘joint effect’ of the three variables of 
interest and a very particularistic policy—import concessions—enables us to appreciate 
the ‘strength’ of the joint effect in extracting concession even in a context where we do 
not expect to see.302
                                                 
302 The average import concessions level in the context of countries with HH leading sectors is .58. 
For countries with LL leading sectors, however, it is  ‘.41’ 
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Figure 31– Marginal effect of the strength and independence of the private sector on Protection for the 
leading sector’s product, conditional on sectoral attributes  and the level of financial dependence, with 95 
percent confidence intervals.   
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Figure 32 – Marginal effect of the Financial Dependence on the level of Tariff Protection guaranteed to 
the leading Sector’s final product, conditional on sectoral attributes and SIPS, with 95 percent confidence 
intervals.   
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 In the context of countries dependent on the oil sector (a HH sector), we observed 
some evidence for responsiveness of the rulers to the particularistic import concession 
demands of capitalists (only) due to increasing strength of the private sector. However, 
the network-like and ‘behind the door’ type of relationships between oil sector investors 
and the policy-makers in those sectors, preclude one from considering that kind of 
responsiveness as a type of accountability.  
 
 
(2) Indirect Accountability as a result of Exit   (Responsiveness due to Learning)  
 
Controlling for other factors which may lead policy-makers in non-democratic countries 
to make economic pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policies, I hold that increase in the 
level of pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policies as a result of capital flight and/or 
investment strike can also be regarded as responsiveness—i.e. as indirect accountability.  
The argument about ‘exit-credibility’ is based on the assumption that rulers are rational 
and that they would take the necessary policy measures to avoid the twin threats of 
capitalists—capital flight and investment strike. However, should the incumbents make 
wrong calculations (or due to some exogenous reasons) and should capital flight or 
investment strike occur, I argue that those rulers who are financially dependent either on 
rents from a single sector or on tax revenue from the whole economy would step back and 
make pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policies—which we can regard as a case of 
indirect accountability.  
Controlling for other factors, we expect to see indirect accountability as a result of 
exit (i.e.  an increase in the level of the above mentioned policies  as a result of capital 
flight or investment) if and only if incumbents are highly dependent on (1) extraction 
from domestic productive forces or (2) a single sector.  
 
Let us begin by recalling the part of the model dealing with capital movements (CM) 





R = … + βCF (Capital Flows) +  βFD (Financial Dependence)  
 + βCF_FD(Capital Flows*Financial Dependence) 
 + βLDS (L.Sect.Cont.) + βMOB (Mobility)  + βCF_LDS (Capital Flows*L.Sect.Cont)   
 +  βCF_MOB (Capital Flows*Mobility) + βLDS_MOB (L.Sect.Cont*Mobility)  
 + βCF_LDS_MOB (Capital Flows*L.Sect.Cont.*Mobility) 
 
The three-way interaction is used to account for the effect of capital movements in 
the sectorally dependent economies with a HH or a LL leading sector. The marginal 
effects of capital movements (in/out flows) is given by  
 
d R / d Capital Flows =  βCF + βCF_FD(Financial Dependence)  
 + βCF_LDS (L.Sect.Cont) + βCF_MOB (Mobility)  
 + βCF_LDS_MOB (L.Sect.Cont.*Mobility) 
 
Capital Flight is indicated by the negative range of Capital Flows variable.  
Accordingly, we expect a negative marginal effect of Capital Flows indicating a positive 
relationship (or an increase inn the level of pro-capitalist or pro-leading sector policies).  
 
 
The effect of Capital Flight on Common pro-Capitalist policies 
Capital flight has no effect on the level of pro-capitalist policies. However in countries 
with a relatively diverse economy (leading sector’s contribution below 60 percent) with a 
HH leading sector, incoming capital is positively related with the level of common pro-
capitalist policies (Figure 33). In the sample 34 percent of the cases fall into the category 
of a HH leading sector (Mobility ≤ .5) whose contribution to economy is below 60 
percent.  
 
The effect of Capital Flight on Market-Conforming Policies  
Contrary to our expectations, high levels of financial dependence and HH-leading sector 
contribution reduces the effect of capital on market-conforming policies. As we see on 
the second graph in Figure 34, when the leading sector is a LL sector at a middle level 
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financially dependent economy, only at low levels of sectoral contribution does capital 
flight have a positive effect on the level of market-conforming policies. However, there 
are only 8 percent of the total cases within this category—which are very poor agro-
industry countries. At higher levels of financial dependence –i.e. slightly more developed 
economies with a LL leading sector—CF has no effect on MC policies (Figure 34-c) 
 Because the ‘capital flows’ variable also measures the extent of incoming capital 
(% GDP), we can also assess the marginal effect of incoming capital on market-
conforming policies. In countries with a very HH-leading sector (oil sector), we observe a 
positive relationship between incoming capital and the level of MC policies, when 
sectoral contribution is above 40 percent. In other settings CF does not have a statistically 
significant effect on market-conforming policies.  









































































Figure 33 – Marginal effect of In and Out Capital Flows on Common pro-Capitalist Policies, conditional 
on sectoral attributes and the leading sector’s contribution to economy, with 95 percent confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 34 – Marginal effect of In and Out Capital Flows on Market-Conforming Policies, conditional on 
sectoral attributes, the leading sector’s contribution to economy,, and financial dependence on tax revenue, 
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Protectionist Policies  
The graphs in Figure 35 depict the marginal effect of capital movement on the level of 
protection guaranteed for the leading sector’s final product(s). Because the level of 
financial dependence does not mediate the effect of capital flight, the level of FD is set at 
55 percent. 
 We noted that dependence on a single LL sector increases the effect of CF on the 
level of protection. As seen on Figure 20 when the leading sector is a LL sector and when 
its contribution to economy is above around 40 percent, increase in capital flight leads to 
an increase in the level of protection. The greater is sectoral contribution, the higher is the 
impact of CF on the level of protection granted for the leading sector. In the sample 21 
percent of the cases (58 percent of countries with a LL leading sector) fall into this 
category. The same positive effect is also valid at lower ranges of the HH-LL sector 
continuum. In countries with a very HH leading sector (oil sector), capital flight seems to 
have a positive effect on protection when the leading sector’s contribution is below 70 
percent –i.e. relatively diverse economies with a major oil sector (statistically significant 
only at .05 one-tail level). 16 percent of the all cases and 40 percent of the oil countries 
are in this range.  
 
Import Tariff Concessions  
Figure 36 presents the marginal effect of CF on import concession in countries with a 
very HH leading sector—i.e. the oil sector—conditional on that sector’s contribution to 
economy. We observe that when financial dependence is very low (an indication of a 
rentier state) and when the oil sector’s contribution to economy is above around .80 
percent, capital flight is positively correlated with the extent of concession guaranteed for 
the leading sector. In the sample, 14 percent of the all cases, and 33 percent of the oil 
producing countries are within this range of financial dependence and sectoral 
contribution. From another perspective, we find that in oil sector dependent (rentier) 
economies, incoming capital reduces the extent of sector specific concessions. One 
explanation for this effect may be that since there are already high levels of capital 
investment (in oil sector) in such countries, extra capital inflows may lead rulers to lift 
 161 
‘oil-sector-specific’ concessions either totally, or to enlarge/generalize these concessions 
to include non-oil sectors as well.  















































































































Figure 35 – Marginal effect of In and Out Capital Flows on the level of protection for the leading sector’s 
product, conditional on sectoral attributes and the leading sector’s contribution to economy, with 95 
percent confidence intervals (90 percent for Mobility=.15)  
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 We observe that at lower ranges of HH leading-sector contribution (i.e. relatively 
diverse economies with a HH leading sector—oil, mining and heavy manufacturing), 
policy-makers positively respond to ‘incoming  capital’ with respect to providing greater 
concession for the leading sector. Only the effect of CF in the context of mining countries 
is presented in Figure 20, yet the effect is statistically significant within the context of 
upper HH leading sector economies—though with a smaller magnitude (Figure 21). 
Finally, we find that in countries with a LL leading sector, at lower levels of sectoral 
contribution (relatively diverse economy) capital flight is positively related with the level 
of import concessions. In the sample 15 percent of the cases (42 percent of the countries 
with a LL leading sector) fall into this range.  
 
 Overall capital flight seems to have positive effects only on the level of 
particularistic policies but in exactly opposite economic settings. In countries with a LL 
leading sector, at relatively higher levels of sectoral contribution (above .40), capital 
flight is positively correlated with protectionist measures. However, at lower levels of a 
single sector contribution (in relatively diverse economies with a LL leading sector) 
capital flight increases the level of import tariff concessions. In the context of LL sectors, 
where import concessions in general are scarce, increase in the level of concessions 
should be understood as extending the coverage of tariff exemptions from no exemption 
to selective projects or supplies and then exemptions for all the sectors in general—rather 
than very particularistic  leading-sector-only  exemptions.  
 In contrast, in countries with a HH leading sector, at high levels of sectoral 
contribution, capital flight has a positive effect on import concessions, and at lower levels 
of HH sector contribution, capital flight is positively related with the level of protection 
for the leading sector.  
In the former context, high single-LL sector contribution indicates a poor economy 
and a weak private sector—since mostly in agro-industry dominant countries of Africa 
we observe dependence on a single LL sector. Given that protectionist measures are 
positively correlated with LL sector dependence (i.e. high single LL sector contribution), 
and negatively correlated with the strength and independence of the private sector, the 
observed positive marginal effect of capital fight on the level of protection of the leading 
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sector at high levels of LL sector contribution can simply be interpreted as an extension 
of the dominant strategy of the rulers. In a similar vein, in non-rentier oil producing 
countries (defined by lower level of sectoral contribution and higher level of financial 
dependence on tax revenue) increase in the level of strength and independence of the 
private sector is positively correlated with the level of protection granted for those 
sectors—probably, as I argued before, against more powerful oil industries of the rentier 
oil producing countries. Thus, observing that capital flight is positively correlated with 
the level of protection in those countries can again be interpreted as an extension of the 































    
    
 
 
Figure 36 – Marginal effect of In and Out Capital Flows on Import Tariff Concession policies, in countries 
with a HH leading sector (FD = 25 percent), conditional on the leading sector’s contribution to economy 
and financial dependence, with 95 percent confidence intervals   
 
































    
  
 
Figure 37 – Marginal effect of In and Out Capital Flows on Import Tariff Concession, in countries with a 
LL leading sector (FD = 80 percent), conditional on the leading sector’s contribution to economy and 
financial dependence, with 95 percent confidence intervals   
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LINKING FINDINGS TO 





The present study intends to look for seeds of accountability in non-democratic regimes. 
Given the absence of a formal (or effectively functioning) mechanism in non-
democracies to hold autocratic rulers accountable for their deeds, I investigate the 
presence of some kind of informal mechanism which de facto shapes, and hence, 
‘restricts’ the policy-making power of rulers. In that regard, I examine business-state 
relations, and quantitatively test the factors shaping responsiveness of rulers to business 
interests.  
 I argue that in capitalist economies, wherever the government is financially 
dependent on extraction from domestic productive sources, owners of capital may 
influence policy-making. While in democratic regimes, capitalists’ influence on policy-
making overshadows the preferences/interests of the citizens, and hence, damage 
democratic accountability, in non-democratic regimes, responsiveness of policymakers to 
domestic business interests may sow the seeds of democratic accountability in the long 
run. Accordingly, it is the claim of this study that in nondemocracies, capital owners may 
play an indirect role in restraining the unlimited policymaking power of the rulers. This 
does not mean that capitalists actively promote democratization. As John Waterbury 
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notes, owners of capital initially bargain to protect or advance their business activities;303 
they do not necessarily promote democratic accountability.304 However, scholars 
highlight two intertwined processes which may indirectly establish such a link in the long 
run. One is ‘changing power relations’ as a result of economic reform. Greater 
responsiveness to capitalist interests involves, at some point, divesting from direct control 
of the economy and transfer of economic power to the private sector; hence, changing 
power relations between the private sector and the state in favor of the former. And the 
second one is ‘formalization of habits of interaction between the government and 
citizens.’ Waterbury claims that “as a kind of by-product of their bargaining for favorable 
policy responses from the state, [owners of capital] may foster habits of interaction 
between the governments and citizens that can lead to a transition.”305
Against this theoretical background, I hypothesized certain conditions under which 
we expect autocratic rulers to be responsive to business interests due bargaining-power of 
the capitalists—but not because of some structural or contextual reasons. For I hold that 
only this kind of responsiveness can be regarded as having the potential to establish a 
formal interaction process between government and citizens in the long run.  Specifically, 
I argue that those rulers who are financially dependent on domestic economic forces may 
be indirectly held accountable by domestic capital owners and investors who are able to 
credibly threaten to exit while voicing their demands and/or who can actually perform 
exit. I argue that responsiveness of government to business interests under the conditions 
of ‘credible exit-threat’ and/ or ‘exit’ can be regarded as a form of accountability—
indirect accountability. This form of accountability is indirect, because capital owners 
cannot directly remove the rulers from the office in case of mal-performance. Still, 
because they control the main revenue generation mechanism, they can influence 
economic policies to some extent. In other words, we expect that rational rulers respond 
to capitalists’ voice or exit by making policies in their interests just to avoid a potential 
capital flight and investment strike or to re-attract outgoing capital.  
 
I specified bargaining power of the private sector as a function of investment 
strength and independence from government rents—capacity to profitably survive in the 
                                                 
303 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.395. 
304 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p.164.   
305 Ibid. and Waterbury and Richardson, A Political Economy of the Middle East, p.36.   
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absence of government protection and support—and existence of sectorally determined 
viable exit-opportunities; and also potential to inflict some loss on the government 
revenue upon exiting—which is measured by financial dependence of the government on 
tax revenue.  
 I also specified three policy categories to form the dependent variable(s). One the 
dependent variables measures Common pro-Capitalist Policies which guarantee a free 
and secure investment environment for capital owners. The following items were used to 
measure the degree of such policies: Protection of property rights and the rule of law, 
Foreign investment freedom and freedom to access to foreign exchange, Free banking 
system and ease of accessing competitive bank credits, Lower inflation (domestic price 
stability, and Exchange rate stability. The other dependent variables measure sector-
specific policies—because, I hold that capitalist interests are not unique, but shaped to a 
great extent by the attributes of the sectors they operate in. Accordingly, I assume that 
capital owners in LL sectors (marked by low capital intensity, small economies of scale, 
and production and assets/factor flexibility) prioritize policies which enhance their 
competitiveness and adaptability to market changes—Market-Conforming Polices. Four 
items were used to measure the level of such policies: Ease of starting/ending and 
operating business, Ease of exporting and importing, Lower tax burden on profit, and 
Flexibility of hiring/firing & employing workers. I also assumed that investors in HH 
sectors (marked by the opposite sectoral characteristics) prioritize policies which would 
protect them against market and changes and cover their losses. Accordingly two separate 
items were used to measure the degree of particularistic Market-Resisting Policies: 
Import tariff concession (exemptions or reductions) for the leading sector’s inputs and 
supplies, and Tariff protection for the leading sector’s final products. 
The model which is constructed to test the presence of government responsiveness to 
the above mentioned policies (i.e. an increase in the level of those policies) under the 
conditions of indirect accountability also controls for alternative factors which may bring 
about government responsiveness to the same policies in the absence of adequate 
bargaining-power of the private sector—such as ‘dependence on a single HH sector,’ 
‘fiscal crisis’, ‘conditionalities attached to a loan,’ etc.  
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Overall, we find evidence for indirect accountability—i.e. responsiveness of 
autocratic rulers as a result of ‘exit-credibility’ (or bargaining-power of the leading 
sector) for two sector-specific policy categories: Market-Conforming Policies and Import 
Tariff Concessions guaranteed to the leading sectors inputs and supplies. We have 
observed that when the three conditions (financial dependence of the ruler on domestic 
productive forces, a strong and independent private sector and a leading sector possessing 
viable exit-opportunities) are jointly present, there is increase in the level of market 
conforming policies and the specificity of import tariff concessions.  
Because one of the conditions of credible exit-threat is ‘existence of viable exit-
opportunities,’ we necessarily observe indirect accountability only in the context of 
countries with a LL leading sectors. Still, in the context of countries with a HH leading 
sector (specifically the oil sector) we have observed a positive relationship between 
strength and independence of the private sector and Import Tariff Exemptions.  However, 
the network-like and ‘behind the door’ type of relationships between the investors in the 
oil sector and the policymakers refrain us from considering this kind of responsiveness as 
a type of accountability. In the same settings, we also observe that increase in the level of 
strength and independence of the private sector or the degree of financial dependence of 
the government on tax revenue is positively correlated with the level of Market-
Conforming Policies. In other words, the increase in the level of market conforming 
policies results either from an increase in the level of financial dependence or strength 
and independence of the private sector—but not from their joint presence. More 
specifically, increase in strength and independence of the private sector raises the level of 
market-conforming policies only in rentier economies (but not in financially dependent 
oil producing countries). Furthermore, the magnitude of the marginal effect of financial 
dependence on market conforming policies is greatest when the private sector is weak; 
and diminishes as the private sector gains strength. Therefore, the causal mechanism 
behind responsiveness to market conforming policies in the context of oil producing 
countries is not ‘the bargaining-power’ of the private sector. Accordingly, it cannot be 
considered as a form of accountability.  
While the joint presence of the conditions of indirect accountability seems to 
positively affect the level of general pro-capitalist macroeconomic policies as well, the 
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analysis reveals that these kind of policies result from the factors not accounted for by the 
model or from ‘snowballing’ effect. For the variable measuring spatial interdependence 
between the units has a statistically and substantively significant effect only on general 
pro-capitalist policies; and there are also very powerful unit-specific effects in this 
analysis. 
The Protectionist Policies are negatively related to the joint presence of the 
conditions of indirect accountability—and determined, to a great extent, by dependence 
on LL sectors. Rather than reading this finding as a weakness of the ‘exit-threat’ 
hypothesis, we can claim that the conditions of indirect accountability—financial 
dependence of the state on tax revenue, existence of a strong and independence private 
sector, and prevalence of greater sectoral mobility—are also indicator of  economic 
development. We know that there is a vast literature on the connection between economic 
development and democratization.306
Barrington Moore, for example, examines the paths to various political regimes and 
highlights the nature of the industrialization process and the role of bourgeoisie.  He 
argues that the elite that dominate the industrialization process determine the type of 
regime. He claims that only when there is a strong bourgeoisie, which emerges as a result 
of a grass-roots industrialization process, and challenges the economic and political 
power of the landed aristocracy, is representative democracy likely to emerge—as 
happened in Britain. However, when a strong state initiates the industrialization process 
by allying with a powerful landed aristocracy and a weak bourgeoisie that needs 
 While the scope of the present research does not 
allow us to establish a direct link between the joint presence of the conditions indirect 
accountability and democratization through the mechanism of economic development, 
nevertheless we can mention a few studies which draw our attention to such a possibility 
by highlighting the restraining role of certain aspects of economic development. 
                                                 
306 A few of the influencital names and studies can be listed as S. Martin Lipset,.  Political Man: The 
Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960). Robert Barro, Determinants of Economic 
Growth: A Cross-Country Empirical Study (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 1998), Deutsch, Karl, 
“Social Mobilization and Political Development,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 3. 
(Sep.1961), 493-514. Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Political Regimes and Economic Growth” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.7, No.3 (Summer 1993). Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Ronald Inglehart. Modernization and 
Postmodernization.  (Princeton: Princeton, 1997).  
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protection of the state—as happened in Germany under Bismarck’s rule—he argues that 
fascism is likely to emerge.307
A recent body of literature stresses on the changing nature of economic assets with 
economic development, and its implications for regime transformation. Charles Boix 
notes, for example, that “economic modernization implies … a shift from an economy 
based on fixed assets, such as land, to an economic system based on a highly mobile 
capital.”
  
308 The ideas about the political implications of capital mobility date back to 
Montesquieu who salutes capital mobility as a restraint on arbitrary power of tyrants.309 
Among the contemporary scholars who underline the political “power” of capital 
mobility and also its role in the emergence of democracy are Robert Bates (1991), 
Charles Boix (2003) and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2006). It can be argued 
that these authors attempt to provide causal grounding for the correlation between 
economic development and democracy observed by the early modernization theorists.310 
Bates, from a game-theoretic perspective, sees capital mobility as a factor determining 
bargaining power of citizens vis-à-vis their governments. He states that historical 
evidence on the origins of parliaments reveals that it was the desire of the revenue-
seeking monarchs to tax “moveable” property for the costs of warfare that promoted the 
conferral of representation to the property owners. He argues, thus, that the nature of 
economy, and particularly the tax base, shaped the terms of bargain between revenue-
seeking monarchs and asset-owning citizens. Specifically, he claims, “the more elastic 
the tax base, the greater the degree to which the sovereign had to give control over public 
policy to those whose money he sought to appropriate for public purposes.”311 Bates and 
Lien argue that the significance of these claims lie primarily in the light they cast upon 
the origins and limitation of democratic institutions.312
                                                 
307 Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966, 
reprint 1993)  
  
308 Charles Boix. Democracy and Redistribution, New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003, p.13.  
309 Noted in Ibid, p. 12.  
310 Robert H. Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” PS: Political Science & Politics, 
March 1991, p.72. Robert Bates and D.-H. Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative 
Government." Politics and Society, Vol.14, No.1 (1985), p.54. Boix, Democracy and Redistribution, pp.12-
13.  
311 Bates, “The Economics of Transitions to Democracy,” p.25.  
312 Bates and Lien, "A Note on Taxation, Development and Representative Government." 
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From a different standpoint, recent works by Charles Boix, and Daron Acemoglu and 
James Robinson define the conditions under which capitalists would prefer 
democratization.313 The authors assume that every individual builds a preference for the 
regime that looks after her interests and maximizes her welfare.314 In that regard, they see 
capital mobility as one of the factors shaping the regime preference of the elite/capital 
owners. They argue that as the specificity of capital declines or as capital becomes more 
mobile (especially when accompanied with international financial integration) the cost of 
moving it away from its country of origin diminishes; thus capital owners can easily take 
their money away from a given country. This makes it more difficult to tax. Thus, 
mobility of capital curbs the redistributive effects of democracy or reduces the extent to 
which democratic government can pursue populist and highly majoritarian policies. 
Accordingly, since the likelihood of conflict between the capital owners and non owners 
is diminished, the elite feel more secure about the redistributive effects of democracy and 
are discouraged from using repression to prevent a transition from nondemocracy to 
democracy. In contrast, “the prevalence of highly immobile types of capital exacerbates 
the authoritarian solution. Unable to shift assets abroad to escape the threat of high taxes, 
capital owners grow more resolute in their efforts to block democracy.”315
 
 
A more indirect causal link between the condition of indirect accountability and 
democratization is posited by students of the Middle East. John Waterbury argues, for 
example, that “we may hypothesize that institutional forms of accountability and 
representation emerge from tacit or explicit bargaining between the government and 
various interests it seeks to tax.”316 He adds that the hypothesized process does not 
necessarily have to be a conscious demand for democratic procedures; it may also be 
initiated in a nondemocratic setting in which the protagonists are oblivious to the 
democratic implications of their bargaining.317
                                                 
313 Boix. Democracy and Redistribution. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. Economic Origins 
of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
 In that regard he looks at capitalists’ role 
in the process of regime transition and argues that capital owners and investors may have 
314 Boix, p.10. Acemoglu and Robinson, p.22.   
315 Boix, p.3. Also for a general overview of their arguments: Boix , pp.1-18 & 36-45 and Acemoglu 
& Robinson, pp. 15-47.  
316 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p. 393 (Emphasis added)  
317 Ibid.  
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a particularly important role to play in the preparatory phase of democratization (yet this 
does not necessarily have to be a conscious demand for democratic procedures.)318  He 
claims that while they initially bargain to protect or advance their business activities,319 
“as a kind of by-product of their bargaining for favorable policy responses from the state, 
they may foster habits of interaction between the governments and citizens that can lead 
to a transition.”320
Waterbury and Richardson, state that due to fiscal crisis and hence to greater need to 
appeal to private capital to stimulate economic growth, a bargaining between the state 
and the social actors has been established. In the Middle East, they says, “whereas thirty 
years ago most social actors were ‘policy-takers’ in the face of autonomous states that 
they could not significantly influence, much less hold to account, by the 1990s a process 
of bargaining between the state and social actors had become common,” and they 
concludes that “if democratic practice is to take root in the Middle East, it will be as the 
result of the formalization of this bargaining process.”
  
321
According to Waterbury, the obligation of the government to deal directly with 
significant economic interest in society is a public good, and has been created in the 
Middle East due to economic constraints. He claims further that “it will be difficult to 




 Thus, he 
explains a possible transition process as follows:  
“The alliance for profits can work for a time, but not all private interest will prosper, 
and sooner or later the fact that the regime unilaterally determines all parameters of 
economic life – interest rates, discretionary credit, tariffs, prices, etc – will be 
intolerable for some private actors. Groups will begin to lobby to protect themselves. 
If concessions made by the government involve the transfer or creation of real 
private wealth, real power will be transferred as well. Private interests may move 
from lobbying for their specific advantage to trespass into foreign affairs (we need 
good relations with ‘X’ to protect or open markets) or into the affairs of state (the 
government must do something about inflation; the central bank should be 
autonomous). The expansion of the private sector agenda requires no explicit 
                                                 
318 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p.164.   
319 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.395. 
320 Waterbury, “From Social Contracts to Extraction Contracts,” p.164. Waterbury and Richardson, A 
Political Economy of the Middle East,  p.36.   
321 Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
322 Waterbury, “Fortuitous By-Products,” p.396.  
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demand for democracy, but it is rooted in a demand for accountability on the part of 
those who own wealth and capital. Accountability is a public good, and once it is 
available to some, it may be hard to deny to others.”323
 
 
Therefore, in the words of Waterbury again, “the importance of the bourgeoisie lies 
in the resources it controls. If they are significant and beyond the reach of the state, then 
the mere possibility that the bourgeoisie might confront the state is enough to create 
political space.”324
 
 In the context of the present research, the “possibility to confront the 
state” is formulated as ‘credible exit-threat’, and we have seen indeed that it creates a 
political space for capitalists to influence the autocratic rulers’ policy-making. Taken 
together with Boix, and Acemoglu and Robinson’s argument about the determinants of 
capitalists’ regime preference (capital mobility), therefore, we can argue that under the 
joint existence of the conditions of financial dependence of the ruler on extraction from 
domestic economy and  a strong and independent private sector possessing greater capital 















                                                 
323 Waterbury, “Democracy without Democracrats,” p.28-9. (emphasis added) 




THE FREEDOM HOUSE  
POLITICAL RIGIHTS INDEX 
 
 
Freedom House, Political Rights Ratings 
Rating of 1 – Countries and territories that receive a rating of 1 for political rights come 
closest to ensuring the freedoms embodied in the checklist questions, beginning with free 
and fair elections. Those who are elected rule, there are competitive parties or other 
political groupings, and the opposition plays an important role and has actual power. 
Minority groups have reasonable self-government or can participate in the government 
through informal consensus. 
 
Rating of 2 – Countries and territories rated 2 in political rights are less free than those 
rated 1. Such factors as political corruption, violence, political discrimination against 
minorities, and foreign or military influence on politics may be present and weaken the 
quality of freedom. 
 
Ratings of 3, 4, 5 – The same conditions that undermine freedom in countries and 
territories with a rating of 2 may also weaken political rights in those with a rating of 3, 4, 
or 5. Other damaging elements can include civil war, heavy military involvement in 
politics, lingering royal power, unfair elections, and one-party dominance. However, 
states and territories in these categories may still enjoy some elements of political rights, 
including the freedom to organize quasi-political groups, reasonably free referenda, or 
other significant means of popular influence on government. 
 
Rating of 6 – Countries and territories with political rights rated 6 have systems ruled by 
military juntas, one-party dictatorships, religious hierarchies, or autocrats. These regimes 
may allow only a minimal manifestation of political rights, such as some degree of 
representation or autonomy for minorities. A few states are traditional monarchies that 
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mitigate their relative lack of political rights through the use of consultation with their 
subjects, tolerance of political discussion, and acceptance of public petitions. 
 
Rating of 7 – For countries and territories with a rating of 7, political rights are absent or 
virtually nonexistent as a result of the extremely oppressive nature of the regime or 
severe oppression in combination with civil war. States and territories in this group may 
also be marked by extreme violence or warlord rule that dominates political power in the 




Freedom House, Political Rights Checklist 
 
A. Electoral Process 
1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected  
through free and fair elections? 
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and 
honest tabulation of ballots? 
 
B. Political Pluralism and Participation 
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise 
and fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic 
possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through 
elections? 
3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any 
other powerful group? 
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4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-
determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal 
consensus in the decision-making process? 
 
C. Functioning of Government 
1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government? 
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it 
operate with openness and transparency? 
 
Additional discretionary Political Rights questions: 
A) For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, 
and allow the right to petition the ruler? 
B) Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic 
composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political 
balance in favor of another group? 
 
NOTE: For each political rights and civil liberties checklist question, 0 to 4 points are 
added, depending on the comparative rights and liberties present (0 represents the least, 4 
represents the most). However, for additional discretionary question B only, 1 to 4 points 











Freedom House ‘Electoral Democracy’ Criteria: 
 
The survey assigns the designation “electoral democracy” to countries that have met 
certain minimum standards. In determining whether a country is an electoral democracy, 
Freedom House examines several key factors concerning the last major national election 
or elections. 
 
To qualify as an electoral democracy, a state must have satisfied the following criteria: 
- A competitive, multiparty political system;  
- Universal adult suffrage for all citizens (with exceptions for restrictions that states 
may legitimately place on citizens as sanctions for criminal offenses);  
- Regularly contested elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable 
ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud, and that yield results that 
are representative of the public will;  
- Significant public access of major political parties to the electorate through the 
media and through generally open political campaigning.  
 
The numerical benchmark for a country to be listed as an electoral democracy is a sub-
total score of 7 or better (out of a total possible 12) for the political rights checklist sub-
category A (the three questions on Electoral Process). In the case of 
presidential/parliamentary systems, both elections must have been free and fair on the 
basis of the above criteria; in parliamentary systems, the last nationwide elections for the 
national legislature must have been free and fair. The presence of certain irregularities 
during the electoral process does not automatically disqualify a country from being 
designated an electoral democracy. A country cannot be an electoral democracy if 
significant authority for national decisions resides in the hands of an unelected power, 
whether a monarch or a foreign international authority. A country is removed from the 
ranks of electoral democracies if its last national election failed to meet the criteria listed 






MEASURING SECTORAL ATTRIBUTES 
A HIGH/HIGH & LOW/LOW SECTORAL ATTRIBUTES CONTINUUM  
 
Sectoral analysis is based on two core variables—capital intensity (CI) and the extent of 
economies of scale (EOS)—and two composite variables—production flexibility (PF) 
and asset/factor flexibility (AFF)—which recombine elements of the two core 
variables.325 Because these economic variables covary across sectors, it is possible to 
think about them along a single continuum between two polar ideal types: High/high 
sectors (which are marked by high capital intensity, high economies of scale, and high 
production inflexibility and asset/factor inflexibility); and low/low sectors, marked by the 
opposite.326
 It is highly challenging to precisely measure the above mentioned four variables 
for each economic sector. This is both due to existence of various measurement 
techniques discussed in the literature and also to difficulty of collecting firm-level data or 
obtaining sectoral-level data for every sector. As a result, in this study, I rely on the 
measurement of the two core variables of the sectoral analysis (capital intensity and the 




   
  
Capital Intensity:  
As a scholar of sectoral analysis, Shafer defines capital intensity very broadly: Capital 
intensity, he says, refers to “the capital costs of start-up, production, research and 
development, inventory, and distribution…”328
                                                 
325 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p. 23.  
 He regards capital intensity as a proxy for 
326 Ibid., p.10.  
327 Because all the variables covary  (according to Shafer’s definition of sectoral attributes), using 
only capital intensity and economies of scale, for the measurement of low/low and high/high sectors 
continuum, would not pose a major problem.  
328 Ibid., p.23 
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other critical characteristics such as fixed costs, technical complexity, management 
professionalism, and work-force skill-levels.329
Because the sectoral analysis part of this study is to a great extent based on Shafer’s 
arguments, I follow his definition of capital intensity for the measurement as well—
which I explain below. Nevertheless, it is also worth mentioning some other definitions 
and measurement techniques of capital intensity that find a place in the literature.  
  
Traditionally, from the perspective of factors of production, capital intensity is 
defined as “the amount of fixed or real capital present in relation to other factors of 
production, especially labor;”330  that is, the ratio of capital to labor. However, as 
Nicholas Kaldor states, the meaning of this ratio is not so immediately obvious, because 
capital—real capital—consists of “heterogeneous … objects, which themselves embody 
labor and which periodically have to be renewed or replaced.”331 As a result, he claims, 
there is no absolute or unique measure of this ratio. Still, he says, “one can conceive 
several ‘indices’ which give an ‘ordinal’ measure of it—i.e. which enable us to say 
whether the ratio has increased or diminished, even if the exact quantitative magnitude of 
the change registered by a particular index may have no special significance.”332 
Accordingly, he suggests an index as “the ratio between “initial cost” and “annual cost” 
involved in the production of a certain stream of output.”333
Later, attention has been focused on “capital: output” ratio,
  
334 which is defined as 
“an increase in the amount of capital employed for each unit of output.”335
                                                 
329 Ibid., p.23-4 
 A similar 
formulation is also made from the perspective of capital expenditures-revenue 
relationship. For example, Hassan Elmasry, in a study made for Morgan Stanley 
330 Find the reference  
331 Nicholas Kaldor, “Capital Intensity  and the Trade Cycle, “ Economica, New Series, Vol.6, No.21 
(Feb.,1939), p. 42 
332 Ibid., pp.42-3. 
333 Ibid., p.43.  
He defines “initial cost” as is the replacement cost at current prices of an equipment incurred in the 
past. And “annual costs” he says “ could be either (a) its actual rate of expenditure in connection with the 
output which it is actually producing; or (b) its “normal” rate of expenditure, associated with the rate of 
output which corresponds to the normal capacity of the equipment…. The former can vary with variations 
in the amount of labor and raw materials employed in connection with a given equipment, but the latter can 
only be varied by changing the type of equipment in use.” pp.43-4.   
334 Maurice Dobb, “Second Thoughts on Capital Intensity of Investment, The Review of Economic 
Studies, Vol.24, N.1 (1956-57), p.33.  
335 Ibid.  
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Investment Management, defines capital intensity as “the amount of plant, property, 
equipment, inventory and other tangible or physical assets required to generate a unit of 
sales revenue,” and quantifies it as “the ratio of a company’s annual capital expenditure 
divided by revenues.”336
 Shafer’s broad definition of capital intensity is similar to Elmasry’s formulation, 
except that besides the costs/value of tangible assets, he also includes the costs of 
research and development (R&D) and distribution. As I indicated above, because the 
sectoral analysis part of this study is mainly based on Shafer’s arguments, I follow his 
broad definition and use the following items to measure capital intensity: Replacement 
cost of Tangible Fixed Assets
  
337 (as a measure of the capital costs of start-up), General 
Operating Costs (as a proxy for fixed costs), and costs for Research and Development, 
Marketing and Distribution.338
As we discuss sectoral attributes, we refer to certain characteristics of economic 
sectors that are unchanging across countries. In other words, if a particular sector (e.g. 
mining) is high on capital intensity and economies of scale in one country, it should have 
the similar characteristic in country B as well, provided that the same product group is 
extracted or processed. Thus, given the generalizability of sectoral attributes, and also the 
difficulty of gathering sectoral data from various countries, I used the most available data 
source for me to rank-order sectors based on sectoral attributes, and then to generalize 
that order to other countries in the sample. Hence, I gathered data for the above 
mentioned items from the sectoral-level aggregate balance-sheet and income-statement 
 
                                                 
336 Hassan Elmasry, “Capital Intensity and Stock Returns,” Issues of Interest,  Morgan Stanley 
Investment Management, p.1 
337 Tangible fixed assets are composed of the following sub-items: Land, Land Improvements, 
Buildings, Machinery and Equipment, Motor Vehicles, Furniture and Fitting, Other Tangible Fixed Assets, 
Accumulated Depreciation (-), Construction in Progress, and Advances Given. To obtain replacement cost 
of tangible fixed assets, I added the value of accumulated depreciation to total tangible fixed assets value. 
The values were adjusted for inflation by using the general whosale price index.  
338 Although Shafer mentions ‘capital costs of production’ too as an element of capital intensity, I am 
unable to use this item due to lack of adequate data. The income-statements, from which I gather data, list 
only one item related to production costs: “Cost of Sales”. However, beside general production costs, this 
item includes both raw material costs and labor costs. And it is impossible to differentiate the share of 
general production costs from other items. As a result, I am unable to use any indicator for production costs 
within the measurement of capital intensity.  
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datasets published by The Central Bank of the Turkish Republic.339 The time coverage is 
from 1996 to 2003.340
To obtain a measure of capital intensity, the values of Replacement Cost of Tangible 
Fixed Assets, General Operating Costs, Research and Development Costs, and Marketing 
and Distribution Costs were first adjusted for inflation by using the general wholesale 
price index, and then were divided by the number of firms surveyed in each year. Hence I 
obtained the ‘per firm’ value for each indicator cited above. By adding up these values I 
constructed a measure of ‘capital costs per firm’ for every year between 1996 and 2003. 
Finally, by averaging the values across time within each sector, I obtained a proxy 
measure of capital intensity for different economic sectors.
  
341 The raw values were 
converted to zero-to-ten scale.342
 
 Ten indicates highest capital intensity.  
The Extent of Economies of Scale:  
The economies of scale (EOS) relates to the relationship between costs and output, and 
indicates the extent to which efficiency demands large-scale production.343
                                                 
339 Since Turkey is my home country, it happened to be much easier for me to obtain and analyze 
sectoral level data. Additionally, Turkey is politically and economically a mid-level case between liberal 
democracies and non-democracies, and also between advanced economies and emerging economies. This 
characteristic adds to the generalizability of the results obtained from Turkey.  
 It is defined 
340 There are five series of Central Bank datasets, of which each covers a three-year period from 1996 
to 2006. Because in 2004 the entries were adjusted for inflation, in order to preserve data consistency, I 
employ only 1996-2003 period data.  
341 Given the discussion of capital intensity in the literature, using raw capital cost values, but not 
“capital intensity per unit of production” or “labor/capital ratio,” may not seem to be a reliable measure of 
capital intensity. A better measure of ‘capital intensity per unit of production’ could have been constructed 
only if the ‘production index’ were available for the very firms surveyed for their balance sheets and 
income statements by the Central Bank. Using some other proxies for production, such as the combination 
of Gross Sales (GS) and Inventory values, creates insensible results. I also tried a ‘capital / labor ratio’ 
measure (replacement cost of TFA/GS index over number of employees/ GS index), and the resulting 
ranking was not much different from that of the raw capital cost values. But, again, because I had to use 
‘Gross Sales’ values but not the actual production index, I find the measurement less reliable than a 
measure using raw values.  Further, what makes my measurement more reliable is the high correlation 
between the ranking of sectors according to capital intensity and economies of scale. Based on the sectoral 
approach, we know that capital intensity and economies of scale values covary. The correlation between the 
capital intensity ranking I created and the economies of scale ranking I constructed based on a study of a 
prominent scholar of the field, Cliff Pratten, is .91 (if only Mineral Oil Refining Sector is excluded—which 
seems to have very high capital intensity in my index but pretty low economies of scale according to 
Pratten.)   
342 To convert the raw capital intensity scores to zero-to-10 scale the following formula was used:  
(Vmin − Vi) / (Vmin − Vmax) multiplied by 10. Vi represents the average raw capital cost value for each 
sector. The values for Vmin and Vmax were set at 17.7 and 10,834, respectively. 
343 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.24.  
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as “reductions in average unit costs attributable to increase in the scale of output. As 
output increases from x1 to x2, unit costs fall from y1 to y2.”344 Typically, a company 
that achieves EOS lowers the average cost per unit through increased production since 
fixed costs are shared over an increased quantity of goods;345 though there might be other 
source of economies of scale, too. A prominent student of the field, Cliff Pratten, 
enumerates the following forces making for EOS: indivisibilities, economies of increased 
dimensions, economies of specialization, economies of mass resources, superior 
techniques for organizing production, the learning effect, and economies through control 
of markets.346
                                                 
344 C. Pratten, “A Survey of the Economies of Scale,” in Commission of the European Communities: 
Research on the cost of non-Europe, Vol. 2: Studies on the economics of integration (1988), p. 18. 
 
345 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp 
346 Indivisibilities: Costs which are at least partly independent of scale over certain ranges of output. 
For example, the initial development and design costs of new car are indivisible with respect to the output 
of the car; items of capital equipment are indivisible with respect to the total output for which the 
equipment is required, etc. “As the relevant dimensions of scale are increased, indivisible costs can be 
spread over a larger throughput and the cost per unit is therefore reduced.”   
Economies of increased dimensions: Occurs when initial and operating costs increase less rapidly than 
capacity. One reason for large units being relatively less costly is that there are proportionately fewer parts 
to make and fabricate. Also, the total direct labor costs of operating units of equipment are not much 
affected by their size, and maintenance costs are usually assumed to be proportional to the capital costs of 
equipment.  
Economies of specialization: The larger the output of a product, plant or firm, the greater will be 
opportunities for, and advantages of, specialization of both the labor force and the capital equipment. 
Economies of mass resources: A firm using several identical machines will have to stock proportionately 
fewer spare parts than a firm with only one machine, because the firm with several machines can assume 
that its machines are unlikely to develop the same faults at the same time. There may be similar economies 
for stock of raw materials, and intermediate and final products.  
Superior techniques for organizing production: As scale is increased automatic machinery may be used 
instead of manually operated machinery, or it may be possible to substitute methods of flow production for 
batch production. These usually result in faster rate of production, and this should reduce unit costs for 
stocks and works in progress. 
The learning effect: Relates to movements along some dimensions of scale, particularly the cumulative 
output of products and the length of production runs. Effects of learning can be divided between the 
invention and introduction of new techniques during production run, and other cost-reducing effects of 
sustained production of a good—such as greater manual dexterity brought about by experience of 
production and machining successive batches of components more exactly as experience of assembly is 
obtained.  
Economies through control of markets: Can be attributable to a monopoly situation where the supplier 
controls the customer. Control of a market by a manufacturer may reduces the uncertainty he faces—he 
will know that customers cannot switch their custom to competitors—and also enable him to invest more 
heavily in capital intensive methods of production. There are also other economies which are attributable to 
the control of suppliers—such as reduction in buying and selling costs, reduced need for checking the 
quality of consignments and control of the timing of deliveries as quality.  
       Pratten, “A survey of the economies of scale” 1988, p. 21-26. Aubrey Silberston, “Economies of Scale 
in Theory and Practice, The Economic Journal, Vol. 82, No. 325, Special Issue: In Honour of E.A.G. 
Robinson. (March, 1972), pp. 374-5. 
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Shafer notes that EOS “may affect production, research and development, marketing, 
distribution and financing, and is also a proxy for the size and geographical concentration 
of facilities; the size, concentration, and stability of the work force; and the extent of 
specialized infrastructure required.”347
The literature comprises various techniques for measuring EOS. MacPhee and 
Peterson provide a comparison of the three main methods of EOS measurement: 
accounting, engineering, and survivor approaches.
  
348 In the accounting approach average 
costs are estimated from accounting data on existing plants and firms. The survival 
approach, first used by Stigler in 1958, classifies “the firms in an industry by size, and 
calculate(s) the share of industry output coming from each class over time. If the share of 
a given class falls, it is relatively inefficient, and in general is more inefficient the more 
rapidly the share falls.”349 And the engineering technique uses expert knowledge of best 
practice technology—that is, engineer’s cost estimates—to construct average production 
costs for various sizes of plants or firms.350 Although each method has its own technical 
complexities and drawbacks,351
                                                 
347 Shafer, Winners and Losers, p.24.  
 still all are used by various researchers.  
348 MacPhee, Craig R., and Rodney D. Peterson. “The Economies of Scale Revisited: Comparing 
Census Costs, Engineering Estimates, and the Survivor Technique,” Quarterly Journal of Business and 
Economics, Vol.  29. no.2, (Spring 1990): 43(25).  
349 George J. Stigler, “The Economies of Scale,” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 1. (Oct., 1958), 
pp. 54-71. 
350 MacPhee et. al, “The Economies of Scale Revisited.” 
351 The drawbacks of the main measurement techniques of EOS:  
Accounting approach: Proprietary secrecy makes data on individual firms difficult to obtain. Different 
accounting conventions limit comparability. They often lead to arbitrary asset valuations and variable 
methods of allocating the costs of administration, planning, sales promotion, and research and 
development. Interfirm differences in product mix, technology, input prices, and lengths of product runs 
add to the distortions. Furthermore, when sample size is small, managerial errors and the vagaries of the 
market cause observed costs and quantities of output to depart from the long-run equilibrium values. 
(MacPhee & Peterson) Also, “observed cost variation between two plants in an industry can result not only 
from differences in size but also from (1) unstable demand, so that existing capacity is used differently; (2) 
non-homogeneous output; (3) age differences, with the newer plant embodying technological improvement 
unrelated to scale and unavailable to the older plant; (4) different locations, with the cost of preparing the 
construction site having little relationship to scale; and (5) other factors, such as different technology 
induced by differences in relative factor prices.” (Haldi & Whitcomb, p.374)  
Engineering Approach: “Information-gathering varies from sample questionnaires to detailed analysis 
of each machine or process in actual and/or model plants. The question-and-answer method has the 
disadvantages of misinterpretation, oversimplification, and subjectivity on both sides. Even detailed models 
usually assume a lack of substitutability among factors and techniques; such models may ignore less costly 
alternatives to engineering ideals. These models may neglect certain aspects of labor or management 
organization that would alter efficiency. Some economists believe that expert opinion has relatively low 
value in comparison to the decisions of managers or owners who have their economic fortunes at stake. 
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Measuring EOS of an industry/sector requires extensive data collection and expert 
knowledge of the field. Because of this, I adopt the index created by a prominent student 
of the area, Cliff Pratten. However, Pratten’s index covers only manufacturing and some 
service sectors. For the other sectors (mainly Agriculture, Hunting & Forestry (AHF), 
Fishing, Mining) I estimate an approximate ranking / classification based on the 
correlations between Pratten’s EOS estimates and the two other indices I created based 
on data from the sectoral-level aggregate income-statements and balance-sheets 
published by the Central Bank of Turkey. These are the capital intensity index and the net 
sales share of big firms (> 500 employees) in a sector.352
In the literature, not much work compares EOS of different industries/sectors. The 
most comprehensive index of EOS is constructed by Cliff Pratten first in 1971 and then 
in 1988. Pratten uses the engineering technique and focuses on the manufacturing 
industries and some service sectors.
  I explain the rationale behind 
the selection of these indices below.  
353 As noted before, the engineering approach 
assembles estimates from managers, engineers, economists, and accountants of the costs 
of operating at different scales of production, where full adaptation to the scales of 
production is allowed for.354
 
 Pratten explains the engineering approach as follows:  
 “Their estimates are based on operating experience for plants of varying size, the 
experience of planning and building new plants and expanding plant capacity and 
general experience of their industry. Estimates of the components of costs, capital 
and operating costs for processes and-or for groups of processes, development, first 
copy or initial costs for production, etc. are assembled for each industry, and are used 
                                                                                                                                                 
Finally, this approach is expensive and yields results applicable only to the year of study and the particular 
plant sizes considered.” (MacPhee & Peterson)  
Survival Technique: “This method fails to measure the amount of size economies, and therefore 
cannot answer important questions about the height of the entry barriers and the benefits of industrial 
concentration. Survivor technique computations only yield the optimum quantity of shipments and do not 
provide any further information on the shape of the long-run average cost function. Even when confined to 
plants, the survivor estimates may be distorted by firm-specific economies, because the technique does not 
distinguish plants operated by one plant or multiplant firms. There is some ambiguity over the relevant time 
period for measuring changes in market shares, over the interpretation of stable shares, and over the 
relevance of relative or absolute shares.” (MacPhee & Peterson)  
352 Due to lack of sectoral-level production data for the firms surveyed by the Central Bank of Turkey, 
I am unable to construct a proxy measure based on the accounting technique.  
353 C. F. Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industries, Department of Applied Economics 
Occasional Papers, No. 28 (Cambridge University Press, 1971).  Also Pratten, “A Survey of the Economies 
of Scale” 
354 Pratten, “A Survey of the Economies of Scale,” p. 2.28.  
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Pratten, in the revised version of his work (1988) presents a survey of the 
engineering estimates of EOS by various authors.356 This survey concentrates on the EOS 
for production and the spreading of development costs, but not EOS for marketing and 
distribution. There are both national and international-level studies in the survey. All 
estimates of EOS are based on the percent increase in costs of production per unit at 
different levels (1/3, 1/2, or 2/3) of minimum efficient scale (MES). Pratten notes that the 
scale at which unit costs cease to fall is labeled MES. In practice, he says, the MES is 
usually defined in terms of the scale above which costs cease to fall rapidly, rather than 
the level at which they cease to fall at all.357
Pratten presents a highly detailed list for the sub-branches (products) of the 
manufacturing sector. Table 25, at the end of this Appendix, presents Pratten’s estimates.  
To be able to combine them with the capital intensity values (which are available only for 
the main sectors), first, I converted all the available ‘increase in cost per unit’ percent-
values, at different levels of MES, to zero-to-ten scale. This conversion was made for 
each level of MES (1/3, 1/2 or 2/3 MES) separately.
  
358
                                                 
355 Pratten, “A Survey of the Economies of Scale,” p.2.28. Pratten also adds that “the 
reliability of estimates depends upon the experience of those making the estimates. 
Managers familiar with construction and operation of giant steel Works in Japan or 
cigarette factories in the USA are in a strong position to make estimates for those sizes of 
plant.”  P.2.28.  
 Then, I averaged all the EOS 
values (now standardized across all the levels of MES) available for a sector. Thus, I 
obtained an average EOS estimate for each main branch of the manufacturing sector. 
Table 24 presents these results along with the capital intensity index.  
356F. Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industries. The main sources of information for 
the survey are the studies made by Pratten based on UK firms (1971), Scherer (1975, 1980). Müller and 
Owen (1983), Müller et al. (1985), Weiss  (1976), and Connor et al. (1984).  
357 Pratten, “A Survey of the Economies of Scale,” p.18  
358 The raw EOS values (i.e. the percent increase in cost per unit at 1/3, ½ or 2/3 MES) are presented 
at the end of this Appendix. To convert the raw EOS estimates to zero-to-10 scale, the following formula 
was used:  (Vmin − Vi) / (Vmin − Vmax) mult iplied by 10. Vi represents the EOS for each branch of the 
manufacturing sector. The values for Vmin and Vmax were set at 1.5, 1, and 2 (minimum values) and 14.3, 
16.9, and 13.2 (mean plus one standard deviation), for 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 MES, respectively. This conversion 
also enables me to verify that where there are more than one EOS estimates for a sector at different MES, 
the converted scores are approximately the same at zero-to-10 scale.  
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As noted above, Pratten’s survey does not cover sectors other than Manufacturing. 
Hence, to estimate EOS for the other sectors (and also to obtain a final ranking of sectors 
along the High/High and Low/Low continuum of sectoral attributes) I added another 
indicator: ‘the net sales share of big firms (> 500 employees)’359 The justification for the 
use of this item is two arguments made by Shafer. The first one is his argument that the 
sectoral variables (i.e. capital intensity, economies of scale, asset/factor (in)flexibility, 
and production (in)flexibility) covary across sectors.360 And the second one is again 
Shafer’s argument that when sectoral variables score high, oligopolistic market 
structure—defined as small number of firms—prevails. Hence the net sales share of big 
firms (i.e. market dominance of big firms) is a good indicator of high capital intensity, 
big economies of scale, and asset/factor and production inflexibility.361
Accordingly, based on the available values of capital intensity and net sales share of 
small firms corresponding to Pratten’s classification of EOS (small, moderate, 
substantial, very substantial EOS), I created a table of ranges (Table 23).
 The correlations 
we obtain from the data available (from Turkey) also confirm these arguments. The 
correlation between EOS and capital intensity is .91 when Mineral Oil Refining sector 
(which is very high on capital intensity but low on Praten’s EOS index) is excluded from 
the list. Both capital intensity and EOS strongly correlate with the net sales share of big 
firms (.77 and .65).  
362
 
 Finally, for 
sectors, which were not covered by Pratten, I assigned a qualitative classification on EOS 




                                                 
359 The net sales shares for all sectors are presented in Table 24. The data are obtained from the 
sectoral level data collected by the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic.   
360 Shafer, Winners and Losers,  pp.10.  
361 From the other angle, Shafer states that “the prevalence of small firms also indicates limited 
economies of scale.  In 1970, for example, Third World firms employing forty-nine workers or less 
generated 37-38 percent of value added and accounted for 46-53 percent of light manufacturing jobs….” 
Ibid. p. 107.  
362 This table only includes the actual values, but not a fully complete range; and there are some 
overlaps. (CI and EOS values are on zero-to-10 scale.) 
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Table 23 - A Classification of Economies of Scale and the corresponding value ranges for Capital Intensity 
and Net Sales Share of Big Firms variables. .  
 
Economies of Scale 
Classification 
(Praten 1988) 




Capital Intensity  
(0-10 scale) 
Net Sales Share of 
 Big Firms (%) 
( > 500 employees) 
NO – SMALL  n.a. (only his remarks) .2 – .8 4 – 6 
SMALL – MODERATE 1.2 – 4.4 1– 2.8 29 – 58 
MODR. – SUBSTANTIAL 3.5 2.4 69 
SUBSTANTIAL  4.7 – 7.6 3.1 – 5.7 45 – 72 
VERY SUBSTANTIAL  8.3 6.6 78 
 
 
As noted at the beginning of this section, due to difficulty of measuring all the 
variables of sectoral analysis, in this study I only rely on the two core variables. 
According to Shafer, the other two variables of sectoral analysis—production flexibility 
and asset/factor flexibility—are the composite variables and combine elements of capital 
intensity and economies of scale. In other words, if a sector scores high on these two core 
variable, we also expect them to be high on production and asset/factor inflexibility.363
                                                 
363 Production flexibility: Production flexibility is the ability to meet short-term market shifts by varying 
factor intensity, output/production levels or product mix. Shafer notes that it is composed of three elements 
reflecting the extent of capital intensity and economies of scale: (1) The size of fixed costs, which 
determines whether production decisions respond to current market conditions (when fixed costs are low) 
or are driven by debt service requirements (when they are high). (2) The size of firms’ investment in the 
work force, or rather their interest in retaining workers so as not to lose that investment. (3) The sensitivity 
of firms’ physical plant to shutdown. As a rule, he says, the greater the capital intensity and extent of 
economies of scale, the more likely facilities will suffer from being shut down.  
  
Asset/factor flexibility: Asset/factor flexibility determines the long-term difficulty of reallocating 
resources, that is, the extent to which assets and factors can be reused elsewhere. Its indicators are sector-
specificity of facilities/buildings, machinery, supporting infrastructure, and workforce skills, and 
production technology. Shafer notes that, the greater a sector’s capital intensity and extent of economies of 
scale, (1) the larger, more geographically concentrated, and more specialized are its facilities and 
equipment; (2) the more concentrated and sector-specific are the necessary infrastructures (power grids, 
railroads, pipelines, ports); (3) the more specialized the production technology is; (4) the greater the 
concentration of skilled workers in stable and homogeneous communities that owe their existence and 
identity to the sector they serve; and (5) the more specialized management is, reflecting the greater need for 
specialized services within the firm, specialized management organizations, training systems, and corporate 
cultures.  
Shafer, Winners and Losers, p. 24. and Peter MacKay, “Real Flexibility and Financial Structure: An 




To obtain a low-high sectoral attributes continuum for the main economic sectors, I 
first averaged the scores of capital intensity, economies of scale and net sales share of big 
firms (which are already on zero-to-one scale). Because we do not have very precise 
measures of these variables, instead of strictly using the exact results obtained from the 
calculation, I rounded the results to upper or lower values and hence obtained scale of 
sectoral attributes. Finally to better indicate absence/existence of exit-opportunities I 
reversed the scale. On zero-to-one scale, therefore, zero indicates the highest capital 
intensity and economies scale, and absence of exit-opportunities. The final scale 
presented in the last column of Table 23.  
 
I excluded “Mining & Quarrying of non-energy producing materials” sector from the 
ranking. Because, the characteristics of this sector is to a great extend dependent on the 
commodities extracted. In Turkey, where the data used in this part of the study belong to, 
mining sector is dominated by salt, various stone quarrying, and iron ore and chromium 
mining. Therefore, it cannot be considered as representing the characteristics of the whole 
mining sector. Classification of this sector on the low/low and high/high sectoral 
attributes continuum is done, thus, based on the dominant product(s) of each country, and 









Table 24 – A ranking of the major sectors along the High/High and Low/Low Sectoral Attributes Continuum.  (Zero indicates lowest exit – opportunities) 

























Fishery No   .0 0 .00 .00 1 
Leather & Leather Products Small EOS n.a  .02 4 .05 .04 1 
Wood Products No EOS for plants. Possible EOS from specialization and the length of production runs.  n.a  .08 6 .08 .08 .9 
Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry Small    .03 17 .22 .12 .9 
Retail & Fixing Small    .07 28 .35 .21 .8 
Footwear & Clothing Small (slight) EOS at plant level but possible EOS from specialization and longer production runs  1.0 .12 .10 42 .54 .25 .7 
Hotels & Restaurants Small - moderate   .22 29 .37 .30 .7 
Processing of Rubber & Plastic  Moderate EOS in tire manufacture. Small (Slight) EOS for general rubber goods or moulded plastic products.  3, 6 .25 .28 41 .53 .35 .6 
Food, Drink & Tobacco   For food sector, principal EOS is the individual plant. Possible EOS from specialization and distribution level. Moderate ES for large breweries, slight ES for cigarette factories  3.5, 21 .44 .19 46 .59 .41 .6 
Textile Industry  EOS are more limited than in most other sectors, but there are economies of specialization for long production runs  10.0 .29 .26 58 .75 .43 .6 
Mechanical Engineering  Limited EOS at firm level but substantial production 3, 10 .35 .24 69 .89 .49 .5 
Chemical Industry  Substantial EOS in production processes. In some segments of the industry (pharmaceuticals) R&D is an important source of EOS.  2.5, 15 .51 .44 51 .66 .54 .5 
Prod. and preliminary processing of Metals Substantial (large) EOS in general for production processes.  > 6 .47 .51 53 .68 .55 .5 
Electrical (& Optical) Engineering  Substantial EOS at production level and for development costs.  5, 15 .49 .31 72 .92 .57 .4 
Non-metallic Minerals Substantial EOS in cement and flat glass production processes. In other branches optimum plant size is small compared with the optimum size of the industry  > 6 .76 .57 45 .58 .63 .4 
Mining & Quarrying of Energy Prod. Materials Substantial   .50 71 .91 .71 .3 
Manufacture  & Assembly of Motor Vehicles  Very substantial EOS in production and in development costs.  6, 9 .83 .66 78 1.00 .83 .2 
Mineral Oil Refining (& Coal)   5 .22 1.00 78 1.00 1.00 0 
1Economies of Scale, 2Capital Intensity, 3Sectoral Attributes: Simple Average of CI, EOS, and Sales Share  *Remarks: Pratten (1988) cited in Karsten Junius,  “A 




Table 25 – Estimates of Economics of Scale (by Pratten, 1988) 
  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
11 Oil, general purpose refinery 4.0 5.0   2.0 2.5  
         
22 Production and preliminary processing of Metals Generally large eco of scale for production processes 
221 Iron and Steel Industry          
 Steel 11.0    7.4    
 (a) steel production - blast furnace and L.D. Route  5-10    2.5-5.6   
 (b) works making wide strips and other rolled products  8.0    4.4   
 Iron foundary         
 (a) making cylinder blocks  10.0    5.6   
 (b) making small engineering castings   5.0    2.5   
          
24 Non-metalic          
241 Manufacture of Clay products for Construction Purposes > 10    > 6.7    
 Bricks  25.0    15.1   
242 Manufature of Concrete or Plaster for Construction          
 Cement  26.0 9.0   19.2 5.0   
  >10    > 6.7    
247 Manufacture of Glass and Glasware  11.0    7.4    
 Glass Bottles          
          
25 Chemical Industry  generally large for production processes…R&G is a source of large scale economies 
251 Manufacture of basic Industrial Chemicals          
 Dyes   22.0    13.2   
 Petro-chemicals 19.0    13.7    
 sulphuric acid 5-10 1.0    0.0   
 titanium bioxide   8-16     4.4-9.4   
 syntetic rubber  15.0    8.8   
 ethylene plant  9.0    5.0   
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  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
          
255 Manufacture of Paint          
 Paint  4.4    2.3    
258 Manufacture of Soap and Synthetic Detergent   2.0    0.6   
6 Detergents - plant   2-5    0.6-2.5   
          
26 Man-made Fibres  generally large ES      
 Nylon, acrylic, and polyester fibres         
 polymer plant  5.0    2.5   
 plant for filament yarn extrusion   7.0    3.8   
          
 Foundries          
 Iron castings, cylinder bricks   10.0    5.6   
 Small engineering castings   5.0    2.5   
          
32 Mechanical Engineering          
321 Manufacture of Agricultural Machinery and Tools          
 Tractors  6.0    3.1   
 .. Harvestors   7.7    4.2   
322 Manufacture of Machine Tools   3-5    1.3-2.5   
14 Machine tools  5.0    2.5   
14.1 (a) one type  5.0    2.5   
14.2 (b) factories  varies w/ range       
          
 Manufacture of Transmission Equipment  for .... Power 8-10    5.1-6.7    
325 Manf. Of other Machinery and Equipment          
 Diesel engines   10.0    5.6   
 Diesel engines - models in range 1 - 100 h.p.  > 4    > 1.9   
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  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
33 Manufacture of Office Machinery and Data processing eqp.         
 
 Electronic typwriters  5-10    2.7-6.7    
          
34 Electrical Engineering          
342 Manf of Electrical Machinery          
 Transformers, Distribution transformers, etc. (various sizes)   7-10    3.8-5.6   
 Turbo generators - one design   5.0    2.5   
 Electric motors - range of models  (1-100 h.p.)   15.0    8.8   
343 Electrical Equipment for Industrial Use, and Batteries & Accumulators         
 
 Auto Battery  4.6    2.4    
 Manf of Telecommunications Equipment          
 Micro Processors          
 Public Switches  5-10 4.5   2.7-6.7 2.2   
344 Manf of Radio and Television Receiving Sets         
 TV Sets 15.0    10.6    
 Electronic Capital goods  8.0    4.4   
19 Electronic Capital Goods  9.0    5.0   
19.1 (a) one product (e.g. Computer or radar equipment)   8.0    4.4   
19.2 (b) range of products   10.0    5.6   
346 Manf of Domestic Type Electric Appliances          
 Fridges & Washing Machines  6.5-7.5    3.9-4.7    
 Domestic Electrical Appliances - range of 10 appliances  8.0   4.7 4.4   
          
35 Manf & Assembly of Motor Vehicles  very large ES       
351 Manf of Motor Vehicles          
 Cars > 10 & 15    6.7-10.6    
 (a) one model and its variants   6.0    3.1   
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  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
 (b) a range of models   6.0    3.1   
 Trucks 12.0    8.2    
          
36 Manf of Other Means of Transport          
361 Shipbuilding          
 Marine Dissels (?)   8.0    4.4   
363 Manf of Cycles   small    small   
364 Aerospace Equipment Manf  20.0    11.9   
 Aircrafts - one type of aircraft  > 20    > 11.9   
          
41/2 Food, Drink & Tobacco Industry  moderate ES for large breweries, slight ES for cigarette factories  
411 Manf of Vegetable and Animal Oil         
 Soybean oil   4    1.8  
412 Slaughtering, Preparing and Processing of Meat         
 Meat Packing    3    0.9  
413 Manf of Dairy Products          
 Butter    2    0.0  
 Cheese    2    0.0  
 Milk Products   2    0.0  
414 Processing and Preserving of Fruit and Vegetables           
 Canned fruit and vegetables    3-12 (??)    0.9-8.9  
415 Grain Milling          
 Flour   23 (??)    > 18.8  
 Rice   9    6.3  
419 Bread and Flaur Confectionary         
 Bread - bakery   15.0    8.8   
420 Sugar Manf and Refining          
 Sugar   5(?)    2.7 ?  
427 Brewing and Malting          
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  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
 Beer - brewery 5-10 7-9   2.7-6.7 3.8-5   
 Manf of Tobacco Products          
 Cigarettes  < 3    > 1.2    
          
43 Textile Industry  Generally ES are more limited than in most other sectors, but there are economies of specialization for long prod. runs.  
431 Wool Industry          
432 Cotton Industry          
 Spinning open-end weaving  significant      
20 Cotton Textiles          
20.1 (a) spinning mills   small for mills, but high for individual products  
20.2 (b) weaving mills   small for mills, but high for individual products  
 Manf of Carpets   10    5.6   
 Warp knitting   small       
          
45 Footwear and Clothing Industry          
 Manf of Mass-produced footwear 1.5 2.0   0.0 0.6   
          
47 Paper Products          
471 Processing of Paper & Board          
 …. Board   8    4.4   
 kraft Paper   13    7.5   
 Printing paper   9    5.0   
473 Printing and Allied industries          
 Book printing   20-30    11.9-18.2   
 (a) one title   36.0    21.9   
24.1 (b) firms   small    small   
24.2 Newspapers   20.0    11.9   
23          
48 Processing of Rubber & Plastic          
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  % increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES)  increase in costs per unit (over costs at MES) (0-10 scale) 
 Product, etc. at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES  at 1/3 MES at 1/2 MES  at 2/3 MES 
 Manf of Rubber Products          
 Tires for passenger cars   5    2.5   
 Plastics products          
 (a) one product   large    large   
  (b) firms making range of products    small        small     
 MEAN 10.9 9.7 3.7      
 STD DEV. 7.7 6.8 2.7      
 1.5 STD DEV. 11.5 10.2 4.1      
 MEAN + 1 STD DEV. 14.3 16.9 13.2  10.0 10.0 10.0  
 Smallest 1.5 1.0 2.0  0.0 0.0 0.0  


















A NOTE ON THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF  
THE TAX REGIMES IN EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 364
 
 
The special character of the fiscal regimes comes from the fact that in extractive 
high/high sectors (i.e. hydrocarbons and mining sectors) the fiscal regime applied to 
investing companies is different from the general corporate taxation system, and is 
usually highly complicated with even inter-sector variations. A general inquiry of the 
fiscal regimes applied to petroleum and mining sectors reveals that companies (usually 
foreign investors) in those sectors pay not only corporate income tax (CIT) but also some 
other additional special taxes, such as royalties, rentals, license taxes, etc. Two fiscal 
systems—Concessionary System and Contractual Systems—and their variations 
dominate the petroleum industry. Figure 38 displays a visual summary of the fiscal 
systems for the hydrocarbons industry.  
 
Figure 38 – Petroleum Legal Arrangement. 
 
Source: Daniel Johnston, International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production Sharing Contracts 
(PennWell Books, 1994) presented in Silvana Tordo, “Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons Design Issues”, 
World Bank Working Paper,  No. 123,  p.8.  
                                                 
364 This section is based on the following articles:  
Greg Muttitt, “Production sharing agreements: oil privatisation by another name?” Paper presented to the 
General Union of Oil Employees’ conference on privatization, PLATFORM, Basrah, Iraq, (26 May 2005), 
p.5. (www.carbonweb.org).  
African Development Bank Group, Development Research Department, “Briefing Note on Revenue and 
Tax Levels: Mineral Taxation in Africa,” (March 2008) 
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Concessionary system: In its most basic form, a concessionary system has three 
components: royalty; deductions (such as operating costs, depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, intangible drilling costs); and tax. In the Concession or Tax and Royalty 
system the government grants a foreign company (or more often, a consortium of foreign 
companies) a license to extract oil, which becomes the company’s property (to sell, 
transport or refine) once extracted. The company pays the government taxes and royalties 
for the oil.  Royalties is a fixed percentage to be received by the host government based 
on volume or value of production or export. 
 
Production sharing contracts (PSC) are the most widely used form of the contractual 
system. Under a PSC the contractor receives a share of production for services 
performed. In its most basic form, a PSC has four components: royalty, cost recovery, 
profit oil, and tax. In theory, the state has ultimate control over the oil, while a foreign 
company or consortium of companies extracts it under contract. In practice, however, the 
actions of the state are severely constrained by stipulations in the contract. In a PSA, the 
foreign company provides the capital investment, first in exploration, then drilling and 
the construction of infrastructure. The first proportion of oil extracted is then allocated to 
the company, which uses oil sales to recoup its costs and capital investment – the oil used 
for this purpose is termed ‘cost oil’. There is usually a limit on what proportion of oil 
production in any year can count as cost oil (commonly 40-60%). Once costs have been 
recovered, the remaining ‘profit oil’ is divided between state and company in agreed 
proportions. The company is taxed on its profit oil. There may also be a royalty payable 
on all oil produced. Sometimes the state also participates as a commercial partner in the 
contract, operating in joint venture with foreign oil companies as part of the consortium – 
in this case, the state provides its percentage share of capital investment, and directly 
receives the same percentage share of cost oil and profit oil. (For example, in a 50-50 
joint venture, the state provides 50% of the investment and directly receives 50% of the 
cost oil and profit oil.) 
 
The foreign company’s share of the profit oil is then subdivided 
according to the production sharing terms. Figure 39 displays the main characteristics of 
the production sharing system.  
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Figure 39 – Production Sharing Scheme 
 
Source: Philip Daniel, “Fiscal Regimes for Minerals and Petroleum: Issues and Current Trends, Fiscal 
Affairs Department,” International Monetary Fund, International Consortium on Governmental Financial 
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